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Economic Development

The *Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations* is pleased to invite submissions for upcoming issues. Our Summer/Fall 2005 issue will address **Economic Development**. We welcome papers that deal with policy issues, academic viewpoints, as well as regional perspectives. We are currently inviting submissions on these topics as well as general submissions pertaining to international affairs. Please direct all articles or questions to *diplomacyjournal@shu.edu*.

Message from the Editor

In each of its six years of publication, the *Journal* has made tremendous progress in its contribution to the discussion of diplomacy and international relations. The current issue marks a revision of the format of the *Journal* itself, while maintaining the level of scholarship that our readers have come to expect. As the official, semi-annual publication of the John C. Whitehead School of Diplomacy, the *Journal* is pleased to announce its formal name change. The new title, "The Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations" allows the *Journal* to reflect its affiliation with the school, while paying respect to its namesake. The *Journal* has valued its association with Mr. Whitehead, a man whose career exemplifies the virtues that the *Journal* tries to embody. The *Journal* is honored to feature an article by Mr. Whitehead that discusses his viewpoints on "Foreign Policy after the Election." The affiliation of Mr. Whitehead with the school has been important to its students, and the *Journal* looks forward to continuing this association.

The editorial board of *The Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy* devotes itself to the subject of "Democratization in the 21st Century" as its main discussion topic in this issue. To begin this discussion, it is wise to reflect on democracy in the last century. In the latter half of the 20th century, democracy was involved in a great debate with communism, which occupied the other end of the theoretical and political spectrum. Democratic ideals had survived two world wars and was now entering a new battle, which as the last quarter of the century began, seemed unending. However, as the century came to a close, the fall of the Soviet Union, changes in Eastern Europe, and the rise of democracies around the world surfaced. It seemed that democracy had won the debate against communism.

Now democracy has entered a new "great" debate. This debate is not against an external force, but an internal one; not whether democracy is a better form of government, but *who* should promote democracy, *how* it should be decided, *where* it is needed, *when* it is necessary, as well as *whether* democracy should be considered and *what* form it should take. As Winston Churchill once said, "No one pretends that democracy is perfect or all-wise. Indeed, it has been said that democracy is the worst form of Government except all the others that have been tried." Now, as the world takes this imperfect form of government into the 21st century, answers to the questions of who, how, where, when, whether, and what are all the more pressing. Our contributors address these questions, and while we know that the answers cannot be found in one journal, we hope to contribute to the debate in a positive and open manner.

In addition to the forum on democratization, the *Journal* is pleased to feature discussions on the themes of state building and global democracy. The articles on these two topics bring a unique viewpoint and compliment our main discussion. Furthermore, the *Journal's* commitment to the area of global health continues with a

discussion on “Health Security and International Relations Theory.” The global health section is a result of the *Journal’s* work with the Whitehead School’s Center for Global Health Studies, which is under the direction of Dr. Yanzhong Huang.

In the final section, the *Journal* introduces a new feature. The “Book Review” section will critique current works and time-tested classics in the field of diplomacy and international relations. We are pleased to showcase four quality authors as we pioneer this new permanent feature.

In conclusion, there are several individuals who have made generous and important contributions to the growth and expansion of the *Journal*. First, the *Journal* would like to thank the Dean of our school, Ambassador Clay Constantinou (Ret.) and Associate Dean Marilyn DiGiacobbe for their direction and support. Members of the *Journal* are grateful to our faculty advisor, Professor Philip Moremen, for his valuable contributions to the advancement of the *Journal* over the past several years. Finally, the *Journal* would like to acknowledge Dr. Robert Manley for his wise counsel and S. Tsegaya Persons for his talent in redesigning the cover of the *Journal*.

Michael P. O’Bryan

ADDRESS TO SETON HALL UNIVERSITY

Foreign Policy after the Election

by John C. Whitehead

Thank you both very much. Those were splendid introductions. You did some research that I didn't know you would find out about, and that was good quality. You were very complimentary to the speaker, maybe overly so, which is a good habit to get into in a diplomatic world.

I am delighted that I can show you today that there really is a John C. Whitehead whose name is attached to your school, and to tell you how very proud I am that the dream of Seton Hall, to have a school that teaches young people about foreign policy and diplomacy, and capitalizes on your proximity to the United Nations, and specializes in multinational organizations, has really become a reality.

As I look around the hall, I am delighted to see how many of you come here from other countries, I suppose in part due to our closeness to the UN. The room looks a bit like the UN itself. I am sure you are finding that you are forming international friendships that will last all your lives.

Not all dreams become realities in this world of ours, but yours has. With 400 students, half undergraduates and half graduates, you already rank right up there with the other long-established foreign policy schools in the United States. And the others better watch out because you are going to pass them before long. I understand that the graduate school is already the most selective of any of the graduate programs at Seton Hall and is getting more so every year.

I am very proud to have my name attached to such a fine school, and I thank everyone who has been involved; Monsignor Robert Sheeran, whose support from the very start has been wonderful, and Dean Clay Constantinou, a brilliant, imaginative and highly successful leader, and to all of you in the administration and on the faculty, for your dedication and for the quality of your work.

Finally, to all of the students assembled here today, without you — and this is rather trite — but without you this place would not be much. And how you use your lives in the years ahead will be what determines the final evaluation of the school. And I feel very optimistic about that.

I am so very proud to have this splendid school named after me. Its existence represents two things in my life that are very important to me: One, is our need to strengthen all international organizations, including at the top of the list, the

John C. Whitehead served as deputy secretary of state from 1985 to 1989 and is currently the chairman of the Lower Manhattan Development Corporation.

United Nations, so that they may play a more important part in the world of the future. And the other is the importance of better education of young Americans in what goes on in the rest of the world, particularly on the issues of foreign policy.

Well, let me turn to the subject of my remarks today, foreign policy after the election. My dream has always been that some day the entire world will become one and live together with peace and freedom for all people. Many dreams are idle dreams, but I do not believe this one is an idle one. Already remarkable technical developments of the last hundred years have brought the world closer together. First the telegraph, then the telephone, then transcontinental air flights, then radio, the television, then fax machines and now the Internet have brought people everywhere closer together.

Information about what happens almost anywhere in the world is available almost instantly everywhere. No longer are people isolated in their own little communities. In rural China you see television antennae everywhere. In the most desolate parts of Afghanistan, people talk on their cell phones. In the poorest villages of Bangladesh, people huddle around the village radio and listen to the BBC. The word gets around as never before. Nothing can be kept secret for long. We are all closer together than we used to be. In the world of communications we have already become one world.

It is happening too in the world of economics, where the benefits of free trade are now evident to consumers everywhere, where each country can concentrate its output on what products and services it does best. This results in the best quality at the lowest price without being frozen out or restricted by artificial tariffs in other countries. Free trade is now with us. It is here to stay, and everyone, everywhere is benefiting.

The word gets around as never before. Nothing can be kept secret for long. We are all closer together than we used to be. In the world of communications we have already become one world.

It is only in the world of politics that national boundaries continue to exist, where tensions over national boundaries risk war. I am convinced that in the next hundred years the importance of national political boundaries will fade away as have the boundaries between people based on poor communications and restrictions on trade. It is already happening in the United States over the last 200 years, where what were once fifty independent states, and originally thirteen independent states, have now banded together to form what some still call the perfect union.

It is happening in Europe, where only a few months ago ten more countries joined the European Union. It is happening in Asia as ASEAN develops, as the two Koreas show signs of softening enmity, as India and Pakistan seek ways to resolve their problems in Kashmir, and as Mainland China and Taiwan find the right path to peaceful coexistence. It is happening too in Latin America and even in Africa.

People everywhere want desperately to live in peace with their neighbors and to improve their standards of living. As they see the benefits of cooperation with other countries, instead of tensions and violence, they press their governments to move in the direction of peace. They will not permit in the future their political leaders to stand in the way of achieving the kind of peace and prosperity that is now there for them to participate in.

If the world can become one in communications and one in economics, it should be able to do the same in government. While the creation of a single world living together in peace and prosperity may still be a somewhat distant dream, I believe it is coming more quickly than many may think. It is to speed that process that the United Nations was created and its existence has never been as essential as it is today. The United States must lead the way and take its rightful place as a strong and positive leader in the United Nations and all of its affiliated organizations. This Seton Hall school can play an important roll in training future leaders and is a most important ally in the cause of world peace and freedom.

Let me use my remaining time to make a few remarks about a more general question: What I think it means to be a superpower, a question that we face now, and that the administration faces as they think about what their policies will be in the next four years. What does it mean to be a superpower? And I hope the administration is thinking of things like this as they think about the next years.

I've always felt that one of our greatest achievements as a nation was the fifty years of the Cold War...Our overwhelming military power was always there in the background, and its existence surely affected the outcome, but it was never used. I consider those fifty years to be a triumph of diplomacy.

Yes, we are a superpower. Indeed, we are the only superpower; militarily, economically, scientifically, in every way. We are able to do almost anything we want to do, anywhere in the world, and we have every right to be proud of what our great country has achieved in the nearly 230 years of our existence. But power is a funny thing. If we flaunt it too much, we will begin to lose it. That has been the history of mankind throughout the ages, going back to the Roman Empire and more recently to Hitler's Germany and Stalin's Soviet Union. Powerful nations, which flaunt their power, do not last very long.

On the other hand, if we use our power infrequently, and only in a benevolent way, in the interest of other nations as well as our own, it can last for a very long time. Shouldn't we begin to think now, not only of what is good for the United States, but what is good for the world as a whole? Shouldn't we act more as a leader, a benevolent leader with less arrogance, less of an attitude that we have all of the right answers, a little more listening and not quite so much talking?

I've always felt that one of our greatest achievements as a nation was the fifty years of the Cold War and the fact that with patience and determination we kept it cold, for the alternative would have been a hot war, which would have been devastating for all of us. Our overwhelming military power was always there in the background, and its existence surely affected the outcome, but it was never used. I consider those fifty years to be a triumph of diplomacy. We tend sometimes to be prouder of the wars we have won with the use of our military power than of the wars we avoided through patient diplomacy.

The last several years have had their unhappy moments for those of us who believe that diplomacy, given time and patience, will almost always prevail. It is better to seek support elsewhere around the world for what we think should be done, rather than have to take unilateral action ourselves. Furthermore, it is better to support and try to lead the United Nations and other international organizations, and to have their support of our objectives rather than their opposition.

These are opportunities we have as the only superpower that we did not have when we were only one of several superpowers. As we have become relatively stronger and more dominant in every way we can afford to take the risk of working the diplomatic path a little harder and a little longer. I suggest that it is now time to reappraise the significance of our strong superpower status and use it more effectively to achieve a more peaceful and a more stable world. Thank you very much.

The State of Democratization at the Beginning of the 21st Century

by Larry Diamond

Thirty years ago, a global democratic revolution began with the Portuguese military revolution that overthrew several decades of dictatorship and launched a contentious but ultimately successful democratic transition in that country. This “third wave” of global democratization then spread to Spain and Greece, then to Latin America, and eventually to a number of countries in Asia, Africa, and, with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, Central and Eastern Europe as well. By the mid-1990s, the percentage of states in the world that were democracies had increased from 27 percent in 1974 to over 60 percent. Democracy had become the dominant form of government in the world.

Since the mid-1990s, the global democratic revolution has stalled in some respects while deepening in others. Several things have been striking about the global trends in democratic development over the past decade. The first has been the relative stability of democracy as a system of government in the world. This has been true in two senses. First, the overall number of democracies in the world has remained relatively stable since 1995. By the end of 2002, the number of democracies in the world (as rated by Freedom House) had increased slightly from 117 in 1995 to 121 in 2002, but it fell back to 117 at the end of 2003. In recent years, democratic breakthroughs have been counterbalanced by democratic setbacks or by changes in scoring, as several countries oscillate on the margins of electoral democracy and electoral authoritarian rule.

Stability has been evident in a second sense as well. Although many democracies continue to perform very poorly, there have been few outright breakdowns of democracy into renewed authoritarian rule. The most spectacular democratic reversal since 1995 has come in Pakistan, where the military overthrew a deeply corrupt and badly governing parliamentary system on October 12, 1999. As I noted in the *Journal of Democracy* the following year, this was only the fourth blatant reversal of democracy in a country with more than 20 million people since the third wave of democratization began in 1974.¹ The other three were the military coups in Nigeria in 1983, in Sudan in 1989, and in Thailand in 1991, and the latter was reversed

Dr. Larry Diamond is co-editor of the *Journal of Democracy* and Senior Fellow at Stanford University's Hoover Institution. From January to April 2004, he served as a Senior Adviser to the Coalition Provisional Authority in Baghdad.

within 17 months. All the other breakdowns of democracy either occurred in relatively small African states, or took the form (most notably in Peru) of a somewhat ambiguous executive seizure of power, a “self-coup,” that sought to preserve the constitutional facade of democracy. I wondered at the time whether the coup in Pakistan might signal the onset of a new “reverse wave” of democratic breakdowns, as the problems that brought the demise of democracy in Pakistan beset a number of other poorly functioning democracies in the world. Briefly, these problems— that I termed the “triple crisis of governance”—are: 1) the lack of accountability and a rule of law, as evidenced in pervasive corruption, smuggling, criminal violence, personalization of power, and human rights abuses; 2) the inability to manage regional and ethnic divisions peacefully and inclusively; and 3) economic crisis or stagnation, stemming in part from the failure to implement liberalizing economic reforms and the failure to raise the levels of integrity, capacity, and professionalism in the state bureaucracy. Clearly, these problems concern many important new democracies in the world. Yet, four years after the coup in Pakistan (with that country having achieved only a very partial return to democracy), no other democracy has been overthrown by the military.

The indispensable requirement for a country to be a democracy is that all its principal positions of political power be decided by regular, meaningful, free and fair elections.

Instead, what has been happening during the late period of the third wave has been the slow political descent into ambiguous or “hybrid” status of some regimes that continue to have multiparty, competitive elections and other constitutional trappings of democracy. This has been the second noteworthy development of recent years. Under Vladimir Putin, Russia has been the most prominent instance of a major country slowly, steadily deteriorating from a democracy to semi-democracy. But under the autocratic, demagogic hand of Hugo Chavez, a former army officer who tried and failed twice to seize power by force in the early 1990s, Venezuela has been headed in the same direction. The indispensable requirement for a country to be a democracy is that all its principal positions of political power be decided by regular, meaningful, free and fair elections. This means that it must be possible to turn the incumbents out of power if the majority (or plurality) of voters prefer a different party or coalition of rulers, and that whoever is elected must have real power to rule. It also requires the freedom of all parties and candidates to campaign and solicit votes, and thus some considerable freedom of speech, movement, assembly, and association in political life, if not entirely in civil society. To be fair, elections must also be impartially administered in a way that prevents or counteracts fraud in the voting and vote counting, assures the secrecy of the ballot, enables virtually all

adults to vote, and resolves disputes in a transparent manner.²

If we apply this minimum definition of (electoral) democracy in a rigorous way, then some of the countries that are today classified as democracies—such as Armenia, Ukraine, Venezuela, Paraguay, Nigeria and Mozambique—appear ambiguous, and may be better classified as “electoral authoritarian.”³ Ukraine’s Supreme Court overturned the victory in the November 21st presidential election of pro-Moscow Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovich, which was the product of massive and blatant electoral manipulation. Viktor Yushchenko, the opposition candidate and real winner of the Ukrainian election, should steer the country towards democracy. Had the results been sustained, however, Ukraine would clearly be classified as an electoral authoritarian regime. If we count all the ambiguous regimes as democracies, I estimate that at the end of 2002 there were some 44 electoral authoritarian regimes in the world. Roughly twenty of these are “competitive authoritarian” in the sense that there is significant opposition representation in parliament and some capacity to register opposition, resistance, and a check upon power peacefully in civil society, the mass media, the judiciary, and other institutions. Indeed, one of the most striking features of the world today is how few regimes in the world do not make even a feeble attempt (through the façade of electoral authoritarianism) to claim some democratic legitimacy. Today, only about one in every eight regimes in the world is politically closed in this way, forbidding any kind of multiparty electoral competition, and only a very few states are ruled by the military. This is certainly a triumph for the *idea* of democracy.

Indeed, one of the most striking features of the world today is how few regimes in the world do not make even a feeble attempt (through the façade of electoral authoritarianism) to claim some democratic legitimacy.

There is another respect, as well, in which the status of democracy appears somewhat more hopeful today than it did in the mid-1990s. Whether or not there are more democracies today than in 1995, there is more political and civil freedom in the world. There has been a steady improvement in the average freedom score for all countries in the world, from 4.47 at the start of the third wave in 1974 to 3.63 in 1995. Since 1995, the average score has continued to improve each year, to 3.38 at the end of 2002.

The number of states rated “free” by Freedom House has also increased from 76 in 1995 to 88 at the end of 2003, an improvement of six percentage points as a proportion of all states. A state is rated “free” if it receives an average score of 2.5 or better (meaning lower) on the twin scales of political rights and civil liberties, each of which ranges from 1 (most free) to 7 (least free). One could argue that states

at the lowest level of the “free” category (typically those which receive a 2 on political rights and a 3 on civil liberties) have such serious problems with the protection of human rights and the administration of justice that they cannot be considered “liberal.” Thus I now consider a score no worse than 2 on each scale as the minimum empirical indicator of liberal democracy. Even by this more rigorous standard, the number of liberal democracies in the world has been steadily increasing. But by this more demanding standard, the gap between electoral democracy and liberal democracy is more apparent. In 1974, four of every five democracies in the world were liberal; today less than two-thirds are.

This scarcity of democracy and freedom in the Middle East has led many to question whether Islam and democracy are compatible. Of the 47 Muslim-majority countries in the world, only nine are democracies (and only one, Mali, is a liberal democracy).

The trends in the distribution of freedom and democracy in the world have been quite uneven across the regions. All of the industrialized states of the “west” (Western Europe, the U.S., Canada, Australia, and New Zealand) are liberal democracies. Almost all of the states of Latin America and Central and Eastern Europe are democracies; half of the former and most of the latter are liberal democracies. By contrast, of the fifteen states of the former Soviet Union, only the three Baltic states are liberal democracies, and most of the others are now some form of authoritarian. Only about half of those 25 states in the East, Southeast and South are democracies, but of the twelve Pacific Island states, eleven are democracies and eight of those are liberal democracies. About two of every five African states are democracies now, but most of them are not liberal. Finally, of the nineteen states of the Middle East and North Africa, there are only two democracies, Israel and Turkey. This region also has by far the lowest average freedom score (5.5) of any region of the world, compared with 4.4 in Asia, 4.3 in Africa, 3.4 among the postcommunist states, and 2.5 in Latin America and the Caribbean.⁴

This scarcity of democracy and freedom in the Middle East has led many to question whether Islam and democracy are compatible. Of the 47 Muslim-majority countries in the world, only nine are democracies (and only one, Mali, is a liberal democracy). While only about a fifth of the Muslim-majority countries are democracies, three-quarters of the remaining countries in the world are democracies.⁵ But the Muslim-majority democracies include some very large countries, such as Indonesia, Turkey, and Bangladesh. The largest concentration of minority Muslims in the world (larger than almost all states) lives in a democracy, India. In that country, Muslims are strongly committed to and participatory in democratic institutions and procedures. In the Middle East, there are signs of democratic ferment and progress. In Turkey, a party with Islamist roots won a decisive victory in the

2002 elections and was permitted by the military to take power. In Iran, the authoritarian fusion of Islam and politics has suffered a broad loss of legitimacy, and there is now overwhelming public aspiration for a more open, tolerant, and democratic political system. In recent years, the Gulf monarchies of Bahrain, Kuwait, and Qatar have each taken tentative steps toward more constitutional rule, and democracy is struggling to be born in Iraq and the Palestinian Authority as well.

In the Arab world over the last two decades, political liberalization has proven to be no more than a tactic of political survival and one element in a type of regime that combines “guided pluralism, controlled elections, and selective repression.”⁶ Shifting from this form of electoral authoritarianism (and from the more extreme forms of political closure in countries like Saudi Arabia, Libya, and Syria) to a genuine electoral democracy, would seem to require a transformation in the political climate and culture of the region, and in its relations with Europe and the United States.

On the level of ideology or values, it is striking that democracy appears to remain the only legitimate form of government in the world. Even where there is resentment against the West or the United States, there is no broad preference for a non-democratic form of government. Indeed, much of the current criticism of American “hegemony” in the world, or of conditionality by the International Monetary Fund, stems precisely from the belief in many societies that their own elected governments do not enjoy sufficient sovereignty and that decisions at the international level should be made in a more consultative, democratic fashion. Although much has been made of the so-called “clash of civilizations,” especially since September 11, 2001, survey evidence indicates, “Muslims are as supportive of democracy as non-Muslims.” In four African countries with substantial Muslim populations (Mali, Nigeria, Tanzania, and Uganda) the Afrobarometer has found that large majorities of Muslims as well as non-Muslims support democracy, and any hesitancy in supporting democracy among African Muslims “is due more to deficits of formal education and other attributes of modernization than to religious attachments.”⁷ Data from Central Asia and the Middle East point in a similar direction.⁸ At the same time, many Muslim intellectuals are making the case either for a liberal interpretation of Islam or for a broader liberal view that de-emphasizes the literal meaning of sacred Islamic texts while stressing the larger compatibility between the overall moral teachings of Islam and democratic principles such as accountability, freedom of expression, and the rule of law.⁹

These trends provide cause for hope about the future of democracy in the world. There is no intrinsic reason why there must be another “reverse wave” of democratic breakdowns in the world. Whether that happens will heavily depend on whether the new democracies that have come into being during the third wave can respond to the “triple crisis of governance,” by controlling corruption, strengthening the rule of law and the capacity and professionalism of the state, improving economic management and entrepreneurship, and finding ways, through mechanisms of power-sharing and protection of minority rights, to manage ethnic and regional conflict.

The key to preventing a new “reverse wave” is thus to improve the quality of governance and the policy outputs of new democracies. If democracy “works” in this sense, to provide accountable government, a decent society, and gradually, a better life for most people, it will deepen and consolidate where it now exists, and it will continue to spread. It is not inconceivable that some decades hence, virtually all the countries in the world will be democratic.

Table. Trends in Democracy and Liberal Democracy, 1974–2003

Year	Number of Democracies	Number of Liberal Democracies FH Score 1–2	Liberal Democracies As a Percentage of all Democracies	Number of “Free” States FH Score 1–2.5
1974	39	32	82.1	39
1987	66	48	72.7	57
1990	76	53	69.7	65
1991	91	54	59.3	76
1992	99	57	57.6	75
1993	108	62	57.4	72
1994	114	62	54.3	76
1995	117	67	57.2	76
1996	118	68	57.6	79
1997	117	69	59.0	81
1998	117	69	59.0	88
1999	120	71	59.2	85
2000	120	74	61.7	86
2001	121	75	62.0	86
2002	121	73	60.3	89
2003	117	76	65.0	88

Sources: Data from Freedom House, *Freedom in the World: The Annual Survey of Political Rights and Civil Liberties, 1990–1991 through 2004* (New York: Freedom House, 1991 and following years); and Adrian Karatnycky, “The 30th Anniversary Freedom House Survey,” *Journal of Democracy* 14 (January 2003): 106–107 (Table 2).

Notes

¹ Larry Diamond, “Is Pakistan the (Reverse) Wave of the Future?” *Journal of Democracy* 11 (July 2000): 91–106.

² Larry Diamond, “Elections Without Democracy: Thinking About Hybrid Regimes,” *Journal of Democracy* 13 (April 2002): 21–35.

³ Andreas Schedler, “Elections Without Democracy: The Menu of Manipulation,” and Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, “Elections Without Democracy: The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism,” *Journal of Democracy* 13 (April 2002): 36–50 and 51–65.

⁴ These regional averages are for freedom scores at the end of 2002.

⁵ <http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2002/charts.pdf>.

⁶ Daniel Brumberg, “Democratization in the Arab World? The Trap of Liberalized Autocracy,” *Journal of Democracy* 13 (October 2002): 56.

⁷ “Islam, Democracy, and Public Opinion in Africa,” Afrobarometer Briefing Paper No. 3, September 2002, <http://www.afrobarometer.org/papers/AfrobriefNo3.pdf>.

⁸ Richard Rose, “How Muslims View Democracy: Evidence from Central Asia,” *Journal of Democracy* 13 (October 2002): 102–111; Mark Tessler, “Islam and Democracy in the Middle East: The Impact of Religious Orientations on Attitudes toward Democracy in Four Arab Countries,” *Comparative Politics* 34 (April 2002).

⁹ See the essays on Islam and democracy in Larry Diamond, Marc F. Plattner, and Daniel Brumberg, eds., *Islam and Democracy in the Middle East* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003).

Democracy as Policy Goal and Universal Value

by Carl Gershman

One of the most significant but least appreciated changes in American foreign policy during the past two decades is the emergence of democracy promotion as a central, bipartisan dimension of United States engagement with the world. The support for democracy promotion took root with President Reagan's memorable Westminster Address in 1982 that spurred the establishment of the National Endowment for Democracy (NED). The effort expanded geometrically following the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, when Congress and the administration of George H.W. Bush committed hundreds of millions of dollars, mostly through the Agency for International Development (AID), to support the consolidation of democracy in the post-communist countries, and still more resources to aid the transitions that were beginning to unfold in previously authoritarian countries in Latin America, Africa, and Asia. The effort continued to expand during the Clinton administration with the creation of new offices in AID to back transitions and to support free elections, independent media, the rule of law, and civil-society NGOs, and also with the initiation of the Community of Democracies, a new multilateral structure designed to strengthen cooperation among established and emerging democracies. The administration of George W. Bush has magnified still further the United States' support for democracy, pledging most recently in the State of the Union Address that America will stand with the allies of freedom to support democratic movements in the Middle East and beyond, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world.

It would be misleading to suggest that the consensus that now exists on the importance of advancing democracy overrides all other priorities in foreign affairs. In fighting terrorism and pursuing other strategic interests, the United States will inevitably maintain cooperative relationships with some governments, such as those in Pakistan or Russia, that are a good deal less than democratic. Moreover, as the debate over Iraq has made clear, the consensus on democracy promotion does not preclude sharp partisan disagreements on particular issues of foreign policy. It is important to emphasize, though, that the Iraq debate was not about democracy promotion, but focused instead on the decision to use military force to end Saddam Hussein's regime, largely because it was suspected of having weapons of mass destruction that could threaten the United States. On the issue of helping Iraqis establish a democratic system following Saddam's removal from power, however,

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the consensus has held firm. In fact, the National Democratic Institute (NDI), the democracy-promotion organization associated with the Democratic Party, was one of the first groups to establish a presence in Iraq after the war and is today, with its Republican counterpart, fully engaged in aiding Iraqi NGOs and preparing Iraqi parties for the upcoming elections. Senator John Kerry himself, whatever his misgivings about the Iraq war, affirmed his belief in "America's longstanding bipartisan commitment to supporting the spread of democracy, with the understanding that America will be safer in a world of democracies."¹

The consensus is based fundamentally on three propositions: first, that the spread of democracy, as Senator Kerry said and as President Bush has emphasized time and again, serves the American national interest since it will lead to a more secure and peaceful world; second, that the spread of democracy serves the American national purpose in that it advances the ideals of freedom and human dignity which are the country's core values; and third, that it is appropriate and desirable for the United States to provide moral, political, technical, and financial support to people who are striving to achieve democracy, all the while recognizing that democracy, as a system of self-government, must ultimately be built in each country undergoing democratization by the people themselves.

Underpinning the consensus on democracy promotion is the idea that democracy is an universal value, and that people throughout the world, in developing and developed countries alike, admire democracy and want it for their own reasons, and not because the United States wants them to be democratic for *its* reasons. This is by no means a self-evident proposition, and there are critics who believe that even the most peaceful and cooperative means of promoting democracy, such as providing financial and technical assistance to indigenous groups that request such help, is a form of arrogant imperialism. Dmitri Simes, for example, has accused Democrats and Republicans alike of being "messianic" and "condescending" in claiming "the right to impose democracy on other nations and cultures, regardless of their circumstances and preferences."²

In fact, it is the view expressed by Simes that is condescending, since it assumes that people living outside the established democracies of the West either do not want democracy or lack the capacity to achieve it. It is also utterly divorced from historical experience and contemporary political reality since it ignores what Amartya Sen has called the single most important thing that happened in the last century, which is the rise of democracy.³ In just the last thirty years, according to the annual Freedom House Survey of Freedom in the World, the total number of countries rated "free" has doubled, from forty-four to eighty-eight. In addition to these eighty-eight liberal democracies, there are now an additional twenty-nine electoral democracies, meaning countries where there are some restrictions on basic political and civil rights, but where elections are reasonably free and fair. This brings the total of number of democracies to 117, representing more than 60 percent of the world's countries. Democracy has now spread to every major region of the world, with the sole exception of the Arab Middle East where gains have still been minimal. It is more prevalent in

affluent than in non-affluent countries, but it has nonetheless established a significant presence in the developing world, with 38 of the 128 countries with incomes below \$3,500 rated "free" in the Freedom House survey.⁴

While the third wave of democratic expansion ended roughly a decade ago, it has not been followed by the anticipated reverse wave of democratic retreat.

By no stretch of the imagination can it be said that the United States imposed this vast change upon the world over the last three decades. When the "third wave" of democratic expansion began in the mid-1970s with the transitions in Spain and Portugal, the United States was reducing its involvement abroad in reaction to its defeat in Vietnam. The United States policy of promoting human rights and democracy was initiated shortly thereafter during the Carter and Reagan Administrations, and it certainly encouraged the democratization process as it gathered momentum. But in no way did it bring this process about or control it. In fact, in his analysis of the causes of the third wave, Samuel P. Huntington treats the United States policy of democracy promotion that was started in the 1980s, along with the role of other external actors such as the European Community and the Soviet Union under Gorbachev, as but one of five major factors that brought about the historic democratic transformation. The other factors were the legitimacy crisis that undermined many poorly performing authoritarian systems; the unprecedented economic growth of the preceding decades that raised education standards and expanded the urban middle class; the dramatic changes within the Catholic Church that prepared it to play a crucial role in the transitions in many countries with a Catholic majority, such as Chile and Poland; and the revolution in communications that made it possible for information about political changes in one country to spread rapidly around the world, creating a "snowball" effect. Thus, while the United States' role was not insignificant, it was certainly not paramount or imperious.⁵

While the third wave of democratic expansion ended roughly a decade ago, it has not been followed by the anticipated reverse wave of democratic retreat. Since then, there have been numerous developments that could have set in motion a major reversal of the earlier gains: violent ethnic conflicts in the Balkans and in many African countries; sharp economic downturns in Asia and Latin America; rampant corruption, stalled transitions, and democratic back-sliding in many post-authoritarian countries; and, most recently, the war on terrorism that has fostered a less liberal international environment and given some governments new license to attack dissidents and minorities in the name of security. One certainly might have expected a broad setback for democracy as a result of these developments, but this has not occurred. On the contrary, democracy has continued to make modest advances, such as the recent elections in Indonesia, Afghanistan, Ukraine, and Iraq; overall, the gains have outpaced the setbacks. The current Freedom House Survey, for example, reports

that in the three years since 9/11, fifty-one countries have made democratic gains as against twenty-seven countries where there have been setbacks.⁶

The most compelling explanation for this remarkable (and mostly unremarked) absence of a democratic reversal is the enormous support that democracy now enjoys in non-Western countries and cultures. The existence of such support has been confirmed by a recent study of world opinion using data gathered by the World Values Survey. The study concluded that "democracy has an overwhelming positive image throughout the world" and has become, over the last decade, "virtually the only political model with global appeal, no matter what the culture."⁷ While attitudes in Muslim societies are less liberal than they are in the West on gender equality, gay rights, and other social issues, there is no difference at all when it comes to support for democratic institutions. Close to 90 percent of the respondents in Muslim societies favor democracy, the same figure as in the West.⁸

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In developing societies, support for democracy is actually greater among the poor and less educated than among the affluent. On the occasion of India's 50th anniversary in 1997, the New Delhi-based Centre for the Study of Developing Societies (CSDS) conducted a national survey assessing popular attitudes toward Indian democracy. The results constituted a stunning rejection of the common belief that the Indian people, the poor above all, had lost faith in the country's democratic system. On the contrary, wrote Ashish Nandy, the director of the CSDS, "The democratic system enjoys greater legitimacy today than in the past. The poor and deprived defend democracy more vigorously than the elite."⁹ Democracy's appeal, he explained, owed a great deal to the Indians' belief that its inclusiveness offered the best way to deal with the country's staggering ethnic, religious, linguistic, and regional diversities. The poor especially value democracy, he said, because they are convinced that "their votes matter," and they seem to relish exercising their franchise in defiance of their professional well-wishers among the more affluent classes who have their own ideas about what the poor need.¹⁰

The idea that ordinary people in developing countries benefit from democracy and, therefore, desire it and are willing to sacrifice to achieve it is not yet sufficiently understood in the United States and other established democracies. There is still the view, left over from the period of the Cold War when communism claimed to speak for the least advantaged, that democracy is a luxury for the poor, who need bread before freedom. To be sure, the poor need bread, but relinquishing their rights is not the way to get it. While the rich may sometimes take democracy for granted, the poor are keenly aware that it is essential for their protection and overall well-being.

There are eight fundamental ways that democracy benefits the people of developing countries:

1) *Democracy is the means by which the citizenry can hold governments accountable for their policies and prevent an abuse of power.* The political scientist Larry Diamond has written that “predatory, corrupt, wasteful, abusive, tyrannical, incompetent governance is the bane of development.”¹¹ There is simply no way to control or eliminate corruption if people don’t have access to the fundamental institutions of democracy: a free media that can expose corruption, an independent judiciary that can punish its perpetrators, and a system of free and fair elections that can hold political leaders accountable and remove them from office when they violate the people’s trust. This doesn’t mean that democracy will automatically reduce corruption or produce good governance. Responsible governance requires political will, effective institutions, professional officials, and an informed, alert, and aroused citizenry. But without democracy none of these things are possible, and the absence of political and legal restraints leads inevitably to inefficient, overbearing, unresponsive, and corrupt governmental behavior.

2) *Democracy promotes economic development.* In the past, conventional wisdom has held that development and prosperity encourage democracy, as better off citizens become more educated and have the ability to participate in politics and government. More recent analysis shows that the causal effect also works the other way around—democracy fosters development. This is a principal conclusion of the *Human Development Report 2002*, published by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), which notes that “democratic governance can trigger a virtuous cycle of development—as political freedom empowers people to press for policies that expand social and economic opportunities, and as open debates help communities shape their priorities.”¹²

In fact, research has shown that democracy not only helps people influence government policy, but aids development in even more fundamental ways by fostering productive economic activity. A study by Richard Roll and John R. Talbott concludes that more than 80 percent of the cross-country variation in per capita income growth among developing countries (using data compiled for 1995–1999) can be explained by factors that are aspects of democracy, among them the presence of strong property rights, political rights, civil liberties, and press freedoms. They also found that dramatic increases in per capita income in developing countries have tended to follow democratic events (such as the removal of a dictator), and that anti-democratic events tended to be followed by a reduction in economic growth. The variables that contribute to economic growth share two characteristics. The first is that they represent institutions and policies that establish a rule of law enforced with fairness and justice. This encourages economic participants to work, take risks, save, and engage in other forms of productive economic activity. The second characteristic is that the variables constitute forms of collective action at the level of government—the enforcement of contracts, the protection of political and property rights, and the collection of taxes that can be used for public services. Such actions constitute important

components of democratic governance, which explains why developing societies have so much to gain by establishing democratic systems.¹³

The reason is that democracy, by empowering people at the grass roots, gives governments the *political* incentive to guard against famines and to take preventive measures to relieve human suffering if there is a danger of mass hunger.

The economic advantages of democracy also refute the view, still held by some development specialists, that authoritarian regimes in poor countries are more likely than democracies to make the tough economic decisions that are necessary to promote development and reduce poverty. Responding to this view, Amartya Sen, who was awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics, has observed that “there is...no convincing general evidence that authoritarian governance and the suppression of political and civil rights are really beneficial to economic development.”¹⁴ In fact, there is growing evidence to support the view that democracies actually outperform autocracies from an economic standpoint. This is the conclusion of a study based on World Bank data comparing the performance over forty years of democratic and non-democratic countries with per capita GDP under \$2,000 in constant 1995 dollars. Their growth rates were equal, even when including the performance of high-growth East Asian autocracies (some of which, such as South Korea, Taiwan, and Indonesia, have recently become democratic). Outside of East Asia, the poor democracies achieved 50 percent higher growth rates. The democracies also consistently outperformed the autocracies by wide margins on indicators measuring social well-being, such as life expectancy, infant mortality rates, and education.¹⁵

3) *Democracy promotes human rights and protects people from the cruelties of autocratic regimes.* Democracy is a law-based system that restrains the power of the state to deny citizens their basic rights or to control their lawful actions. As such, it is the political system that best protects the fundamental freedoms of expression, conscience, and assembly that are often called human rights. It does this by subordinating the executive authority to legislative power; by making the legislature accountable to a judiciary that is independent of political authority with the power to determine the constitutionality of the laws; and by decentralizing power to ensure the autonomy of local government from the arbitrary control by the central government. Democracy also protects citizens by preserving an open society with an independent media that prevents abuses from being hidden. It also allows independent civic organizations to monitor the government and defend the rights of individual citizens and minority groups. For these reasons, the most severe human rights abuses always occur in the most closed, undemocratic systems in which citizens are denied the protection of law or the ability to organize to defend their rights.

4) *Democracy also protects people from the effects of economic and social disasters.* Amartya Sen has shown that that “in the terrible history of famines in the world, no substantial famine has ever occurred in any independent and democratic country with a relatively free press.”¹⁶ The reason is that democracy, by empowering people at the grass roots level, gives governments the *political* incentive to guard against famines and to take preventive measures to relieve human suffering if there is a danger of mass hunger. Precisely because famine or other kinds of disasters endanger all citizens, not taking protective measures would be fatal to any government in a situation where the people are in a position to register their views. The protective power of democracy, Sen points out, might not be missed when things are going smoothly, but it becomes critically important to the most vulnerable parts of the population when a calamity looms that may be caused by changed economic circumstances or accumulated policy mistakes.¹⁷ In addition to deterring criminal negligence by government, democracy also prevents the deliberate use by government of apparently natural disasters to eliminate entire sectors of the population that are considered to be politically disloyal, a criminal practice sometimes used by totalitarian regimes. This is exactly what happened in the Ukraine during the “forced famine” of 1932–1933, which took the lives of millions of peasants, as well as in North Korea in the late 1990s when two million people died of famine as the regime blocked relief efforts and diverted humanitarian aid to the military. In South Korea, immediately across the border, Koreans lived in relative affluence, the beneficiaries of a growing economy and democratic political systems.

5) *Democracy encourages governments to be alert to the needs of their citizens and to promote, therefore, the health, education, and overall well-being of the population.* One widely used measure of the citizens’ social and economic well-being is the infant mortality rate (IMR). Patricio Navia and Thomas D. Zweifel have conducted two studies of the impact of the type of regime—democracy or dictatorship—on the IMR, the first based on annual observations of 138 countries between 1950 and 1990,¹⁸ and the second based on data gathered since 1990.¹⁹ In each case, democracies have consistently outperformed dictatorships. For example, after isolating the impact of regime type from other factors, the second study found that there were 10 fewer infant deaths per 1,000 live births in democracies than in dictatorships (42.8 versus 52.6) during the 1950–1990 period. The gap was smaller during the 1990–1997 period (45.9 versus 50.5), but still significant, leading Navia and Zweifel to conclude that “at an equal level of development, on average five out of every one thousand newborns will die *only* and needlessly because the land of their birth is not democratically governed.”²⁰ The gap also persisted at every level of development, with 7 more newborns of every 1,000 dying in their first year in dictatorships than in democracies with annual GDP per capita of more than \$6,000, and with the figure rising to 17 in countries with GDP per capita under \$2,000.

Even benevolent dictatorships, they found, are always outperformed by democracies, for the simple reason that democratic governments are naturally more

responsive to the needs of the people and are thus prepared to invest in social services to improve the citizens' quality of life. Overall, social security and welfare expenditures are five times higher in democracies than in dictatorships—10.4 percent of GDP as against 2.1 percent. “Not only do dictators ban political parties and forbid free speech,” write Navia and Zweifel, “they also fail their people in much more concrete ways,” ensuring that fewer infants reach adolescence and fostering a lower quality of life.²¹

6) *Democracy enriches the life of people by promoting peace, both between states and within them.* The idea that democracy is a pacifying force owes a great deal to the work of R.J. Rummel, whose multi-volume work, *Understanding Conflict and War*, concluded that free societies do not go to war with each other.²² Immanuel Kant had reached the same conclusion nearly two centuries earlier in his essay “Perpetual Peace,” where he noted that if “the consent of the citizenry is required in order to determine whether or not there will be war, it is natural that they consider all its calamities before committing themselves to so risky a game.”²³ Greater sensitivity to the cost of war is just one of the reasons that democracy fosters peace. James Lee Ray has also emphasized democracy's capacity to moderate the day-to-day relations among states, thereby preventing crises from developing to the point where they have to be peacefully resolved to prevent the outbreak of violent conflict.²⁴ We have also seen from the Indian case that democracy is an inclusive system that offers a way of accommodating ethnic and religious differences that are a principal source of conflict in the contemporary world.

7) *Democracy helps people in developing societies learn from one another through public discussion, thereby facilitating the definition of needs, priorities, and duties.* Amartya Sen calls this the *constructive* role of democracy since it involves the formation of values and the generation of “informed and considered choices.”²⁵ Through public discussion, he notes, the people of the Indian states of Kerala and Tamil Nadu have come to understand and internalize the harmful effects of high fertility rates on the community and on the lives of young women. The result is that Kerala now has a fertility rate similar to that of Britain and France and lower than China's, a result achieved without coercion.²⁶ Having people take ownership of an approach to solving a social problem through the formation of new values is ultimately far more effective than having a solution imposed or mandated by the government or by international assistance agencies. But such constructive action can't happen without democracy.

8) *Democracy enriches the lives of citizens by recognizing their dignity as human beings.* Sen calls this the *intrinsic* value of democracy. People value political participation in the life of the community *for its own sake*, not because it advances a practical purpose. To be denied such participation, he writes, is “a major deprivation” since “exercising political rights is a crucial part of good lives of individuals as social beings.”²⁷ As we have seen, freedom serves many purposes since it makes it possible for people to defend their interests, expand their potential, and create new opportunities for themselves, their families, and their communities. This is what is meant by “the pursuit of happiness.” But human freedom does not require an instrumental justification. It is important in itself.

Given the powerful link between democracy and the capacity to address so many needs that ordinary people have, including the need to pursue lives with dignity and self-fulfillment, it should not be surprising that nongovernmental civic and political organizations committed to the advancement of democracy have sprung up throughout the less developed and non-democratic regions of the world. The presence of such organizations constitutes a quiet revolution that has taken place over the last two decades, especially since the cresting of the third wave in the late 1980s when opportunities for democratic activism expanded dramatically around the world. Such organizations are enormously diverse both functionally and geographically, reflecting the complex challenges of democratization in post-authoritarian countries, as well as the need to open and liberalize the remaining autocracies. Their purpose and programs are invariably a response to the circumstances and challenges in each particular country, giving these organizations an identity that is distinctly local and that is formed out of grassroots movements to achieve particular democratic objectives.

Thus, in countries wracked by civil conflict, such as the Congo or Liberia, there are local NGOs that use radio, theater, and schools to promote tolerance and ethnic reconciliation and that advance human rights through monitoring, education, advocacy, and the provision of legal aid. In countries trying to make the transition to democracy, there are groups that fight corruption, promote the rule of law, encourage citizen awareness and grassroots political participation, strengthen local government and independent media, and seek the empowerment of women politically and economically. There are political parties that offer democratic alternatives in elections. There are also research centers that advocate democratic ideas and policies, trade unions that protect the rights of workers, business associations that advance transparency and market reforms, citizen groups that monitor elections, and civic education organizations that promote democratic values both in and out of schools. Not least, there are exile-based groups that expose human rights abuses in closed societies and that provide a lifeline of independent information to people living under dictatorship.

During the same period that such organizations have proliferated throughout the democratizing and non-democratic regions of the world, there has also developed among the established democracies a growing number of democracy-support institutions and programs. The German political party foundations were the first institutions of this kind, having been established in the aftermath of the Second World War. The role played by the largest of these nongovernmental, publicly-funded foundations—the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung of the Social Democratic Party and the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung of the Christian Democratic Party—in the successful transitions in Spain and Portugal in the 1970s caught the attention of officials in the United States and was an important factor leading to the creation of the NED in 1983. The NED and its four institutes representing the United States' two major political parties, the trade unions, and the business community provide training as well as grant support to independent democratic parties and organizations throughout the world. Their work has expanded significantly over the last two decades and has added an important new dimension to the way the United States engages with the world.

With the fall of communism in Central Europe and the Soviet Union and of the many authoritarian governments in Latin America, Asia, and Africa, the need for programs to aid democratic transitions has increased dramatically. The United Kingdom, Canada, France, Spain, the Netherlands, and other established democracies have created political foundations of their own, as have some of the new democracies in Central Europe. The first democracy foundation in Asia was created in Taiwan in 2003. Privately funded institutions such as the Soros and Ford Foundations have also expanded their work.

In addition, governments and multilateral bodies have become increasingly involved in providing democracy assistance. Development agencies in the United States, Britain, Canada, and other established democracies have devoted substantial funding for the administration of elections, strengthening parliaments and local government, and aiding independent media and civil society organizations. The European Union now provides significant democracy assistance through member countries, and the United Nations itself has expanded its democracy-support programs, managing elections in war-torn countries such as Cambodia, El Salvador, and East Timor, and providing assistance in institution building through the UNDP. Regional bodies such as the Organization of American States and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe have created democracy units to aid elections and assist new democracies; and they have also approved charters that set democratic norms that member countries are required to observe and establish procedures for defending democracy when it is threatened in particular countries.

Accompanying the growth of international democracy programs has been the creation of global networks at both the governmental and nongovernmental levels that promote greater democratic cooperation, contact, and solidarity. The nongovernmental World Movement for Democracy was founded in New Delhi in 1999 and brings together networks activists from over 100 countries "to foster collaboration among democratic forces around the world," according to the Movement's Founding Statement.²⁸ The networks include regional groups such as the Africa Democracy Forum and functional networks of parliamentarians, youth, women, intellectuals, and local government activists. At the governmental level, the Community of Democracies, established in Warsaw in 2000, brings together over 100 countries "to strengthen institutions and processes of democracy," as stated in the Warsaw Declaration, and to work together on such initiatives as establishing a democracy caucus within the United Nations.²⁹

The terrorist attacks of 9/11 have had the effect of increasing the importance that the United States' and its European allies' efforts attach to the promotion of democracy in the Middle East and throughout the Muslim world. The United States launched the Middle East Partnership Initiative in 2002 to advance political, economic, and educational reform and the empowerment of women in the Middle East. It also took advantage of its chairmanship of the G-8 to establish the Democracy Assistance Dialogue, a forum where NGOs from the broader Middle East will be able to discuss democracy issues with representatives of governments in the hope

that the results of these discussions, and the monitoring of democratic progress in individual countries, will increase pressures for reform in the region. Even before 9/11, the Europeans had created the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) or Barcelona Process to foster political and economic reform in North Africa and the Levant, and a democracy assistance budget for the region was established by the European Union. In 2003, the European Union also established democracy and human rights guidelines as a basis for discussing national reform plans with each of the EMP states.

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The scope and continued expansion of democracy programs supported by the United States and the European Union represent a new international reality that reflects the changed conditions of the modern world, in particular economic globalization and the revolution in communications technology. These forces have produced a more integrated and competitive international environment that has awakened previously dormant peoples to the possibilities of political and social change. The growing demands for change have put tremendous pressures on fragile, traditional systems that find it difficult to adapt to the conditions of modernity and face the threat of marginalization from the new order. The established democracies have come to the realization that they have a profound stake in the modernization of non-Western developing countries, authoritarian and post-authoritarian systems alike, since the failure to adapt could produce conditions that give rise to violent conflict and international disorder.

But in trying to press for gradual change in the non-democratic or democratizing countries of the world, the democracies are increasingly coming up against stiff resistance from old-guard and autocratic elites that feel threatened by the rise of new social forces and the constraints that democracy would impose on their power, and from anti-democratic political or religious movements that reject pluralism and liberal values. In addition, in some countries, the democracies face not so much organized resistance by anti-democratic forces as sheer chaos, in which the state has completely broken down and marauding gangs threaten each other and the general population.

At the present time, there are essentially four kinds of anti-democratic resistance in the international system, each of which poses a distinct challenge to the democratic world and to the efforts currently underway to strengthen democratic values and institutions. The first is the movement of Islamic radicalism that is centered in the Middle East, but whose influence extends throughout the Muslim world, including

among the Muslim minorities now living in the established democracies. The war on terrorism that began with the horrific events of 9/11 is mistakenly perceived by some people as a “clash of civilizations” or a war between Islam and the West. In fact, the 9/11 attacks sharpened a clash that was already underway *within* Islam between modernizing forces seeking political reform and integration into the world economy and extremist elements intent on shutting out the modern world and imposing an intolerant theocratic system on Muslim societies. The United States and other Western countries cannot determine the outcome of this clash, which is essentially an internal conflict, but they have an obvious stake in its outcome and can assist the democrats and modernizers in various practical ways.

It is of vital importance that governments in the Middle East also take the initiative to move forward and not try to block change or just make a few grudging concessions under pressure from within and without.

In the first place, by speaking out on the issue of democracy in the Middle East and devoting resources to reform, Western leaders have put the issue on the international agenda for the first time, ending what President George W. Bush has called “sixty years of Western nations excusing and accommodating the lack of freedom in the Middle East.”³⁰ While the president’s message was initially criticized as an attempt to impose democracy from the outside, it soon got picked up by Arab intellectuals meeting in Sana’a, Alexandria, Doha, Beirut, and other cities who issued declarations citing the urgent need for fundamental democratic change. A broad agenda for economic, social, and political reform started taking shape, building on the UNDP’s Arab Human Development Reports, which were drafted by Arab intellectuals. The agenda calls for addressing three fundamental deficits: the absence of basic human freedoms as the cornerstone of good governance; the failure adequately to acquire, diffuse, and utilize the knowledge needed for integration into the modern world; and the subordination and marginalization of women in society.

The implementation of this extraordinarily ambitious agenda will require the collective effort of many different actors, both governmental and nongovernmental. Nongovernmental activists and practitioners will have to take the lead in fashioning the agenda, in mobilizing pressure from below to defend rights and promote reform, and in developing grassroots education and training programs to foster a new consciousness of engaged citizenship. In doing so, they will need financial, technical, and moral support from the United States and other democratic countries, delivered primarily through nongovernmental counterpart institutions, such as the NED and the democracy foundations in Western and Central Europe.

It is of vital importance that governments in the Middle East also take the initiative to move forward and not try to block change or just make a few grudging concessions under pressure from within and without. They are more likely to take

bold steps forward if the United States and its European allies are united in pressing for a reform agenda and in developing the policies and programs that will create political and economic incentives for governments to reform. In addition, Western governments will have to be decisive in defending the human rights of democracy activists in the Middle East, many of whom are now in prison or are threatened with retribution if they advocate basic freedoms.

Not least, it will be necessary for the United States and its allies, along with governments in the Middle East, to foster a political context that will encourage democratic progress. Such progress was achieved in Iraq in the elections held on January 30, 2005, when millions of citizens voted in defiance of massive terrorist threats, thereby taking an historic step toward ending the violence in the country through political inclusion and the creation of a truly democratic and legitimate government. Similarly, the elections held in the West Bank and Gaza on January 9, 2005 set the stage for progress toward an interim agreement between Israel and the Palestinians, which could lead, in time, to a revival of the road map and the creation of a Palestinian state at peace with Israel. While such progress cannot be made a precondition for efforts to promote Middle East democracy, it would remove a principal barrier to progress and give new momentum to the growing movement for reform in the region. Finally, continued movement toward Turkey's eventual accession to the European Union would add to regional stability and create new incentives for Middle East countries to deepen their relationship with the democratic world.

As we have seen, many important initiatives are already underway to promote a new democratic agenda for the Middle East. The Forum for the Future, which met in Rabat in December 2004, includes the participation of both Arab governments and representatives from Arab civil societies and private sectors and offers a framework, like the Helsinki Accords during the era of the Cold War, for stimulating and monitoring reform. There are also many initiatives underway at the nongovernmental level, such as the Transatlantic Democracy Network, that seek to create new forms of transatlantic cooperation in addressing the challenge of advancing democracy in the Middle East. No single program or initiative will be decisive, but cumulatively, these efforts have the chance of helping the countries of the Middle East turn the corner toward democracy and modernity.

The second form of resistance to democracy derives from the widespread prevalence today of semi-authoritarian or "hybrid regimes" where the existence of some formal democratic processes, such as elections, "masks (often, in part, to legitimate) the reality of authoritarian domination."³¹ The number of such regimes has actually grown as a consequence of the third wave of democratization, as democratic transitions have stalled and many countries have entered a "political gray zone" of illiberal democracy that is sometimes called "electoral authoritarianism" or "pseudodemocracy."³² Larry Diamond estimates that there were only about half a dozen such regimes in 1974, whereas today "at least 45 and perhaps as many as 60 are electoral authoritarian—roughly between a quarter and a third of all states."³³ He notes that "in proportional terms, authoritarian forms of multiparty electoral

competition have increased during the third wave much more rapidly than democratic ones.”³⁴

Fraudulent elections, involving electoral manipulation and various kinds of formal and informal disenfranchisement of voters potentially opposed to the government, are but one aspect of the “democracy deficit” in semi-authoritarian countries. Other features of such regimes are also the centralization of power in the hands of the executive authority, a weak parliament, a judiciary that lacks independence, a high level of corruption, significant government control of the media, serious human rights violations, and the weak rule of law. Nonetheless, despite these deficits, opposition political parties and civil society NGOs have sometimes been able to mount a successful challenge to the ruling party in countries where the government has not been able to close off political space, where the international community remains engaged, and where the regime has lost legitimacy among large segments of the population. Such breakthroughs occurred in Slovakia and Indonesia in 1998, Nigeria in 1999, Croatia and Yugoslavia in 2000, Mexico in 2001, and Georgia in 2002. In addition, the historic breakthrough in Ukraine, where hundreds of thousands of people took to the streets in a struggle that culminated on December 26, 2004 with the election of a Europe-oriented democratic government was the most important democratic gain in the post-communist world since the collapse of the Soviet Union more than a decade ago.

Thomas Carothers has urged that in semi-authoritarian systems, democracy promoters should seek “to encourage the growth of alternative centers of power.”³⁵ Indeed, they should. But the autocrats who rule in these countries are determined to hold on to power, and they are becoming increasingly sophisticated in developing strategies to weaken and divide internal opposition forces and to frustrate international efforts to assist them. These strategies include bringing under the control of the central government the electoral machinery as well as all levels of governing authority, including municipal and provincial governments, the parliament, and the courts; tightly regulating the press, especially television and radio; dividing and marginalizing the political opposition; and bringing civil society to heel by harassing independent NGOs and restricting their international funding.

The problem of semi-authoritarianism is magnified today by the growing assertiveness of influential backsliding regimes that are determined not just to eliminate internal political opposition but to mobilize in their respective regions resistance to the spread of democracy. Russia is playing this role in the countries that once formed part of the Soviet Union (the so-called “near abroad”), some of which want closer political and economic ties to Europe and the United States. Nostalgic for the old Soviet empire and emboldened by high oil prices, Russia has, for example, interfered in Abkhazia, a Russian-oriented part of Georgia, and in Moldova’s Transnistria region, and it has backed the dictatorial regime of Aleksandr Lukashenka in Belarus. Venezuela, another oil power, is seeking to play a similar role in Latin America. Under the populist leadership of Hugo Chavez, a military man who twice led unsuccessful coups in the 1990s and has now consolidated internal power, the

regime is promoting what Chavez calls a "Bolivarian alternative for the Americas." This alternative, according to Richard Lugar, the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, consists of "a pan-hemispheric oil cartel, a congress of South American left-wing parties, and a state-sponsored regional TV network to broadcast his authoritarian propaganda."³⁶

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There is obviously no quick or simple solution to the problem of semi-authoritarianism. The critical challenge is to defend the political space that exists and to mobilize international pressure to prevent the tightening of political controls and the persecution of democratic activists. It is also important to retain a regional perspective and not to view each country in isolation. The victories after 1989 in Central Europe aided the struggles a decade later in Slovakia, Yugoslavia, and Croatia, and these victories in turn contributed to the subsequent gains in Georgia and Ukraine. The momentum of democratic change is often propelled forward by the activists in successful struggles who feel committed—for reasons having to do with both democratic idealism and enlightened self-interest—to aiding like-minded activists in neighboring autocracies that could pose a threat to their democratic gains. The victory in Ukraine was made possible by earlier triumphs in Central Europe. If consolidated, it will certainly improve the chances for success in neighboring Belarus. In time, such progress may help the internal democratic forces in Russia gain sufficient strength to reverse the authoritarian backsliding that has occurred during the rule of President Vladimir Putin.

The incentive of closer ties to an enlarged European democratic community will also improve the chances for success in the post-Soviet region, as will the continuation of international support for democratic NGOs and parties, however weak they might be in certain countries at the present time. The fact that semi-authoritarian regimes are generally corrupt and economically inefficient means that they will always have a problem generating sufficient internal support to legitimize their rule. Discontent will inevitably create pressures for change and opportunities for a democratic breakthrough. The international community will be in a better position to help democrats take advantage of such opportunities if it stays engaged in semi-authoritarian countries during the hard times when the prospect for democracy seems very bleak.

The third center of anti-democratic resistance comes from the remaining dictatorships in the world, regimes that survived the third wave of democratization.

Such regimes are spread unevenly around the world. Many of the most important dictatorial systems can be found in East Asia (China, Burma, North Korea, Vietnam, and Laos), while Cuba is the only dictatorship in the Western Hemisphere, though it continues to have international influence out of proportion to its size. While all dictatorships deny fundamental human rights and multiparty political competition, they nonetheless differ in terms of the amount of space that exists for independent social, economic, and intellectual activity. There is a world of difference, for example, between China and North Korea, though both countries can be considered dictatorships. While China permits no challenge to the power of the Communist Party, it has joined the global economy; it has a growing private sector and middle class; and it has become a relatively wired society, with nearly 100,000,000 users of the Internet.³⁷ By contrast, North Korea is a genuinely closed totalitarian system, completely isolated from the world, from where thousands of desperate people *flee to China* for refuge.

Dictatorships are not static systems. They can open up somewhat if a particular regime wants to increase trade or bring in foreign investment, and inevitably they undergo a process of decay as leaders age and the ruling elite becomes increasingly corrupt.

China itself is a more open society than it was when Mao died three decades ago, which is another way to understand different degrees of authoritarianism. Cuba, too, has changed. Just a little over a decade ago, the only visible dissent in Cuba came from a small number of intellectuals in Havana. Today, demonstrations of civic resistance have spread across the island and involve workers and other people from the mainstream of society.³⁸ Dictatorships are not static systems. They can open up somewhat if a particular regime wants to increase trade or bring in foreign investment, and inevitably they undergo a process of decay as leaders age and the ruling elite becomes increasingly corrupt.

As small cracks open up in a dictatorial system, it becomes possible for international democracy supporters to find practical ways to promote increased openness and liberalization. In the early stages of the process of change, the most realistic forms of support are the defense of human rights and the provision of independent information. In closed systems, much of this work would have to be done by groups based in exile which can provide some protection for people inside, perhaps leading to a small expansion of social or political space. The emergence of dissidents within a dictatorship is a sign of progress even if they are arrested, as is often the case, since it means that there is the beginning of internal dissent and that some people are not afraid to speak out. Dissidents do not yet exist in North Korea, where even small infractions can lead to the imprisonment in the gulag not just of the accused individual but of three generations of his or her family. Burma is also an

extremely tough dictatorship, but the democracy movement there is led by a Nobel Laureate, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, who is under house arrest, but is still a visible symbol of resistance for the society and for the supporters of Burmese democracy in the international community. It is thus well ahead of North Korea in the process of change.

As dictatorships evolve and decay, independent groups can emerge, often of a nonpolitical character, such as community, women's, and ecological groups. In some cases, it is possible for international human rights and democracy supporters to establish contact with such groups and to help them. Eventually the doors of the country might open sufficiently to allow some democracy promoters to conduct training and education programs inside the country. Such programs already exist on a large scale in China where the leadership, while determined to maintain a monopoly of political power, is nonetheless prepared to consider political reforms that will reduce crime and corruption and promote economic growth.

A strategy for aiding democracy in dictatorships thus has to be driven by what is feasible. In North Korea, the current priority is documenting human rights abuses and building international pressure for human rights. In Burma, it is possible to provide training, education, and information to Burmese groups in exile to strengthen their institutional capacity as well as their ability to communicate internally and with the international community. In Cuba, assistance can be provided both internally to independent journalists, libraries, and workers organizations, and externally for initiatives that defend human rights, provide uncensored information to people on the island, and encourage dialogue within Cuba and in the diaspora about the political future of the country. As we have seen, an even more diversified approach is possible in China where external efforts that defend human rights and provide access to independent information and ideas can be supplemented by training and conference programs conducted by international groups that are able to maintain a presence inside the country.

Finally, a democracy strategy for dictatorships should also involve efforts to build international pressure for democratic openings. With respect to Burma, for example, democratic trade unions have defended the rights of Burmese workers in the International Labor Organization, while political activists have recruited more than 3,000 parliamentarians in a campaign of international solidarity. Over the past five years, Korean, American, and European activists have built an international coalition for human rights in North Korea that has resulted in, among other things, two resolutions of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights. Similar campaigns are also underway to aid human rights in other dictatorships.

The fourth challenge to democracy comes from the proliferation during the last decade-and-a-half of many failed and war-torn countries. Some of the worst crises faced by the international community during this period derive from the conflicts and breakdowns in such countries, which can also become spawning grounds for terrorism. The list of such countries includes Somalia, Haiti, Cambodia, Bosnia,

Kosovo, Rwanda, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Congo, East Timor, Afghanistan, and Iraq. The crises are a product of the breakdown of old political structures, a process fueled by the rise of ethnic and religious violence in the aftermath of the Cold War and by the inability of many poor countries to adapt to the pressures of globalization. The international community has focused on two goals in such countries, conflict resolution and state building, but in each case it has run up against enormous difficulties.

Efforts by the international community to end conflicts are generally limited to holding talks among leaders of warring factions. But peace agreements will not last unless civil society is brought into the process and becomes invested in negotiated solutions through an inclusive democratic process. Including groups from civil society can have the effect of diluting the influence of the armed factions and their leaders, who have little understanding of inclusive solutions that try to protect the legitimate interests of all segments of the population.

In the Congo, Sierra Leone, Liberia, and other war-torn countries, civil society groups perform a number of vital functions. They defend human rights, educate about democracy, and provide training in conflict resolution. Often, they use innovative techniques, including popular theater, concerts, and soccer tournaments to build trust and nurture a culture of tolerance. In effect, they establish enclaves of democratic values and inter-ethnic dialogue that become centers of grassroots pressure for peace and reconciliation. They also help marshal international support for democracy assistance and the defense of human rights. In peace negotiations or constitutional talks, they can give voice and representation to civil society in the process of reaching a peace agreement. And in a post-war setting, they can also help the process of healing and offer an alternative model and vision of democratic social and political organization.

The involvement of the local society is also needed in addressing the second objective of the international community, which is state-building. The task of rebuilding governing institutions in failed or post-conflict states is vastly more complex than rebuilding the physical infrastructure of the country. An institution cannot function on its own if there is not the indigenous capacity to make it work. But as Francis Fukuyama has pointed out, "the rhetoric of the international community stresses 'capacity-building' while the reality has been rather a kind of 'capacity sucking out'" as international bureaucrats and NGOs often prefer to perform functions themselves and crowd out less qualified local practitioners.³⁹ The result is a form of "progress imposed from above" that bears a distinct resemblance to the 19th century governing style of "an imperial power over its colonial possessions," according to an analysis of the experience in Bosnia.⁴⁰ The international community is still in the early stages of understanding the art of state building which, according to Fukuyama, "will be a key component of national power, as important as the ability to deploy traditional military force to the maintenance of world order."⁴¹ If it is to succeed in meeting this challenge, it will have to learn to find the proper balance between efficiency and local ownership, which will often involve ceding control to the local society and its indigenous practitioners and civil society organizations.

Since its founding more than two centuries ago, the United States has been identified around the world with the idea of democracy and the efforts to spread democratic institutions and processes. This has been especially true since the fall of the Berlin Wall when activists rallied to the banner of democracy and expected, and in many cases received, help from this country. The connection between the United States and international democracy is such that the forces that resist the spread of democracy—Islamic extremists, semi-authoritarian autocrats, dictators, and warlords in failed states—are also invariably anti-American. Since these real and would-be despots find it difficult to argue directly against democracy, which is so hugely popular around the world, they are increasingly using anti-Americanism to advance their cause. The Bulgarian writer Ivan Krastev has called attention to this new practice, noting that “anti-Americanism is a stalking horse and platform for antidemocratic and anti-market forces.”⁴² America’s best strategic option in responding to this challenge, Krastev writes, is quite simple. It is to reaffirm its support for democracy and to help in every way possible the people around the world who are fighting to defend democratic values. These are America’s best friends, and we dare not underestimate the stake we have in the success of their struggle.

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The Exertions of Better Men: The Role of the US Military in Planting, Protecting, and Nurturing Free Government

by Alan W. Dowd

INTRODUCTION

In his biography of Theodore Roosevelt, historian Edmund Morris recounts the strange story of Ion Perdicaris¹, whose kidnapping at the hands of a Moroccan warlord nearly triggered a war. Upon his release, as he approached the Moroccan coastal city of Tangier, Perdicaris caught the first glimpse of the source of his regained freedom—"the mastheads of Admiral Chadwick's ships, twinkling the news of his return." Overcome with emotion as he took in the US armada, Perdicaris whispered a quiet prayer of thanks for "that flag...that people...that president...those frigates."²

Almost a century later, Ronald Reagan told a similar story. "Back in the early 1980s, at the height of the boat people," Reagan began, "a sailor was hard at work on the carrier *Midway*, which was patrolling the South China Sea."³ As it cut through the choppy waves, he explained, the *Midway* came across "a leaky little boat" crammed with refugees from the killing fields of Indochina. They hoped to do the impossible—to reach America's shores and to find freedom. But on this day, freedom found them first. The *Midway* changed course to pluck the refugees from danger, and as the giant ship drifted toward the tiny raft, one of the refugees stood up and yelled out in broken English, "Hello, American sailor. Hello, freedom man!" It was, as Reagan concluded, "a small moment with a big meaning."⁴

Both of these stories reveal something powerful and poignant about freedom, but they also say something about the US military and its role in promoting freedom worldwide. That responsibility began long before Roosevelt dispatched his armada to the Moroccan coast, and it continued long after the *Midway* returned with its precious cargo and powerful story for Reagan to share. Indeed, it continues today. America's unique role is both a by-product and expression of a natural inclination to promote free government.

For each generation, there has been a different way of expressing this inclination. Within sight of the Union and Confederate fallen, Abraham Lincoln spoke of "a new

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birth of freedom.”⁵ In 1917, Woodrow Wilson sent Pershing’s troops to make Europe “safe for democracy.” Franklin Roosevelt sent yet another generation of Americans to build “a world founded upon four essential human freedoms”—freedom of speech, freedom of worship, freedom from want, and freedom from fear.⁶

As World War II gave way to the Cold War, Harry Truman vowed, “to help free peoples maintain their free institutions and their national integrity.”⁷ John Kennedy promised that America would “bear any burden...in order to assure the survival and the success of liberty.”⁸ In that brief interregnum between two terrors, between the Cold War and bin Laden’s jihad, Bill Clinton envisioned “engagement and enlargement” of the democratic community.⁹ And after September 11, George W. Bush vowed to use American might to build “a balance of power that favors freedom.”¹⁰

After all, words did not protect Nanking or Czechoslovakia in the 1930s, nor Srebrenica or Rwanda in the 1990s. They did not liberate Europe or Asia in 1945. They did not preserve free government during the Cold War, or give it space to grow afterwards. And they are not protecting or planting free government in our time.

Words of this sort are important. They provide form and focus to American power. However, they are just words, and as such they have their limits. After all, words did not protect Nanking or Czechoslovakia in the 1930s, nor Srebrenica or Rwanda in the 1990s. They did not liberate Europe or Asia in 1945. They did not preserve free government during the Cold War, or give it space to grow afterwards. And they are not protecting or planting free government in our time. That task falls to “men whose values are not those of politicians or diplomats,” as military historian John Keegan has observed—men who are willing to do more than simply write or talk about freedom.¹¹ According to Keegan, “All civilizations owe their origins to the warrior,” especially the increasingly democratic civilization of the early twenty-first century.¹²

Although many countries have contributed to this great cause of democracy-building, the US has a disproportionate burden because of its unique position, unrivaled power, and historic, albeit self-appointed, role as leader of the free world. The US military shoulders the lion’s share of that burden.

WAITING FOR THE AMERICANS

Critics of American power may refuse to recognize this special role, but by turning to Washington when tsunamis swallow South Asia, genocide is let loose in Europe, famine devours Somalia, nuclear weapons sprout up in North Korea, democracy teeters in Haiti, or chaos overtakes some faraway nation, they are tacitly

conceding that the United States is, well, special. RAND Corporation's international security analyst James Dobbins puts it matter-of-factly: "It now seems clear that nation building is the inescapable responsibility of the world's only superpower."¹³ Adds Johns Hopkins professor Fouad Ajami, "The world rails against the United States, yet embraces its protection, its gossip and its hipness."¹⁴ Especially its protection. As of 2004, some fifty countries enjoy defense treaties with the US; the US military is the first and last line of defense for dozens of others. This role of global guarantor of freedom expands daily in the War on Terror, with US forces now welcomed in more than 100 countries.

This is not to be construed as jingoism or triumphalism, but rather a statement of reality. Indeed, the pronouncements of America's friends and actions of its enemies bear out this truth. After Dunkirk, Winston Churchill contemplated a day when "the new world, with all its power and might, steps forth to the rescue and liberation of the old."¹⁵ As the Cold War thawed and the West contemplated a response to Moscow's new openness, NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner reminded President George H.W. Bush, "the United States should not expect others to deliver much. They are waiting for the Americans."¹⁶ With Washington averting its gaze from the Balkan wars of the 1990s, French President Jacques Chirac mixed contempt with delight by concluding, "the position of leader of the free world is vacant"—a backhanded admission that the US does indeed play a special role in protecting and promoting freedom.¹⁷

On balance, American military power is a force for good in the world, especially when it comes to defending freedom and deterring its enemies.

Moreover, Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda network targeted the Pentagon because it is a symbol of American power. Few nations, if any, have so often or so freely used their military power to promote democracy and help the helpless. As a consequence, the US military has made its share of friends and enemies. Within those five walls, Americans have planned peacekeeping missions in Kosovo, Bosnia, and Lebanon; humanitarian efforts to save Berliners, Somalis, and Kurds; rescue operations to defend Korea and Kuwait; democracy-building missions in Haiti, Afghanistan, and Iraq; the defeat of German fascism, Japanese militarism and Soviet communism; and the early counterstrikes against Islamist terrorism's practitioners, patrons, and partners.

This is not to say that America's military is flawless. The abuse of Iraqi prisoners at Abu Ghraib is a grim reminder that any organization made up of humans is inherently imperfect. Of course, it is also a reminder that the American military strives to do the right thing; it pays to recall that the abuse was uncovered by the military itself. On balance, American military power is a force for good in the world, especially when it comes to defending freedom and deterring its enemies.

Nor is this to imply that civilian organizations are unimportant in planting free government. Just as it takes more than words to eliminate the enemies of freedom and build democracy, it takes more than armies. International organizations and NGOs have proven effective at encouraging confidence building measures, nurturing civil society, supporting the rule of law, teaching the habits of democracy, and ensuring fair elections. These are essential ingredients to the health of consensual government inside a state and to the spread of democracy around the world, but seldom are they enough to plant or protect democracy, as the last sixty years illustrate.

SECOND WORLD WAR

Iraq is not the first place the US military has attempted to turn battlefield victories into political success, and ultimately to turn a nation into a democratic government. Colonel Jayne Carson of the US Army has observed that, historically, when the US wades into the waters of nation building, the ultimate objective is “to install or leave behind a constitutional government that recognizes universal suffrage, the rule of law, and separation of church and state.”¹⁸ Early examples include Cuba and the Philippines, which were imperfect efforts at best.

The US military’s greatest success stories in building democracy also happen to represent its most costly and open-ended engagements. Recall that before democracy could be planted on German or Japanese soil, the US had to defeat two brutal regimes. Victory over those regimes came at a cost of some 400,000 American lives and almost \$350USD billion. And after the guns fell silent, the US military invested more capital, resources, and lives to nurture the nascent democracies in Tokyo and Bonn.

“Germany and Japan,” Dobbins concludes in *America’s Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq*, “set standards for post-conflict transformation that has not since been equaled.”¹⁹ In both instances, in Dobbins’ view, the positive result came in direct correlation to “the level of effort the United States and the international community put into their democratic transformations.”²⁰ That effort was led by the US military, which provided internal and external security, dismantled and disarmed the machinery of militarism, convened military tribunals, administered much of the humanitarian aid, cleaned up the poisoned education systems, and set up proto-democratic institutions.²¹ In fact, Dobbins notes that the American military was scheduling municipal elections in Germany as early as 1946.²²

Within a decade of the war’s end, Germany was a sovereign, democratic country. Today, it is a leader in the field of human rights and a role model for developing democracies. None of this was a foregone conclusion. In Weimar’s wake, “it was unclear whether the German people would accept Western democratic principles” after the Second World War.²³ Germany’s stunning and relatively rapid transition from a constant source of instability and war into an international exponent of liberal democratic government is evidence that “military force and political capital

can, at least in some circumstances, be successfully employed to underpin democratic and societal transformation.”²⁴

Likewise, hundreds of thousands of American troops did the heavy lifting of democracy-building in post-imperial Japan. Foreshadowing the American military’s ambidexterity in places like Berlin, Kosovo, and Afghanistan, US forces delivered tons of foodstuffs to the defeated people of Japan, even as they demobilized the Japanese army. The post-imperial constitution, which guaranteed equal rights, education reform, free speech, and religious liberalization, bore the unmistakable fingerprints of an American general—Douglas MacArthur.²⁵ It was MacArthur who ordered that postwar Japan provide legal protection for labor unions, which “invigorated Japanese democracy.”²⁶ Historian Paul Johnson observes that it was MacArthur’s constitution that triggered “a revolution from above” and broke the “mesmeric hold the state had hitherto exercised over the Japanese people.”²⁷ In pursuit of that goal, Dobbins details how the US Army sent teams to school districts to ensure that emperor worship was no longer practiced or encouraged.²⁸

While discussing democratic Japan and proto-democratic Iraq, it is worth noting that, contrary to popular opinion, America’s history of creative battlefield skimping began long before the statues fell in Baghdad.

Sixty years later, Japan is an island of stability, peace, and free government in a region in desperate need of each. In a sign of its maturity, Japan is now leading the effort to plant free government in Iraq. Tokyo has pledged \$5 billion to rebuild Iraq, and in December 2004 announced that it would extend its deployment of peacekeeping troops by another year.²⁹

While discussing democratic Japan and proto-democratic Iraq, it is worth noting that, contrary to popular opinion, America’s history of creative battlefield skimping began long before the statues fell in Baghdad. Although the Continental Congress promised to field and fund an army of 75,000, General George Washington never had more than 25,000 full-time troops under his command. Dobbins reminds us that initial plans for occupying postwar Germany called for nine US divisions (down from the 61 US divisions in Germany on VE Day), but domestic pressures to bring the troops home sliced the nine-division plan down to a five-division plan. Likewise, in Japan, initial plans called for more than 600,000 troops, including 315,000 Americans, 135,000 British Commonwealth troops, 175,000 Soviet troops, and 60,000 Nationalist Chinese troops. Of course, the Soviets and Chinese were never integrated into the occupation effort in Japan, and the Commonwealth only sent 45,000 men.³⁰ Obviously, that would affect how America carried out its occupation, and so would the Cold War with Moscow.

THE COLD WAR

The Cold War at once fueled and impeded democracy-building in postwar Europe. For example, in the western half of Germany, the Soviet threat spurred the Allies to forge a democratic, albeit semi-sovereign, government. Yet Moscow's actions also threatened to derail the progress toward freedom in the western sectors of Berlin. Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin's attempt to close off West Berlin in 1948 was neither the first nor last time Moscow would seek to challenge the process of democratization in the West, but it was perhaps the most brazen.

By blockading Berlin, Stalin no doubt thought he had checkmated Washington with a *fait accompli*. What he did not realize was that there was another option for the Allies. This precipitated the Berlin Airlift, one of the greatest military, political, and technological feats of the twentieth century. Blending the principles of strategic bombing with the efficiency of a Detroit assembly line, the Americans crafted an air campaign unlike any in history. The coal and food laden planes would land every three minutes during the Soviet siege. From June 1948 to September 1949, Allied pilots flew 277,000 missions and delivered 2.3 million tons of supplies to sustain Berlin's civilian population. About 75 percent of those missions were flown by US pilots, and 31 Americans were killed during the airlift.³¹

Although the Cold War would continue for decades, the Berlin Airlift laid the foundation for everything that followed on both sides of the Iron Curtain.

During those fifteen months of brinkmanship, the US showcased not just its military might, political resolve, and boundless economic capacity, but a unique ability to bring all of these qualities to bear in pursuit of its national interests. Washington displayed an ability to balance those interests against the most basic needs of its former enemies in Germany. Although the Cold War would continue for decades, the Berlin Airlift laid the foundation for everything that followed on both sides of the Iron Curtain. With the world watching, the siege and subsequent rescue of Berlin exposed the stark differences between the two postwar superpowers.

For the balance of the Cold War, America's military strength would usually be employed in a similarly restrained manner, not so much to extend the frontiers of democracy, but rather to preserve and protect them. What Churchill said in the first decade of the global standoff with Moscow would be true until the end. "But for American nuclear superiority," he sighed, "Europe would already have been reduced to satellite status and the Iron Curtain would have reached the Atlantic and the Channel."³² When this nuclear balance of terror was threatened, the American military was obliged to intervene, and it did often. From 1946 to 1989, the US military was ordered into action at least forty-six times: ranging from major combat deployments, as in Korea and Vietnam; to token shows of force, as when Washington sent fighter jets to fend off a coup in the Philippines in 1989; to things in between, as when the

US Navy ensured freedom of the seas against Libyan encroachment in the 1980s.³³ Some of those interventions had little to do with democratization, but most of them were aimed at keeping the enemies of democracy at bay and positioning the West to win the Cold War. Thus, even though American military action was sometimes shortsighted and always imperfect during this period, it served an important and worthy cause.

Thus, even though American military action was sometimes shortsighted and always imperfect during this period, it served an important and worthy cause.

BETWEEN THE TERRORS

The same can be said of America's post-Cold War efforts, although the transition was anything but smooth. When Yugoslavia began to descend into civil war in 1991, Western Europe seized upon the crisis as an opportunity to prove it was ready to keep the peace. It proceeded to launch diplomatic missions and deploy "protection forces" to the war-torn region. It was, as one European diplomat declared, "the hour of Europe."³⁴ Washington took the hint and stepped aside. It would be a fateful decision. As historian William Pfaff notes in *The Wrath of Nations*, "In the Bosnian crisis, the United States did not act, so everyone failed to act."³⁵ Relying on diplomacy, sanctions, and bluster, the Europeans were unable to protect the innocents, let alone end the war.

In that long hour, when Europe tested its soft power against Slobodan Milosevic's hard power, almost 200,000 people were erased and another two million were displaced. Europe's fecklessness and America's acquiescence, Pfaff concludes, "dealt a brutal blow to the idea that democracies possessed the capacity, or the will, to enlarge that zone of pacification and cooperation created inside the western political community. It even raised a question as to whether that achievement itself would last."³⁶ The low point came when the Dutch government allowed its peacekeepers in the laughably misnamed UN Protection Force to stand aside, as the Serbs entered the so-called safe haven of Srebrenica and liquidated 7,000 Bosnian Muslim men. (Obviously, little in the way of protection was offered to Srebrenica.) Only after Washington reasserted itself in late 1995, by bringing American military might in the form of robust air strikes against Serbian paramilitaries (under the auspices of NATO), did the war come to an end. A US-led peacekeeping force then entered Bosnia to enforce a partition, smother any flare-ups, and in a faint echo of postwar Germany, crack down on hypernationalist elements, provide public infrastructure, and aid international organizations in holding free and fair elections.³⁷

US troops are still there, and although the process of democratization in Bosnia is far from ideal, the peace is still holding. In fact, the armistice has now held longer than the war itself. Dobbins notes that the postwar cartography of Bosnia, albeit fragile and flawed, is being maintained largely by the presence of American and allied peacekeepers. A similar formula has been successful in Kosovo. It pays to recall that not long ago, Milosevic's terror squads were rampaging through Serbia's tiny Albanian enclave, purging 850,000 ethnic Albanians and killing thousands more. It was not diplomatic communiqués or UN sanctions that changed Belgrade's behavior, but rather a US air armada. During the seventy-eight day air campaign, the US-led NATO alliance would feed, house, and clothe the displaced Kosovars and lead them home. In fact, as Jane's Defense observed at the time, "Kosovo is the only case in modern history where a systematic removal of ethnic groups has been reversed."³⁸ Today, Milosevic is pacing in a jail cell, awaiting his sentence for a decade of war crimes; the Kosovars are protected; Serbia is a democracy; the Balkans are arguably more stable than they have been since Tito; and not coincidentally, there are several thousand American and European troops keeping the peace. They have overseen elections, rebuilt infrastructure, played the role of referee, and worked to inculcate the habits of freedom.

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AFTER SEPTEMBER 11

If people vote with their feet, then post-Taliban Afghanistan held its first elections long before Hamid Karzai's name was placed on a ballot. After all, some three million displaced Afghanis returned home in late 2001 and early 2002. They were able to do so because of the US military, as Christopher Hitchens observed upon the fall of the Taliban. "The United States has just succeeded in bombing a country back out of the Stone Age," he wrote. "This deserves to be recognized as an achievement."³⁹ However, the Americans did not just topple the medieval Taliban and flush out bin Laden's terror network; they simultaneously swooped in to rescue a war-weary people from starvation and lay the groundwork of self-government. In the final three months of 2001 alone, US forces airdropped 2.4 million meal rations and helped deliver another 127,000 tons of food and water over land, all in the midst of a war.⁴⁰ Today, US forces are delivering additional aid and widening the zone of stability in Afghanistan through provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs), which are military units of sixty to eighty troops that work with civilian organizations to rebuild key infrastructure and pacify regions beyond Kabul. The PRTs aim to

create secure areas where aid workers can help with reconstruction and in the process, extend the authority and legitimacy of the central government throughout Afghanistan.⁴¹ According to General Walter Sharp, director of strategic plans and policy at the Pentagon's Joint Staff, "over 400 schools, 600 wells and over 170 medical facilities have been provided through PRT and USAID reconstruction projects across Afghanistan."⁴² As of September 2004, there were nineteen PRTs at work all across Afghanistan.

Despite its good intentions and positive results, the PRT concept drew unwanted and arguably unwarranted criticism in June 2004, when terrorists murdered five aid workers from Doctors Without Borders (DWB). By July, DWB announced its withdrawal from Afghanistan, denouncing the US-led coalition's "attempt to co-opt humanitarian aid." In the process, DWB officials criticized US Secretary of State Colin Powell for praising DWB as "members of a team against terror," condemned the coalition's "attempt to put us in one side of a conflict," and seemed unable or unwilling to distinguish between "armed actors."⁴³

Never mind that some of those armed actors were saving innocents rather than killing them. This sort of criticism, which fails to make any distinction between people who use weapons to destroy freedom and people who use weapons to defend it, calls to mind something John Stuart Mill wrote long before Americans cared a wit about Afghanistan:

*War is an ugly thing, but not the ugliest of things: the decayed and degraded state of moral and patriotic feeling which thinks nothing worth a war is worse. A man who has nothing which he is willing to fight for... has no chance of being free, unless made and kept so by the exertions of better men.*⁴⁴

DWB's retreat from Afghanistan is regrettable because such organizations can achieve far more working with the military than they can alone. According to RAND's Cheryl Benard, the attack on DWB's unarmed team is an argument for "closer cooperation with the military, not a separation of spheres."⁴⁵ Indeed, as US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld has observed, "the only reason humanitarian workers are today back in Afghanistan is because of the US military."⁴⁶

To paraphrase Rumsfeld, the only reason Afghanistan is now a full-fledged democracy is because of the US military. After the *loya jirga* selected Karzai as Afghanistan's interim leader, it was left to US forces to protect this central symbol of the country's nascent democracy. In fact, when a group of Taliban sympathizers infiltrated Karzai's security detail and tried to assassinate the popular president in September 2002, they were repulsed by a detachment of US Special Forces. At least one of Karzai's anonymous American bodyguards was wounded in the attack.⁴⁷

The US military then worked with partners from NATO, the UN, and international NGOs to hold the first democratic elections in Afghanistan's 200-year history. In a macroversion of the effort to guard Karzai, some 18,500 American troops, joined by 13,000 Afghan soldiers and 9,000 NATO forces, provided security

on election day, literally insuring democracy by protecting the right to vote.⁴⁸ With the national elections of October 2004 now behind them and Karzai as their leader, the Afghan people officially govern themselves.

INTO IRAQ

In Iraq, as in Afghanistan, the democracy-building effort has both critics and obstacles. Without question, it is difficult amid car bombings, beheadings, and gun battles to celebrate the birth of Iraqi democracy, but it pays to keep things in perspective. Iraq's is not the first popularly supported government to draw the fire of radicals or reactionaries. Consider the mini-civil war in Moscow in the autumn of 1993, when Boris Yeltsin used tanks and artillery to put down an antidemocratic rebellion. Consider the Israeli democracy, which fought for its very life from its very first breath. Consider the administration of President Abraham Lincoln, which came under assault even before his inauguration. In other words, the fact that Iraqis are fighting to plant democracy is not without precedent; and the fact that they are willing to fight and die to keep their newfound freedom is actually a hopeful sign. "Iraqis are grimly determined to rebuild their own country, grimly determined never again to be ruled against their will," according to Ambassador Feisal Istrabadi of Iraq.⁴⁹

Without question, it is difficult amid car bombings, beheadings, and gun battles to celebrate the birth of Iraqi democracy, but it pays to keep things in perspective.

Moreover, as Germany and Japan remind us, it is not unprecedented for democracy to get a push from outside parties. "Iraqis will tell you universally that they could not possibly have removed the old regime," according to Istrabadi.⁵⁰ After all, Saddam Hussein ruled Iraq for almost twenty-four years, longer than Hitler controlled Germany and longer than Tojo dominated Japan. During that quarter-century, neither the Iraqi people nor their neighbors knew a day of peace. Saddam's wars scarred Iran, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Israel. His internal terror decimated the Kurdish minority in northern Iraq and the Shiite majority in southern Iraq, transforming the cradle of civilization into a giant torture chamber. His cult of death deformed a nation. Tens of thousands were orphaned by his wars. Thousands more were orphaned by his death squads. Saddam became their father and god. "With our souls and our blood," they pledged at school, "we sacrifice for Saddam. We will sacrifice ourselves for you, O Saddam."⁵¹ Those children who refused to join the youth wing of the Ba'th party were imprisoned by the hundreds. It was a regiment of the US Marines that set them free.⁵²

In spite of this brutal history, the Iraqi people are now striving to lay the foundations of free government. Less than a week after the liberation of Baghdad, for example, they were forming city councils and ad hoc assemblies all across the country. "In the space of a year-and-a-half, a hundred political parties have emerged, a couple hundred newspapers. You have people speaking their minds, protesting this and that," Istrabadi observed in October 2004. "Iraq has a lot to learn about democracy, but in fact we're on the way."⁵³ The Iraqi people have already created a national representative body and embraced the rule of law, promising to protect ethnic and religious minorities, assure free speech, and promote basic human rights. A permanent constitution and permanent National Assembly will be in place by the end of 2005.⁵⁴

In spite of this brutal history, the Iraqi people are now striving to lay the foundations of free government.

Playing every role from diplomat to de facto mayor, US forces have aided in this democratization process. In April of 2003, for instance, literally days after Saddam's regime collapsed, US troops were convening town hall meetings with Iraqi communities.⁵⁵ After fighting their way from Kuwait to the northern third of Iraq, a brigade from the 101st Airborne reopened trade flows between the border towns of Iraq and Syria. They did so by convening Iraqi customs officers, tribal leaders, and businessmen and helping them agree on a per-vehicle toll. The humming trade activity has generated enough revenue to hire additional customs officials, fund municipal projects, and reconstitute local institutions of governance. One might call Iraq's northwestern borderlands the 101st Airborne Enterprise Zone.⁵⁶

Without question, a number of US military decisions have angered Iraqis, and will continue to do so. However, as one member of the Mosul City Council told *The New York Times*, "They work hard to do the right thing."⁵⁷ That is largely because the motives of the typical American soldier and Marine are honorable; his instincts are democratic. This is not just syrupy sentiment. An analysis by the US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) concluded that American forces deployed in Iraq believe they are fighting and dying to make Iraq free. Relying on interviews with US personnel deployed in the invasion and initial occupation, SSI's researchers found that "liberating the people and bringing freedom to Iraq" were commonly cited by American troops in describing their combat motivation.⁵⁸

While few question the motivation of American troops, many have questioned Iraq's capacity for democracy. This is more than unfair because it belies a kind of cultural prejudice. As Bush observed on the eve of the Iraq War, "It is presumptuous and insulting to suggest that a whole region of the world—or the one-fifth of humanity that is Muslim—is somehow untouched by the most basic aspirations of life."⁵⁹ Moreover, it echoes the folly of earlier critics of democratization efforts. The list of peoples and places that the experts once deemed as beneath representative government is long. It includes India, now the largest democracy on earth, Latin America, Eastern

Europe, Germany, Japan, South Africa, Afghanistan, and the thirteen breakaway colonies known as the United States of America. There is no reason why Iraq cannot join that list. It will simply take time. "We've done these things quickly and we've done them well," Dobbins explains, "but we've never done them quickly and well."⁶⁰

FORCE OF FREEDOM

The intent here is not to glorify war. Rather, it is to remind those of us who talk and write about democracy, who praise NGOs for their efforts (and rightly so), and who dispense Nobel Peace Prizes to negotiators and diplomats, that the process of democratization often begins with the force of arms and "the exertions of better men." From Normandy to Najaf, America's military has helped fuel that process, extending liberty to those who do not know it and preserving it for those who take it for granted. As historian John Lewis Gaddis writes of the burden America accepted in the middle portion of the twentieth century, "Who else was there to hold the line against the authoritarians who otherwise would have dominated that century? Who else is there now, at the beginning of the twenty-first?"⁶¹

Notes

¹ Ion Perdicaris was not a United States citizen. Roosevelt thought he was and so did his captors. Perdicaris had foresworn his citizenship but later regained it.

² Edmund Morris, *Theodore Rex* (Random House, 2001), pp. 337-338.

³ Ronald Reagan, Farewell Address, January 11, 1989.

⁴ Id.

⁵ Abraham Lincoln, Gettysburg Address, November 19, 1863, Library of Congress, <http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/gadd/gatr1.html>

⁶ Franklin Roosevelt, Message to Congress, January 6, 1941, Yale Law School Avalon Project, <http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/decade/decade01.htm>.

⁷ Harry S Truman, Address to Congress, March 12, 1947, <http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/cold.war/episodes/03/documents/truman/>.

⁸ John Kennedy, Inaugural Address, January 20, 1961, Yale Law School Avalon Project, <http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/presiden/inaug/kennedy.htm>.

⁹ Bill Clinton, "A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement," February 1995.

¹⁰ George W. Bush, "The National Security Strategy of the United States of America," September 20, 2002.

¹¹ John Keegan, *A History of Warfare*, (Knopf 1993).

¹² Id. at p. xvi.

¹³ James Dobbins, *America's Role in Nation Building: From Germany to Iraq*, 2003, RAND, p. xxix.

¹⁴ Fouad Ajami, "The falseness of anti-Americanism," *Foreign Policy*, September/October 2003.

¹⁵ David Cannadine, Ed., *The Speeches of Winston Churchill* (Houghton Mifflin, 1989), p. 165.

¹⁶ George Bush, Brent Scowcroft, *A World Transformed* (Knopf 1998), p. 67.

¹⁷ David Halberstam, *War in a Time of Peace* (Scribner, 2001), p. 305.

¹⁸ Jayne Carson, "Nation Building, the American Way," US Army War College Strategy Paper July 4, 2003, 2.

¹⁹ James Dobbins, *America's Role in Nation Building: From Germany to Iraq*, 2003, RAND, p. xix.

²⁰ Id.

²¹ Id.

²² Id. at p. 16.

²³ Id. at p. 6.

²⁴ Id. at p. 21.

²⁵ Id.

²⁶ Id. at p. 48.

²⁷ Paul Johnson, *Modern Times* (Harper 1991), p.730.

²⁸ See generally, Dobbins, "America's Role in Nation Building".

²⁹ CNN, "Japan extends Iraq troop mission," www.cnn.com, December 9, 2004; Embassy of Japan, "Japan Welcomes Transfer of Sovereignty of Iraq," www.us.emb-japan.go.jp, June 30, 2004.

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³¹ Ross Milton, "Inside the Berlin Airlift," *Air Force Magazine*, October 1998; Stewart Powell, "The Berlin Airlift," *Air Force Magazine* October 1998.

³² *The Speeches of Winston Churchill*, David Cannadine, Ed. (Penguin 1989), p.342.

³³ See Ellen Collier, "Instances of use of United States forces abroad, 1798-1993," Congressional Research Service, October 7, 1993, www.history.navy.mil/wars/foabroad.htm.

³⁴ See Chris Stephen, "Will Ukraine finally be 'the hour of Europe'?" *The Scotsman*, December 3, 2004.

³⁵ William Pfaff, *The Wrath of Nations*, (Simon and Schuster 1993), p.219.

³⁶ Pfaff, p.215.

³⁷ Dobbins, pp.95-98

³⁸ Jane's Defense, "What chance for Kosovo?" www.janes.com, August 3, 1999.

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⁴² General Walter Sharp, Testimony Before the House Armed Services Committee, April 29, 2004, can be found at: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/2004_hr/040429-sharp.htm.

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⁵³ Interview.

⁵⁴ Barbara Slavin, "U.S. stresses the need to get Sunnis involved," *USA Today*, December 28, 2004.

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⁵⁶ Michael R. Gordon, "The Struggle for Iraq: Reconstruction: 101st Airborne Scores Success in Reconstruction of Northern Iraq," *The New York Times*, September 4, 2003.

⁵⁷ Id.

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A Mission Bound to Fail?: The United States as Socializer of Democratic Norms in Post-War Iraq

by Trine Flockhart

"Don't make us thieves or terrorists. Loaf + honorable life"

—Graffiti on a wall opposite the entrance to the Governing Council compound in Baghdad¹

INTRODUCTION

The graffiti in the epigraph above expresses a very important sentiment. Not only does it express the fundamental wish most Iraqis presumably have for a decent and honorable life, but it also expresses a deep frustration about being judged on the basis of the bad and sometimes downright evil actions of the few. Had the graffiti been written by an American soldier, it would probably have read something along the lines, "Don't make us into oppressors and torturers. Democracy + freedom." Sadly, although only a few Iraqis are thieves or terrorists and only a few Americans are oppressors or torturers, events have unfolded in post-war Iraq so that the always ongoing judgment of each side is now based on the negative images of carnage and chaos. These include images of insurgent attacks, hostages in their orange Guantanamo-inspired suits before being brutally killed, traumatized children being horded out of their homes at gun-point, or appalling images and horrifying accounts emerging from the Abu Ghraib prison. Unfortunately, this state of affairs in Iraq is more than just sad and very unpleasant, but may also have very real repercussions for the future of Iraq, perhaps rendering the stated mission of establishing democracy in Iraq an impossible one.

In this article, I want to suggest that the efforts to promote democracy currently underway in Iraq and previously attempted in other post-conflict situations are in effect processes of state socialization² leading to identity constructions, in which a new norm set is being socialized. It is suggested that because democracy promotion may be conceptualized as a process of norm socialization, an understanding of what norm socialization entails is needed. Such an understanding may be derived from a constructivist account using Social Identity Theory (SIT), particularly self- and other

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categorization processes. These are the keys for explaining why some examples of state socialization are successful while other, apparently similar cases, are not.

The argument is based on a theoretical model for norms socialization, called "Complex Socialization,"³ which suggests that successful state socialization will be dependent on positive self- and other categorization processes between socializer and socializee, at both the mass and elite levels. Given the importance of a positive relationship between socializer and socializee, the problem with socializing democratic norms in Iraq, with the United States as the main socializer, should be clear. As the United States and Iraq increasingly display a significant ideational distance from each other, the United States may in fact not be the most suitable socializing agent, especially as the appalling security situation and the evidence of the use of torture in the Abu Ghraib prison gradually seem to have given rise to *negative* self- and other categorization processes between Iraqis and American forces.

As the United States and Iraq increasingly display a significant ideational distance from each other, the United States may in fact not be the most suitable socializing agent, especially as the appalling security situation and the evidence of the use of torture in the Abu Ghraib prison gradually seem to have given rise to *negative* self- and other categorization processes between Iraqis and American forces.

By utilizing a social constructivist account with an emphasis on socialization, the analysis presented here is clearly somewhat different from the type of account that one might expect from an analysis based on more traditional democratization studies. It must be stressed, however, that the present analysis and evaluation of the prospects for achieving democracy in Iraq is not intended as a substitute or an alternative for more traditional democratization studies, but is rather seen as a precondition for *all* externally generated processes of democratization, including constitutional, institutional, and developmental factors. As the self- and other categorization processes have to be positive in order for socialization to be successful, the logic of the model suggests that socialization of democratic norms has poor odds for success if the socializer is cast as uninvited, unrestrained, and ideationally remote, which seems to be the case with the United States in Iraq. Although the model and its supporting argument may be somewhat abstract, it seems clear that the findings generated from the use of the model are policy-relevant, and that a practical application of the model may contribute to the policymaking process by structurally mapping out strategies and avenues for socialization as well as underlining the continuous importance of positive self- and other categorization processes.

COMPLEX SOCIALIZATION: A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING ELITE AND MASS SOCIALIZATION

Norms can be regarded as "inter-subjective beliefs about identity and behavior encoded in organizational culture."⁴ Norms are generally highly stable structures acting as constraints on agents' behavior and as a constitutive factor in their identity formation, which act as a framework for policymaking. It is generally agreed that although norm change may take place gradually over time, profound norm change is a costly exercise that will only be undertaken in specific circumstances following a so-called critical juncture or destabilizing shock, which has destabilized or delegitimized the existing norm set. In such a situation, there is no longer a norm set that can provide cognitive consistency and order in a complex world,⁵ rendering policymaking difficult. Such a situation is described as "ideational vacuum"⁶ or within classical sociology as "anomie"⁷ or "normlessness."⁸ Within a condition of ideational vacuum or anomie, agents are highly receptive to new ideas and open to new social group memberships. In that sense, the ideational vacuum period provides a window of opportunity for socialization of new norms.

The model outlined below is designed to explain how socialization of international norms⁹ at both the elite and mass level takes place within a domestic society, and why such norm change may be successful in some instances, but not in others. The model is different from other socialization models through its emphasis on self- and other categorization processes, which result in a structured model that is able to account for differences in outcome in apparently similar cases and to pinpoint exactly where in the process problems may exist.¹⁰ It is suggested that the many micro-processes involved in norm socialization are dependent on the initial self- and other categorization processes between socializer and socializee, in effect making self- and other categorization processes the key independent variable of the model. The self- and other categorization process is conceptualized as "filter 1" in the model (see fig. 1).

Within most literature on identity constructions, attention is focused on the role of "the other" for defining "the self." However, the view presented here is that identities are not solely constructed or evaluated purely in terms of "the other," but are, perhaps more so, constructed in relation to "the we." Just as each identity within a specific realm¹¹ has a specific "other," which is of great significance for defining "the self," each identity also has a "significant we," within a constellation of several "we's." The "significant we" defines what the "self" strives towards and holds in great esteem, whereas "the other" defines what the "self" seeks to distance itself from. Each of the "we-groups" within a specific realm are likely to be valued differently, but nevertheless, all have a shared conception of who and what constitutes "the other" and the "significant we." The result is a hierarchical system of different "we's" sandwiched between the "other" and the "significant we." The different "we's" are referred to as "out-groups," 1-4 in the model, whereas the socializer is seen as the "significant we" for some of the agents involved in the socialization process.

According to Social Identity Theory, such out-groups or “we’s” may be conceptualized as “social groups,” which are groups that are psychologically significant for its members and to which they relate themselves subjectively for social comparison and for the acquisition of norms and values.¹² Studies from SIT suggest that individuals attach high value to their social group membership and that belonging to a highly valued social group is very important for self esteem. Therefore, individuals will be more inclined to have a positive view on norms emanating from a highly valued social group than from a negatively valued group. Generally, individuals are more likely to adopt the norms of a highly rated social group and unlikely to adopt the norms of a negatively valued group. Unless the socialized norm set is a norm set belonging to a “we-group,” which is highly valued by the socializee, receptiveness to the socialized norm is likely to be poor. In the case of democratic norm socialization in Iraq, it means that as the Iraqis gradually recast the United States from being a highly valued social group to one with less value, perhaps even in some cases as “the other,” prospects for successful socialization are likely to decline.

Most socialization theory within international relations has been overtly concerned with socialization at the elite level, while practically ignoring the mass level.¹³ However, clearly, norms such as democracy are socialized into a domestic setting, which includes a state/elite level and a mass level, conceptualized here as a nation/people level.¹⁴ Attention exclusively focused at the elite level is therefore not sufficient. One cannot assume that the same self- and other categorization processes are present at both levels, as the two domestic levels may, in effect, constitute separate social groups, which may have different salient self- and other categorization processes with different conceptions of what constitutes the “significant we” hence also giving rise to different conceptions of interests and political preferences. With such considerations in mind, four different constellations of in-group/out-group categorizations emerge, which are likely to have very different socialization outcomes. These different constellations are dependent on whether the social group in question views the socializer as “significant we” or not. The four resulting out-groups are illustrated in table 1.


Table 1. Ideational Orientation between In-Group (Socializer) and Out-Group (Socializee)

	Out-group—State/elite level	Out-group—Nation/people level
In-group values + norms	1 ✓	✓
	2 ✓	x
	3 x	✓
	4 x	x

Positive ideational orientation = ✓; Negative ideational orientation = x

Apart from the determining effect of the initial self- and other categorization processes, each of the domestic levels also have an additional filter through which socialization efforts must proceed and which will determine the ease or difficulty in gaining access to opinion leaders at both domestic levels and hence, the likelihood of establishing the socialized norm as a "winning idea set,"¹⁵ by ensuring its institutionalization in political structures and behavioral processes. The two filters at the domestic level largely follow well-established research on domestic structure and policy change, where the state/elite level filter is conceptualized as political structures and processes, representing the relationship between state and society and the individual characteristics of the state level in terms of openness, coalition-building processes, and institutional factors. The filter at the nation/people level is conceptualized as political culture and participation traditions, paying more attention to the rules, norms, values, and practices according to which politics and the use of power is played in the interaction between state and society, and within the societal level itself. The two domestic levels may have very different conceptions of what constitutes the "significant we," and they may have diverging institutional and cultural channels for adapting to new norms and ideas. A graphical illustration of the model is outlined in figure 1 below.

Figure 1. Complex Socialization*



As suggested in the graphic representation of the model (fig. 1), the four different out-groups are likely to have very different socialization processes with various socialization strategies available to the socializer, resulting in markedly distinct prospects for success. Traditional elite-focused analyses of norm socialization have tended to focus on, and assume the existence of, an overall norm set of a specific country that has led to the false impression that only two out-groups are in play, which either categorize the socializer in a positive or in a negative way. However, by also taking account of the domestic mass level, the model presented here operates with four out-groups, where only out-group 1 has positive self- and other categorization processes at both the mass and elite level. Given that SIT tells us that positive self- and other categorization processes are a pre-requisite for successful socialization, it follows that socialization can only be expected to be achieved successfully at those levels where such positive self- and other categorization processes are in place. In the model presented here, out-groups 1, 2, and 3 have at least one level that sees the socializer as the "significant we," indicating that socialization within either both or one of the domestic levels may be successful. However it also indicates that unless a norm receiving country such as Iraq can be cast as an out-group 1 country, serious obstacles are in the way for successful socialization to move from one domestic level to the next. The problem seems to be that Iraq has been assumed by the Bush administration to be an out-group 1 country, where in actual fact it ought to have been categorized as an out-group 2 country.¹⁶ It was simply assumed that if given the opportunity, the Iraqi people would be against Saddam Hussein and in favor of democracy. However, it does not necessarily follow that because the majority of the population is against Saddam Hussein, that the Iraqi people will categorize the United States as the agent with the (for them) most persuasive norm set (liberal democracy), and hence as the "significant we." This is a serious problem for successful socialization of a liberal democratic norm set in Iraq, because as can be seen from the graphic illustration of the model, the only out-group with initially good prospects for successful socialization is out-group 1, followed by out-group 3 and then 2.¹⁷

It would appear that Iraq should be placed in out-group 2 rather than out-group 1, albeit that classification is not straightforward as the Iraqi people and elite are clearly deeply divided on the issue of what constitutes the most attractive norm set. The first democratic elections held in January 2005 showed that millions of Iraqis were willing to defy threats to their personal safety in order to participate in the first democratic elections of their lifetime; yet, the government eventually produced by the election may well turn out to have more in common with Shia Iran than with liberal democratic and secular America. The problem with an out-group 2 categorization is that values at the nation/people level are usually deeply embedded in long held traditions that are more difficult to change than the more "fickle" elite views. This means that socialization of democratic norms in Iraq is not impossible, but even if the political elite following the January election remains positively inclined to the socialized norm set, socialization at the nation/people level is likely to be a slow process even under optimal conditions without violence and a strained

relationship with the occupying forces. From the model, it is possible to hypothesize that socialization is only likely to proceed successfully through all filters and in cases in which both domestic levels have a positive self- and other categorization with the socializing agent and the promoted norm set has a high degree of domestic salience,¹⁸ resonating with its intended audience. In addition, with democratization, one will have to add the further preconditions incorporated in traditional democratization studies on whether the country in question actually has all the necessary preconditions for democratization to take hold. Hence successful socialization—consolidation and institutionalization of democracy—cannot be assumed to be possible unless Iraq gradually can be transferred from out-group 2 to out-group 1, probably through slow and patient on-the-ground persuasion.

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METHODS AND CONDITIONS FOR SOCIALIZATION

The graphical representation of the socialization processes in figure 1 indicates that the extent and form for socialization will vary with out-group position. Out-groups 1 and 2 have robust socialization processes into the state/elite level, but it is only in the case of out-group 1 that the process continues to the nation/people level. Similarly, different strategies (represented with arrows labeled “P” and “SI”) are available in the case of each out-group. This is important because the literature on social learning and socialization¹⁹ suggests that the actual method and manner of socialization may itself partly determine the level of successful socialization. I distinguish between two different socialization strategies, known as “social influence” (SI) and “persuasion” (P). “Social influence” elicits pro-norm behavior through the distribution of social rewards and punishments. In contrast “persuasion” encourages norm adoption through a process of interaction that involves changing attitudes without use of either material or mental coercion or material rewards.²⁰ Strategies of the “persuasion” type are generally believed to be more efficient for changing attitudes rather than merely changing behavior,²¹ but the use of persuasion is only possible under certain conditions.

Jeffrey Checkel has identified a number of conditions that appear to be necessary for successful socialization to take place.²² As already emphasized, the absolutely

necessary pre-condition for successful socialization is the existence of positive self- and other categorization processes. Before either "social influence" or "persuasion" can take place, the socializee must, at a minimum, identify with the in-group and its socializing agent, and the in-group must accept the out-group as an acceptable candidate for social group membership. As evidenced in the difficulty in constraining unwelcome behavior in "rogue states," the absence of a desire for membership and rejection of the in-group's norm set makes socialization impossible. Generally, socialization is most likely to take place if the socializee is in a novel and uncertain environment and hence, cognitively motivated to analyze new information, has few prior ingrained beliefs that are inconsistent with the norm set promoted by the socializer, the socializer appears to behave in a reasonable manner without demanding or lecturing to the socializee, and the socializer does not expect behavior that the socializee either cannot or will not adhere to. Furthermore, it is important that the socializer always behaves in a way that is consistent with the norm set being socialized and that the socializee has a clear understanding of what constitutes the desired behavior.

THE POST-CONFLICT SITUATION IN IRAQ

In many ways the democratization process in Iraq started out as a positive socialization process, which may well have had reasonable prospects for swift success, had the initial quite positive self- and other categorization been maintained. The United States administration was initially careful to point out that their quarrel was with Saddam Hussein and his supporters and not with the Iraqi people, and that any new political system would be designed with careful consideration for all of Iraq's ethnic and religious groups and with consideration for Iraq's complicated clan structure, and above all, with their active participation. Indeed, there was initially considerable success in working with Iraqis in their villages and neighborhoods to restore basic services, rebuild schools, and restart the local economy.²³ The result was that even in March 2004, despite a highly unsatisfactory security situation, Iraqi public opinion remained largely favorable to reconstruction showing more concern about the Americans leaving too soon than overstaying their welcome.²⁴ The majority of Iraqis seemed well aware that the credit for bringing down Saddam Hussein and his regime was due, principally, to the United States administration. Accordingly, many Iraqis welcomed the coalition forces as liberators, which ought to have started the socialization of democratic norms off on a good footing. However, the escalation of violence starting in March 2004 and followed by the scandal surrounding the use of torture in Abu Ghraib, as well as the failure to acknowledge, let alone, register Iraqi civilian casualties, has been immensely damaging.

The feeling that the occupation and the democratization process has not shown the respect for Iraqi concerns is quite widespread and pre-dates the escalation of violence from March 2004. The reason that the occupation, despite good intentions, has not gotten off to a good start is partly due to the fact that the United States-

appointed Interim Governing Council did not really establish any popular base, but was regarded with significant disdain and was generally seen as an American puppet unfamiliar and unconcerned with the Iraqi people.²⁵ However, it is the failure in establishing the necessary security for on-the-ground implementation of reconstruction and democratization that has been the most damaging. Nearly eighteen months after the fall of the Saddam regime, Iraqis saw their fear of Saddam Hussein and his repressive agencies replaced by terror of a different kind in the form of a surge in crime from petty theft to kidnappings, rape, and revenge killings as well as roadside bombings. They also increasingly fear arbitrary arrest and imprisonment with interrogation methods that are more akin to the discredited Ba'athist regime than to a liberal democratic one with commitments to the rule of law and human rights. In addition, they have been deprived even of the few basic necessities of daily life they used to enjoy, such as electricity, water, and fuel, not to mention their jobs.²⁶

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Because of the appalling security situation, all interim government officials and the few remaining aid workers are confined to the so-called Green Zone with little contact with Iraqi society.²⁷ When officials do venture out of the Green Zone, they do so under heavy guard and with as little contact with the Iraqi people as possible. In fact, the unexpected attacks by insurgent groups has meant that, in practice, the United States occupying forces have put security mission number three — protecting United States forces— first, to the neglect of missions number one and two — protecting the Iraqi people from lawlessness and protecting the Iraqi people from attack from remaining Saddam supporters.²⁸ The result is that those who should provide the Iraqis security are cut off from the general populace and only seen on rather infrequent high speed patrols in “Humvees” (fighting vehicles HMMWVs), or when conducting raids against suspected insurgents.²⁹ This goes against all experience from post-conflict reconstructions, where the value of foot patrols backed by helicopter and/or vehicles is well documented in both Northern Ireland and the Balkans.³⁰

The occupation also started out with a number of unfortunate mistakes, such as not foreseeing the immediate need for policing and security, and for not acknowledging and accepting responsibility for civilian casualties. Relations with the people in Falluja are said to have been damaged early on in the process when the United States

liberating forces not only shot dead a significant number of innocent Iraqis, but also failed to acknowledge their mistake and guilt and failed to offer the customary compensation.³¹ It is greatly resented by Iraqis that a great deal of attention is paid to the death of American soldiers, whereas the much larger death toll of ordinary Iraqis is not even recorded, let alone acknowledged and compensated. Another unfortunate mistake is the so-called Bremer decree on "de-Ba'athification." Just as the post-war German occupation started out with an overriding concern with "de-nazification,"³² so the Iraqi occupation started out with wiping the slate clean through the destruction of existing institutions, which amongst others, included the dismantling of the army, police, and government ministries, leading to thousands of Iraqis losing their jobs.

"COMPLEX SOCIALIZATION" IN A COMPLEX SITUATION

It seems clear from the, albeit rather superficial, account written in this paper that the current process of democratic norm socialization in Iraq cannot be described as a socialization process that is located in the out-group 1 category, which had good socialization prospects. Although it is not completely straightforward to localize Iraq into any of the four out-groups, because both the state/elite level and the nation/people level seem split in their ideational orientation, the trend seems to be that the ideational distance between socializer and socializee is widening rather than narrowing. It is not completely clear who actually constitutes the state/elite level, whether it is the Interim Government and soon the democratically elected government or whether it is the religious clerics. Nor is it yet clear how their influence is distributed within the population. The problem is that although the religious clerics who have taken on a political role may have a significant influence at the mass level, they may turn out to have a very different conception of democracy than that promoted by the occupying forces. On the other hand, the Interim Government, whose conception of democracy may be closer to the promoted norm set, does not have the emotional tie with the people; nor does the security situation allow for the necessary extensive contacts at the nation/people level. In the current unsatisfactory security situation, such a close relationship does not seem likely with the new democratically elected government, although that obviously will be endowed with a greater degree of legitimacy, but which might nevertheless remain as distant from the people as their American predecessors were, hence, making their socialization ability rather weak.

The situation in the area of personal security is immensely damaging to the prospects for establishing positive self- and other categorization processes. As it has simply not been possible for the United States occupying forces to establish an acceptable level of security for ordinary Iraqis and for the reconstruction process to proceed swiftly as originally anticipated, an unfortunate negative self- and other categorization process has been started. The result of the unsatisfactory security situation has resulted in deep frustration and perhaps a degree of lost respect for the

Americans on the part of Iraqis, who care more about freedom from torture and other sources of insecurity, as well as a functioning society and economy, than they do about liberal democratic principles. The United States has never been held in great esteem by the Iraqis because of its Middle East policy and its betrayal of the Shiite uprising following the first Gulf War, and partly because of general anti-Americanism. However, following the end of hostilities in April 2003, America was seen as a liberator rather than an occupier. This is no longer the case for a sizeable proportion of Iraqis, who now cast the Americans as occupiers or, at the very least, as incompetent liberators.

The only way socialization can be successful is through the use of positive social influence and persuasion strategies through partnership and dialogue, in which the socializer and its representatives behave in a manner that is not patronizing.

The negative categorization of the United States increased dramatically with the revelations of the use of torture by American forces. It is a clear precondition for successful socialization that the socializer behaves in a way that is wholly consistent with the socialized norm set. Therefore, even isolated instances of torture or indeed any behavior that does not correspond with human rights and democratic norms will be perceived as being inconsistent with the promoted norm set, and is therefore likely to be damaging for the prospects of successful norm socialization. As norm socializer, the socializer and *all* its agents must remain "squeaky clean" on all counts of the socialized norm set in order to maintain its position as a highly valued social group and "significant we." Iraqis are not only (quite rightly so) outraged at the revelations about torture and other bad behavior within the occupying forces, but they also feel they are being patronized. They are mistrustful because it is feared that the American democracy initiative has more to do with Western security concerns than with genuine concern for the benefit of the Iraqi people.³³ Unfortunately, the situation on the ground is like a vicious circle. The only way socialization can be successful is through the use of positive social influence and persuasion strategies through partnership and dialogue, in which the socializer and its representatives behave in a manner that is not patronizing and does not involve "lecturing or demanding;" yet, as the security situation has deteriorated, American forces on the ground have increasingly recast the Iraqi people from "liberated victim" to "dangerous enemy," leading them to behave in not just a patronizing manner, but in a downright disrespectful and unacceptable manner. Thus, what should have been a facilitating democratization process based on positive cooperation between the Iraqi people and the American military and CPA/Interim Government, has in effect turned into a fight for security with corresponding behavior that is not conducive for successful socialization. As expressed by Kenneth Pollack, "the priority placed on force

protection comes at the expense of the larger mission—the safety, psychological disposition, and dignity of the Iraqis.”³⁴ The problem is that although it is necessary for security reasons to presume that anyone targeted for a raid is “a bad guy,” even if he wasn’t before the raid, too often when the raid is over, he has *become* “a bad guy.”³⁵ Once such a negative dynamic has been started, it is difficult to reverse, giving rise to an ever spiraling cycle of negative self- and other categorization processes, with resulting detrimental effects on the possibility for socialization.

Extent of critical juncture

The war in Iraq and the subsequent end of Ba’athist rule certainly constitutes exactly the kind of critical juncture followed by an ideational vacuum, which is seen as a necessary pre-condition for norm change to take place. However, such a “window of opportunity” for socialization does not automatically mean that the norm set that is eventually adopted will be the one promoted by the occupying forces. Several different norm sets are being promoted by different norm promoters, which are likely to be in competition with each other. Different factors are likely to influence which norm set eventually will be the “winning idea set.” In this connection, it is important to note that only the Ba’athist regime and its norms have been destabilized, leaving cultural, ethnic, and religious norms in place, many of which may be incommensurable with a liberal democratic norm set. This is a problem as internal socialization from the state/elite level to the nation/people level is conducted partly by the new political elite in the form of the Interim Government and remaining aid agencies, but also partly by religious leaders, whose aim with democracy may well be the establishment of an Islamic state closer to the regime in Iran than to that envisaged by the United States.

The Bush administration has repeatedly used the example of post-war Germany and Japan as examples of successful socialization of a democratic norm set in a post-conflict situation. While the parallel undoubtedly is there, there are also important differences, which will make the socialization of democratic norms in Iraq less likely to be internalized than the norms were in post-war Germany and Japan. One of these factors is that the destruction of the social fabric in Iraq has been nowhere nearly as extensive as it was in post-war Germany and Japan. Although years of a repressive regime has rendered the general Iraqi civil society underdeveloped, there is more to build on in terms of civil society structures from within its religious and ethnic make-up. However, these initially positive “hooks” for hanging democratization efforts on can also turn out to be a liability when different interests have to be satisfied.

Identifying the “other” and “significant we”

Another way in which present day Iraq is very different from post-war Germany and Japan is the lack of a clearly identifiable “other.” The post-war German and Japanese socialization processes were not particularly successful until the onset of the Cold War in 1947, which clearly cast the Soviet Union as “the other” and the United States as the “significant we.” In the case of norm socialization in Iraq,

however, there is no clear-cut position within the population on who/what constitutes "the other." "The battle" for categorizing "the other" seems at the moment to be fought between the insurgent groups who are categorizing the United States as "the other" and the occupying forces, who are doing their best to categorize the insurgents as "the other."

Western involvement in the democratization process has to take place on the basis of partnership and dialogue with the actors in the region, with much closer attention paid to the cultural and religious linkages with politics and differences from Western culture and religion.

Just as there is no clearly identified "other," neither is there a clearly identified "significant we." The Iraqi people (and its constituent parts in terms of ethnic and religious groups) have several other alternatives than to cast the United States as its "significant we," some of which may be more in keeping with Iraqi history and traditions. Democracy may be of overriding importance to returned exiled Iraqis, and certainly seemed to have been valued by the many particularly Shiites who voted in the January elections, but there are linkages between religion and politics that have not been sufficiently addressed, and which may well have a significant influence on the process ahead. In particular, the different ethnic and religious groups at the nation/people level seem likely to have very different self- and other categorization processes and priorities from what has (artificially) been constructed as the Iraqi political elite. In the case of Sunnis, Shiites, and Kurds, the ideational distance to the United States is significant in terms of identification with democracy and in cultural terms, which in each case seem unlikely to cast the United States as a "significant we," although there may be elements of the socialized norm set that will appear attractive and useful with a post-Saddam Iraqi society. Therefore as suggested at a recent conference on democratization in the Middle East,³⁶ Western involvement in the democratization process has to take place on the basis of partnership and dialogue with the actors in the region, with much closer attention paid to the cultural and religious linkages with politics and differences from Western culture and religion. As such, what emerges is a much more complex and ultimately "murky" picture, that does not place the United States in a particularly strong position as the "significant we," but merely as a source of inspiration and, within some segments of Iraqi society, categorized as the "other." The result is that the socialization process lacks a clear direction and clear parameters for evaluating the socialized idea set and other competing idea sets, despite the many and varied socialization projects (using both social influence and persuasion strategies) undertaken in Iraq. This is not to say that democracy is not possible in Iraq, but merely to say that a model that is so explicitly based on a Western, liberal, Christian, and ultimately American outlook, may not be the obvious choice in the long run for Iraq or other countries in the Middle East, and that the United States may not be the best agent for promoting the norm set.

CONCLUSION

The situation in Iraq is clearly still in a stage of flux, which makes it very difficult to assess accurately how well socialization of the democratic norm set is proceeding. A wide variety of socialization projects have been undertaken, including television ads and radio programs, community-based projects around specific issues, and a clearly targeted re-education of previous Ba'athists, as well as many other projects. Yet, without a clearer definition by the Iraqi people on who constitutes the "significant we" and "the other," and without more positive self- and other categorization processes between Iraqis and the occupying forces, the prospects for successful socialization of a *Western* style liberal democratic norm set are not good. This is, of course, not good news for the Bush administration, whose policy in Iraq seems to have been part of a much more grand and daring plan for the greater Middle East, in which the toppling of Saddam Hussein and rapid democratization of Iraq was only a first step in a process to unleash a "democratic tsunami" in the whole Middle East.³⁷ Success will to a large extent depend on the Bush administration's willingness to accept a culturally specific version of democracy in Iraq (and the wider Middle East), and for it to accept that democratization is a slow process, which is likely to be characterized by many setbacks and only few "leaps ahead." The Bush administration must also understand that although democracy promotion in Iraq has turned out to be much more complicated and difficult than first anticipated, the task ahead in other Middle Eastern countries, which do not have the prerequisites seemingly in place in Iraq, is likely to be even more challenging. It may be that Iraq and other Middle Eastern countries can be democratized, but democratization at gunpoint is unlikely to be successful in the long run, and a true copy of Western liberal democracy is likely to remain an illusion.

Notes

¹ Described in David Aronovitch, "So this is free Baghdad," *The Guardian*, April 9, 2004.

² There is a rapidly growing literature on state socialization, but as yet no "consensus definition" on what it entails. For a general definition on socialization I follow Risse, Ropp and Sikkink, *The Power of Human Rights* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) in using Barnes et al. 1980 definition of socialization that is "the induction of new members...into the ways of behaviour that are preferred in a society," Barnes, Carter and Skidmore, *The World of Politics* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1980). By so doing socialization not only presupposes a society, but also that what is to be socialised is already practised by others.

³ The model is described in more detail in T. Flockhart, *Socializing Democratic Norms. The Role of International Organizations for the Construction of Europe* (Houndmills: Palgrave, 2005).

⁴ T. Farrell, "Transnational Norms and Military Development: Constructing Ireland's Professional Army," *European Journal of International Relations*, vol. 7, 2001, 64.

⁵ Practically all models of socialization such as the "Spiral Model" (Risse et. al., 1999); the "norm life-cycle model" (Finnemore and Sikkink, "International Norms Dynamics and Political Change," *International Organization*, vol. 52, 1998, 887– 917); and the "ideational life-cycle model" (M. Marcussen, *Ideas and Elites: The Social Construction of Economic and Monetary Union* (Aalborg: Aalborg University Press, 2000)) operate with a window of opportunity for norm socialization following a critical event, which may have destabilised the existing norm set.

⁶ Marcussen, *Ideas and Elites*.

⁷ E. Durkheim, *The Division of Labour in Society* (New York: Collier-Macmillan, 1964).

⁸ A. Giddens, *Durkheim* (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1978).

⁹ By international norms, I follow Finnemore and Sikkink in viewing such norms as the diffusion of "a standard of appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity, where the actors of the given identity are states, and where the process of norm diffusion takes place across state borders." Finnemore and Sikkink, *International Norm Dynamics*, 888.

¹⁰ For an analysis of the differences between democratic norm socialization in post-war Germany with post-conflict Iraq see T. Flockhart, "Uses and Abuses of Hegemony: Socialization of Democratic Norms in Post-war Germany and Post-war Iraq," paper presented at the International Studies Association Convention, Montreal, 2004.

¹¹ A realm in this connection is understood as a specific domain around a particular issue area around which social groups compare themselves. For example, football teams will undertake self- and other categorization with other football teams, but are unlikely to engage in such processes with hockey teams. An individual can belong to several social groups operating within different realms at the same time.

¹² J. Turner, *Rediscovering the Social Group* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987), 1.

¹³ Q. Ken Wang, "Hegemony, Socialization and US-Japanese policy cooperation," *Review of International Studies*, vol. 29, (2003): 99–120.

¹⁴ The term people/nation level is preferred to the term "mass level," because the term "people" denotes a we-feeling that the term "mass" does not, and because membership of a nation is a form of identity that is emotionally significant to people, but which does not necessarily denote emotional attachment to the associated "state."

¹⁵ T. Risse-Kappen "Ideas Do Not Float Freely: Transnational Coalitions, Domestic Structures, and the End of the Cold War," *International Organization*, vol. 48, no. 2 (1994): 185–214.

¹⁶ To be fair, Iraq is not an easy country to categorize as the elite in question would have to be the elite in exile rather than the Saddam supported elite, and as the ideational orientation of a violently suppressed people clearly has been difficult to assess. It is still not clear to what extent "significant we" orientation at the national/people level sees those promoting freedom and democracy as their "significant we" or those promoting the opportunity to freely follow a Shiite norm set.

¹⁷ The prospects for successful socialization in out-group 3 is dependent on regime change either through persuasion or through a critical juncture, both of which effectively will turn an out-group 3 country into an out-group 1 country, and hence speed up the process of socialization. Croatia after the death of Franco Tudjman made such an out-group switch and proceeded to rapid democratic norm socialization.

¹⁸ A. Cortell and J.W. Davis, "How Do International Institutions Matter? The Domestic Impact of International Rules and Norms," *International Studies Quarterly*, vol. 40, no. 4 (1996): 451–478.

¹⁹ A. Johnston, "Treating International Institutions as Social Environments," *International Studies Quarterly*, vol. 45, (2001): 487–515.

²⁰ Johnston, "Treating International Institutions," 499.

²¹ There is clearly a methodological problem in claiming that attitudinal change has taken place as a result of socialization, where the "safer option" is to concentrate purely on behavioural change, which can after all be measured. However, logic dictates that attitudes do change and that for example Germans do more than merely "behave" like democrats, and that a significant attitudinal change has taken place since the end of the Second World War.

²² The following list of conditions for successful socialization relies in large measure on the conditions compiled by J. Checkel in "The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory, *World Politics*, vol. 50, no. 2 (1998): 324–348; "Social Construction and Integration," *Journal of European Public Policy*, vol. 6, (1999): 545–560; "Why Comply?: Social Learning and European Identity Change," *International Organization*, vol. 55, (2001): 553–588.

²³ K. Pollack, *After Saddam: Assessing the Reconstruction of Iraq*, The Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution, 2004, 1–35.

²⁴ Jyllands-Posten, 17/3, 2004.

²⁵ Jyllands-Posten, 17/3, 2004.

²⁶ G. Atiyah, "Wanted in Iraq: A Roadmap to Free Elections" *Open Democracy*, vol. 16, 2003.

²⁷ M. Kaldor, "Iraq—the democratic option," *Open Democracy*, vol. 13, 2003.

²⁸ Pollack, *After Saddam*, 9.

²⁹ Pollack, *After Saddam*, 10.

³⁰ This point was made by NATO representatives at a NATO-Parliamentary Assembly seminar in Bratislava, 2002.

³¹ DR Nyhederne, 12/4, 2004.

³² This was done in spite of the fact that it is widely acknowledged that de-nazification was a mistake, which led to a high degree of German resentment, and which slowed down the post-war socialization process. See also Flockhart, "Use and Abuses of Hegemony."

³³ H. Malmvig, *Democratization and Security in the Middle East: Challenges and Possibilities*, Danish Institute for International Studies, 2005.

³⁴ Pollack, *After Saddam*, 14.

³⁵ Pollack, *After Saddam*, 14.

³⁶ "Democratization and Security in the Middle East: Challenges and Possibilities." Conference hosted by the Danish Institute for International Studies in Copenhagen, December 6-7, 2004.

³⁷ M. Ottaway and T. Carothers, "The Greater Middle East Initiative: Off to a False Start," *Carnegie Endowment Policy Brief*, no. 29, 2004.

Terrorism in Western Europe: An Approach to NATO's Secret Stay-Behind Armies

by Daniele Ganser

INTRODUCTION

Recent research has revealed secret armies have existed across Western Europe during the Cold War.¹ Coordinated by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), they were run by the European military secret services in close cooperation with the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the British foreign secret service Secret Intelligence Service (SIS, also MI6). Trained together with US Green Berets and British Special Air Service (SAS), these clandestine NATO soldiers, armed with underground arms-caches, prepared against a potential Soviet invasion and occupation of Western Europe, as well as the coming to power of communist parties. The clandestine international network covered the European NATO membership, including Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, and Turkey, as well as the neutral European countries of Austria, Finland, Sweden, and Switzerland.²

The existence of these clandestine NATO armies remained a closely guarded secret throughout the Cold War until 1990, when the first branch of the international network was discovered in Italy. It was code-named "*Gladio*," the Latin word for a short double-edged sword. While the press claimed the NATO secret armies were "the best-kept, and most damaging, political-military secret since World War II," the Italian government, amidst sharp public criticism, promised to close down the secret army.³ Italy insisted identical clandestine armies had also existed in all other countries of Western Europe. This allegation proved correct and subsequent research found that in Belgium, the secret NATO army was code-named SDRA8, in Denmark *Absalon*, in Germany TD BDJ, in Greece LOK, in Luxemburg Stay-Behind, in the Netherlands I&O, in Norway ROC, in Portugal Aginter, in Switzerland P26, in Turkey Counter-Guerrilla, and in Austria OWSGV. However, the code names of the secret armies in France, Finland, Spain, and Sweden remain unknown.

Upon learning of the discovery, the parliament of the European Union (EU) drafted a resolution sharply criticizing the fact:

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these organisations operated and continue to operate completely outside the law since they are not subject to any parliamentary control [and] called for a full investigation into the nature, structure, aims and all other aspects of these clandestine organisations.⁴

Yet only Italy, Belgium, and Switzerland carried out parliamentary investigations, while the administration of President George H. W. Bush refused to comment, being in the midst of preparations for the war against Saddam Hussein in the Persian Gulf, and fearing potential damages to the military alliance.

After World War Two, the idea to create secret armies was based on the fear of a communist invasion and occupation, or the take over of power by the Communist parties in Western Europe. The network was designed after the British Special Operations Executive (SOE), created by Winston Churchill in 1940 to assist resistance movements and carry out subversive operations in enemy held territory. According to the investigation of the Belgian Senate, preparations for unorthodox warfare continued after World War Two and preceded the creation of NATO.⁵ As of 1948, the so-called Clandestine Committee of the Western Union (CCWU) united senior officers of European military secret services in order to coordinate secret anti-communist warfare. After the creation of NATO in 1949, the CCWU was secretly integrated into NATO, and as of 1951, operated under the label Clandestine Planning Committee (CPC). Next to the CPC, a second secret army command center, labeled Allied Clandestine Committee (ACC), was set up in 1957 on the orders of NATO's Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (SACEUR). This military structure provided for significant US leverage over the secret stay-behind networks in Western Europe as the SACEUR, throughout NATO's history, has traditionally been a US General who reports to the Pentagon in Washington and is based in NATO's Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in Mons, Belgium. The ACC's duties included elaborating on the directives for the network, developing its clandestine capability, and organizing bases in Britain and the United States. In wartime, it was to plan stay-behind operations in conjunction with SHAPE.⁶ According to former CIA director William Colby, it was "a major program."⁷

In order to guarantee a solid anti-communist ideology of its recruits, the CIA and MI6 generally relied on men of the conservative political Right. At times, former Nazis and right-wing terrorists were also recruited. With the beginning of the "war on terrorism," in the wake of the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, secret extremist networks with a potential for violence are attracting renewed attention. Islamist terrorist organizations such as the Jemaah Islamiyah in Indonesia, the Hamas in Palestine, or variations of the international Al Qaida of Osama Bin Laden, as well as terrorist left-wing organizations such as the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) in Colombia are once again in the spotlight. In this context, the secret NATO armies are also being rediscovered. Two questions dominate the research. First, in which countries did the secret armies exist? And second, were they or are they linked to terrorist operations? Above all, the second question is very difficult to answer, as researchers are faced with numerous obstacles, including the classification or destruction of relevant documents. What

follows can therefore by no means be an exhaustive analysis of the NATO secret armies, but rather a very general first overview of the different national branches, as well as a summary of reports concerning the potential links of these armies to terrorism.

ITALY

Italian judge Felice Casson discovered the secret NATO army in summer 1990 in Rome while researching acts of right-wing terrorism in the archives of the Italian military secret service. He concluded that in Italy there were clear links to terrorist operations. During the Cold War, the United States and Great Britain feared the strong Italian Communist Party (PCI), in alliance with the Italian Socialist Party (PSI), might weaken NATO from within. Therefore, as Judge Casson explained in a British Broadcasting Corporation documentary on Gladio, a strategy of tension was employed to weaken the political parties on the left, in Italy, and beyond.⁸ Casson added,

That's to say, to create tension within the country to promote conservative, reactionary social and political tendencies. While this strategy was being implemented, it was necessary to protect those behind it because evidence implicating them was being discovered. Witnesses withheld information to cover right-wing extremists.⁹

According to Casson, the best documented case of this complicated and demonic strategy of tension occurred in the village Peteano in 1972 where three members of the Italian paramilitary police, the Carabinieri, had been killed by a car bomb. For many years, this terrorist attack was blamed on the Italian left-wing terror organization Red Brigades until Casson reopened the case and found right-wing terrorist Vincenzo Vinciguerra had carried out the crime. Casson arrested Vinciguerra, who on trial in 1984 testified it had been comparatively easy for him to escape and hide because large segments of the Italian security apparatus had shared his anti-communist convictions, and therefore silently supported crimes that discredited the Left. After the bombing, Vinciguerra recalled,

A whole mechanism came into action... the Carabinieri, the Minister of the Interior, the customs services, and the military and civilian intelligence services accepted the ideological reasoning behind the attack.¹⁰

Vinciguerra explained at his trial in 1984,

With the massacre of Peteano and with all those that have followed, the knowledge should by now be clear that there existed a real live structure, occult and hidden, with the capacity of giving a strategic direction to the outrages. [This structure] lies within the state itself. There exists in Italy a secret force parallel to the armed forces, composed of civilians and

military men, in an anti-Soviet capacity, that is, to organise a resistance on Italian soil against a Russian army.

With this far-reaching testimony, Vinciguerra revealed the existence of the Gladio secret army and linked it to terrorism, insisting what he was describing was “a secret organisation, a super-organisation with a network of communications, arms, and explosives, and men trained to use them.” As a right-wing terrorist, Vinciguerra insisted this

super-organisation, lacking a Soviet military invasion which might not happen, took up the task, on NATO's behalf, of preventing a slip to the left in the political balance of the country. This they did, with the assistance of the official secret services and the political and military forces.¹²

Based on this testimony of Vinciguerra and the findings of Casson, numerous Italians, above all on the political Left, are convinced today that Gladio was a terrorist organization and both the CIA and NATO have promoted terror in their country. Supported by Judge Casson, a group of Italian parliamentarians under the presidency of Senator Giovanni Pellegrini, investigated Gladio and in 1995 presented a 370 page long public report in which they cautiously confirmed that the “CIA [had] enjoyed maximum discretion” in Italy during the Cold War.¹³ In 2000, a second parliamentary investigation into Gladio carried out by the leftist Gruppo Democratici di Sinistra concluded in a more outspoken fashion the strategy of tension had been supported by the United States in order to “stop the PCI, and to a certain degree also the PSI, from reaching executive power in the country.”¹⁴

Those massacres, those bombs, those military actions had been organised or promoted or supported by men inside Italian state institutions and, as has been discovered more recently, by men linked to the structures of United States intelligence.¹⁵

General Giandelio Maletti, a former head of Italian counterintelligence, in March 2001, confirmed the CIA might have promoted terrorism in Italy. After the so-called *Piazza Fontana* massacre, which in 1969 had killed sixteen and wounded eighty, parts of the bomb had been planted in the villa of well known leftist editor Giangiacomo Feltrinelli in order to blame the terror on the Communists. “The impression was that the Americans would do anything to stop Italy from sliding to the left,” Maletti explained. He concluded,

The CIA, following the directives of its government, wanted to create an Italian nationalism capable of halting what it saw as a slide to the left, and, for this purpose, it may have made use of right-wing terrorism... Don't forget that Nixon was in charge and Nixon was a strange man, a very intelligent politician, but a man of rather unorthodox initiatives.¹⁶

TURKEY

During the Cold War, Turkey guarded a third of NATO's total borders with Warsaw Pact countries and operated the largest armed forces in Europe and the second largest in NATO after the United States. Several years before Turkey joined NATO on April 4, 1952, a secret stay-behind army was set up in the country under the code-name "Counter-Guerrilla." The Counter-Guerrilla was operative throughout the Cold War and carried out some of the most sensitive missions of the Turkish military.¹⁷ Following the Gladio revelations in Italy, General Kemal Yilmaz, chief of the Turkish special forces, on December 3, 1990 officially confirmed the existence of this secret NATO network. He explained the stay-behind army was under the command of the Turkish special forces and had the task "to organise resistance in the case of a communist occupation."¹⁸

When questioned by the press, former Turkish prime minister Bulent Ecevit recalled he had learned of the existence of this secret stay-behind army and the special forces for the first time in 1974. At the time, the commander of the Turkish army, General Semih Sancar, had allegedly informed him the United States had financed the unit since the immediate post-war years.¹⁹ "There are a certain number of volunteer patriots whose names are kept secret and are engaged for life in this special department," the Prime Minister was told, adding, "They have hidden arms caches in various parts of the country."²⁰ When Ecevit implied in front of the press that the Counter-Guerrilla units might have been involved in domestic terror, acting Defense Minister Giray snapped, "Ecevit had better keep his...mouth shut! [sic]."²¹

Yet Ecevit was not intimidated and declared he suspected Counter-Guerrilla's involvement in the Taskim Square massacre in Istanbul in 1977, during which a protest rally of half a million citizens, organized by trade unions on May 1, had been gunned down by snipers on surrounding buildings, leaving thirty-eight killed and hundreds injured. According to Ecevit, the shooting lasted for twenty minutes, yet several thousand policemen on the scene did not intervene. When he had phoned Turkish President Fahri Koruturk and suggested a potential link to Counter-Guerrilla, Ecevit noted "Koruturk relayed my fears to the then Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel," who had succeeded Ecevit in office. Upon hearing the news Demirel

“reacted in a very agitated manner” but was unable to challenge the powerful Turkish military and the special forces.²²

According to Talat Turhan, a former Turkish general, the Counter-Guerrilla had also engaged in torture, noting,

*In the torture villa in Erenköy in Istanbul the torture team of retired officer Eyüp Ozalkus, chief of the [Turkish intelligence service] MIT's interrogation team for the combat of communism, blindfolded me and tied up my arms and feet. Then they told me that I was now 'in the hands of a Counter Guerrilla unit operating under the high command of the Army outside the constitution and the laws.' They told me that they 'considered me as their prisoner of war and that I was sentenced to death.'*²³

Turhan survived the torture and became one of the most outspoken critics of the Counter-Guerrilla.

*When it was discovered in 1990 that Italy had an underground organisation called Gladio, organised by NATO and controlled and financed by the CIA, which was linked to acts of terrorism within the country, Turkish and foreign journalists approached me and published my explanations as they knew that I have been researching the field for 17 years.*²⁴

Still today, Turhan insists that the EU should carry out an investigation, as the Turkish parliament and government had insufficient leverage over the Turkish military in the past. Turhan explained “in Turkey the special forces in the style of Gladio are called Counter-Guerrilla by the public.” He confirmed and lamented, “despite all my efforts and initiatives of political parties, democratic mass organisations and the media the Counter-Guerrilla has still not been investigated.”²⁵

New York journalist Lucy Komisar found not only the EU, but also the US shied away from investigating the Counter-Guerrilla, revealing,

*As for Washington's role, Pentagon would not tell me whether it was still providing funds or other aid to the Special Warfare Department; in fact, it wouldn't answer any questions about it ... I was told by officials variously that they knew nothing about it, that it happened too long ago for there to be any records available, or that what I described was a CIA operation for which they could provide no information. One Pentagon historian said, 'Oh, you mean the stay-behind organization. That's classified.'*²⁶

SPAIN

During most of the Cold War, Spain was a right-wing dictatorship, ruled by Francisco Franco through his victory in the Spanish Civil War of 1939 until his death in 1975. Investigations into the Spanish stay-behind army cannot therefore be compared with similar inquiries, such as those in the Danish government, as Spanish diplomats correctly insisted in 1990. Calvo Sotelo, Spanish prime minister from February 1981 to December 1982, explained to journalists that during Franco's dictatorship, “the very government was Gladio.”²⁷ Defense minister under the Sotelo government, Alberto Oliart, thought it would be childish to investigate alleged acts

of terrorism of an anti-communist secret army in Spain in the 1950s because "here Gladio was the government."²⁸

Acting Spanish defense minister Narcis Serra found it more difficult to provide details to an inquisitive parliament. In November 1990, he misleadingly claimed Spain had never been a member of the secret stay-behind network, "either before or after the socialist government."²⁹ He cautiously added he was basing his evaluation on documents which the Spanish military secret service, known as CESID, had provided to him, and that "it has been suggested there were some contacts in the 1970s, but it is going to be very difficult for the current secret service to be able to verify that type of contact."³⁰

While the Spanish parliament protested that its own government was not providing the data requested, a former Italian general offered more precise data. Gerardo Serravalle, commander of the Italian stay-behind force from 1971 to 1974, recalled in his book *Gladio* that Franco had attempted to establish contacts with the NATO secret army long before Spain became an official member of NATO in 1982. According to Serravalle, NATO's stay-behind command center CPC discussed the admission of Spain in 1973 to the CPC during meetings in Brussels and in Paris. The French military secret service and the dominant CIA had allegedly requested the admission of the Spanish network, while Italy represented by Serravalle, had allegedly opposed the suggestion. Representatives of the Spanish secret service, according to Serravalle, were not interested in the stay-behind function but wanted to gain a tool for domestic control. "In all meetings there is 'an hour of truth,' one must only wait for it," Serravalle related about the meeting. He continued, stating,

It is the hour in which the delegates of the secret services, relaxed with a drink or a coffee, are more inclined to speak frankly. In Paris this hour came during the coffee break. I approached a member of the Spanish service and started by saying his government had maybe overestimated the reality of the danger of the threat from the East. I wanted to provoke him. He, looking at me in complete surprise, admitted that Spain had the problem of the communists (los rojos). There we had it, the truth.³¹

It was alleged thereafter, the Spanish stay-behind officers were welcomed by both the CPC and ACC.

PORTUGAL

Under the headline "'Gladio' was active in Portugal," the Portuguese press in 1990 informed a stunned national audience "a secret network, erected at the bosom of NATO and financed by the CIA ... had a branch in Portugal in the 1960s and the 1970s. It was called 'Aginter Press.'" ³² Allegedly, the network had been involved in assassination operations in Portugal and in the Portuguese colonies in Africa.³³ While no parliamentary investigation was carried out in Portugal, the Italian Senate inquiry into Gladio found that Yves Guerin-Serac, a French specialist in secret warfare and

veteran of the French war in Vietnam, the US war in Korea, and the French war in Algeria, had directed the secretive *Aginter Press*.

[This unit.] according to the latest documents acquired by the criminal investigation, was an information center directly linked to the CIA and the Portuguese secret service [Policia Internacional e de Defesa do Estado, PIDE], that specialized in provocation operations.³⁴

Whether Portugal's dictator, Antonio Oliveira Salazar (1889-1970), who had supported Spanish dictator Franco during the Spanish civil war and led his country into NATO as a founding member in 1949, had been aware of the existence of Aginter remains unclear. In November of 1990, Portuguese defense minister Fernando Nogueira firmly insisted he had no knowledge of the existence of any kind of Gladio branch in Portugal, and declared neither in his Defense Ministry, nor in the General Staff of the Portuguese Armed Forces existed, "any information whatsoever concerning the existence or activity of any 'Gladio structure' in Portugal."³⁵

Thus, it was left to the Italians to confirm the reality of Aginter, which according to Italian judge, Guido Salvini, carried out secret military operations during the Cold War based on the "aims and values...which in their essence are the defence of the Western world against a probable and imminent invasion of Europe by the troops of the Soviet Union and the communist countries."³⁶ Anti-communist militant Guérin-Serac himself confirmed that many of their men were,

officers who have come to us from fighting in Indo-China and Algeria, and some who even enlisted with us after the battle for Korea, [as well as] intellectuals who, during this same period, turned their attention to the study of the techniques of Marxist subversion.³⁷

Together they aimed,

to dissect the techniques of Marxist subversion and to lay the foundations of a counter-technique ... During this period we have systematically established close contacts with like-minded groups emerging in Italy, Belgium, Germany, Spain or Portugal, for the purpose of forming the kernel of a truly Western League of Struggle against Marxism.³⁸

Operating on a global scale, militant Aginter terrorists allegedly participated in Guatemalan terror and counter-terrorist operations from 1968 to 1971 together with the CIA and US Green Berets, in which thousands were killed. They were also involved in the overthrow of socialist President Salvador Allende in Chile in 1973.³⁹

Following Portugal's "Revolution of the Flowers" in May 1974, the Aginter headquarters in the Rua das Pracas in Lisbon were closed down and Guérin-Serac fled the country. Italian journalist Barbachetto of the magazine *L'Europeo* later recalled,

[The Aginter documents] were destroyed by the Portuguese military, because obviously they feared diplomatic complications with the governments of Italy, France, and Germany, if the activities of Aginter in the various European countries would be revealed.⁴⁰

GREECE

To prevent a communist-led Greek resistance from taking power after the end of World War Two, British prime minister, Winston Churchill ordered a secret army to be created in Greece in late 1944. It became known variously as the Greek Mountain Brigade, the Hellenic Raiding Force, or Lochos Oreinion Katadromon, (with its Greek acronym LOK). In order to guarantee its members were staunchly anti-communist, LOK commander, Field Marshall Alexander Papagos excluded, "almost all men with views ranging from moderately conservative to left wing."⁴¹

When Greece joined NATO in 1952, LOK, under the command of Papagos, was firmly integrated into the European stay-behind network. The CIA and LOK reconfirmed on March 25, 1955 their mutual cooperation in a secret document signed by United States General Trascott for the CIA, and Konstantin Dovas, chief of staff of the Greek military.⁴² British journalist Peter Murtagh found,

The Raiding Force doubled as the Greek arm of the clandestine pan-European guerrilla network set up in the 1950s by NATO and the CIA which was controlled from NATO headquarters in Brussels by the Allied Coordination Committee.⁴³

He also relates,

The idea behind the network was that it would operate as a stay-behind force after a Soviet invasion of Europe. It would co-ordinate guerrilla activities between Soviet occupied countries and liaise with governments in exile.⁴⁴

In addition to preparing for a Soviet invasion, the CIA instructed LOK to prevent a leftist coup. According to former CIA agent Philipp Agee,

The Greek-American CIA officer recruited several groups of Greek citizens for what the CIA called 'a nucleus for rallying a citizen army against the threat of a leftist coup' ... Each of the several groups was trained and equipped to act as an autonomous guerrilla unit, capable of mobilizing and carrying on guerrilla warfare with minimal or no outside direction.⁴⁵

In Greece, as in all countries of Western Europe, the stay-behind was equipped with light weapons hidden in arms caches. Agee maintains,

These guerrilla groups were armed with automatic weapons, as well as small mountain mortars. The weapons were stored in several places. Most of the military supplies were cached in the ground and in caves. Each member of these paramilitary groups knew where

*such cached weaponry was hidden, in order to be able to mobilize himself to a designated spot, without orders.*⁴⁶

Agee, who was sharply criticized in the United States for having revealed sensitive information, insisted,

*Paramilitary groups, directed by CIA officers, operated in the sixties throughout Europe [and he stressed that] perhaps no activity of the CIA could be as clearly linked to the possibility of internal subversion.*⁴⁷

There is a possibility the LOK was directly involved in the Greek military coup d'état on April 20, 1967, which took place one month before the scheduled national elections for which opinion polls predicted an overwhelming victory of the left-leaning Center Union of George and Andreas Papandreou.⁴⁸ Based on a NATO-designed response to a communist insurgency, the so-called Prometheus plan, the LOK under the command of paratrooper Lieutenant Colonel Costas Aslanides, took control of the Greek Defense Ministry. In the darkness of the night, tanks with flashlights rolled into Athens and under the command of Brigadier General Sylianos Pattakos gained control over communication centers, the parliament, the royal palace, and according to detailed lists, arrested over 10,000 people. Many of those arrested were later tortured. Phillips Talbot, the United States ambassador in Athens, disapproved of the operation and complained to the CIA chief of station in Athens, Jack Maury, that the coup represented, "a rape of democracy," to which Maury answered, "How can you rape a whore?"⁴⁹

Those arrested and imprisoned by the military in 1967 included Andreas Papandreou and his father George. After years of exile in Canada and Sweden, Andreas Papandreou returned to Greece, won the 1981 election for prime minister, and formed the first socialist government of Greece's post-war history. According to his own testimony, he discovered the existence of the secret NATO army, then codenamed "Red Sheepskin," as acting prime minister in 1984 and had given orders to dissolve it. Papandreou's defense minister, Nikos Kouris confirmed he believed the secret deal with the CIA represented an "unacceptable pact."⁵⁰

In 1990, the socialist opposition called for a parliamentary investigation into the secret army and its alleged link to terrorism and the 1967 coup d'état. Public order minister Yannis Vassiliadis declared that there was no need to investigate such "fantasies" as,

Sheepskin was one of 50 NATO plans which foresaw that when a country was occupied by an enemy there should be an organised resistance. It foresaw arms caches and officers

*who would form the nucleus of a guerrilla war. In other words, it was a nationally justifiable act.*⁵¹

FRANCE

The first French secret stay-behind army, which had been set up immediately after the end of World War Two when both Washington and London feared strong French communists might seize power, was discovered and closed down very quickly. "Towards the end of 1946 we got to know of the existence of a black resistance network, made up of resistance fighters of the extreme right, Vichy collaborators and monarchists," French socialist minister of the interior Edouard Depreux declared to the public in June 1947. He asserted "They had a secret attack plan called '*Plan Bleu*', which should have come into action either towards the end of July or on August 6, [1947]."⁵² The secret army was closed down amidst public criticism of the plan's aim of installing a right-wing government in France.

Due to the persistent fear of the strength of French communists, the military secret service Service de Documentation Extérieure et de Contre-Espionnage (SDECE) under Henri Alexis Ribiere set up a second secret army. "There were probably a lot of Frenchmen who wanted to be ready if something happened," retired CIA officer Edward Barnes later confirmed. Recalling his own work in France he stressed that a Soviet occupation was the primary motivation of the French secret army, while promoting anti-communist political activity in the country, "might have been a secondary consideration."⁵³

When in the early 1960s, large segments of the French military and secret services started to strongly disapprove of President Charles de Gaulle and his intention to allow the former colony of Algeria to become an independent country, the secret army began to see the ruling government of de Gaulle as an enemy alongside the communists. Some "terrorist actions" against de Gaulle and his Algerian peace plan had been carried out by groups that included "a limited number of people" from the French stay-behind network, former director of the French military secret service DGSE Admiral Pierre Lacoste confirmed in 1990.⁵⁴ Lacoste, who resigned in 1985 after the DGSE had blown up the Greenpeace ship *Rainbow Warrior* that was protesting French atomic testing in the Pacific, stressed that despite links to terrorism, he believed Soviet contingency plans for invasion nevertheless justified the stay-behind program.

Socialist François Mitterrand, French president from 1981 to 1995, was less enthusiastic and made all attempts to distance himself from the French secret army when questioned by the press in 1990. "When I arrived I didn't have much left to dissolve. There only remained a few remnants, of which I learned the existence with some surprise because everyone had forgotten about them."⁵⁵ Italian Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti, however, was not amused to see how the French played down their role in the stay-behind conspiracy, and mercilessly declared to the press that far from

having been closed down long ago, representatives of the French secret army had recently taken part in a secret ACC meeting in Brussels on October 24, 1990. When this was confirmed, it caused considerable embarrassment in Paris; Mitterrand refused any further comment.

GERMANY

When socialist parliamentarian Hermann Scheer learned of the existence of a secret right-wing army in Germany in late 1990, he insisted this mysterious "Ku-Klux-Klan" had to be investigated at the highest levels,

because the existence of an armed military secret organisation outside all governmental or parliamentary control is incompatible with the constitutional legality, and therefore must be prosecuted according to the criminal law.⁵⁶

Thereafter, Scheer was discretely informed that the socialists during their time in government had also covered up the secret army, whereupon his criticism faded away and led him to withdraw his request for an investigation.

Meanwhile, the press continued to claim that right-wing extremists and former Nazis had been recruited into the mysterious secret army with the help of General Reinhard Gehlen, director of the first German intelligence service. The service was tellingly called Organisation Gehlen (ORG) before it changed its name to BND. Gehlen had served under Hitler on the Soviet front in World War Two, and according to historian Christopher Simpson, had "derived much of his information from his role in one of the most terrible atrocities of the war: the torture, interrogation, and murder by starvation of some 4 million Soviet prisoners of war."⁵⁷ The information he gathered made Gehlen a valuable asset, and, in 1945, United States President Truman saved him from the Nuremberg trials and installed him as chief of ORG in occupied Germany.

Under Gehlen, Germany had "incorporated the full espionage outfit" of the war into the secret army, an unnamed former NATO intelligence official recalled.⁵⁸ The official noted, "This is well known since Gehlen was the spiritual father of Stay Behind in Germany and his role was known to the West German leader, Konrad Adenauer, from the outset."⁵⁹ Adenauer had allegedly

signed a secret protocol with the US on West Germany's entry into NATO in May 1955 in which it was agreed that the West German authorities would refrain from active legal pursuit of known right wing extremists.⁶⁰

Documents supporting such a far-reaching claim have so far not been made accessible to researchers. But the data gathered in the wake of an early exposure of the German secret army in the 1950s indirectly supports the claim.

On September 9, 1952, former SS officer Hans Otto walked into the police headquarters of Frankfurt and, according to the German governmental records, "declared to belong to a political resistance group, the task of which was to carry out

sabotage activities and blow up bridges in case of a Soviet invasion.” According to Otto, some 100 members of the organization had been instructed in political ideology and secret warfare, and although,

officially neo-fascist tendencies were not required, most members of the organisation featured them. The financial means to run the organisation had been provided by an American citizen with the name of Sterling Garwood.⁶¹

Otto revealed that the secret army was codenamed Technischer Dienst des Bundes Deutscher Jugend (TD BDJ), commanded by Erhard Peters, and financed by the CIA. Otto claimed,

The idea of the Americans was to have all members overrun by the Soviets, and to use them as partisans afterwards. However, this American plan could not be realized by Peters since all men interested in the organization under all circumstances wanted to escape to the West in case of a Soviet invasion.⁶²

The TD BDJ, as Otto revealed, had drawn up blacklists of persons, most of whom were communists or socialists according to the police, who were to be liquidated in case of an emergency.

August Zinn, Prime Minister of the German state Hessen, was furious when he learned of the secret army and pressed for a juridical investigation on the highest levels. Yet already on September 30, 1952, the highest German court, Bundesgerichtshof (BGH), in Karlsruhe ordered all arrested TD BDJ members to be released. The responsible BGH judges Schrübbers and Wagner had not even contacted the police in Frankfurt, or consulted the confiscated material beforehand. Prime Minister Zinn was completely baffled by the high level protection these Nazi secret soldiers seemed to enjoy and concluded, “The only legal explanation for these releases can be that the people in Karlsruhe declared that they acted upon American direction.”⁶³

The German secret army and its links to right-wing extremists came back to haunt the German police when on September 26, 1980 a bomb exploded in the midst of the popular Munich Oktober festival killing thirteen and wounding 213. The bomb trail led to the neo-Nazi group named “Wehrsportgruppe Hoffmann,” whose members already testified to the police one day after the massacre that forest ranger and right-wing extremist Heinz Lembke had provided them with the explosives. “Mister Lembke showed us different sorts of explosives,” Raymund Hörnle testified, adding, “He said that he had many caches full of such material buried in the wood, and that he could provide a lot of them...Mister Lembke told us that he was instructing people in the use of explosive devices.”⁶⁴

This testimony was confirmed when on October 26, 1981, Lembke’s massive underground arms caches were discovered near the village of Uelzen in the Lüneburger Heide. The thirty-three caches contained automatic weapons, chemical combat equipment, 14,000 shots of munitions, fifty anti-tank guns, 156 kilo-grams of explosives, 230 explosive devices, 258 hand grenades, and may have been part of

the post-occupation supplies of the German stay-behind army.⁶⁵ Lembke was arrested and soon after found dead hanged in his prison cell. Socialist parliamentarian Herta Däubler-Gmelin thereafter asked the government, "Could you tell us now whether after the discovery of the arms caches and the arrest of Mister Lembke a new understanding of the...Munich massacre has arisen?" The question was to the point, but the answer was lacking as State Secretary von Schoeler replied, "There is no connection."⁶⁶

AUSTRIA

The cover of the first Austrian secret army was blown two years after the end of World War Two, when a right-wing stay-behind network was discovered in 1947. The so-called Soucek-Rössner conspiracy led to the arrest of a number of right-wing extremists. During the trial, both Soucek and Rössner testified they had recruited and trained partisan units for the eventuality of a Soviet invasion, insisting they were carrying out the secret operation with the full knowledge and support of the US and British occupying powers. The judges found them guilty of conspiracy and sentenced them to death in 1949. Yet, thereafter, Theodor Körner, Austrian Chancellor from 1951 to 1957, pardoned the right-wing conspirators under mysterious circumstances.⁶⁷

Living on a fragile Cold War border, senior members of the Austrian government decided that a stay-behind army would enhance the security of the neutral state, thus with the cooperation of MI6 and the CIA, Franz Olah set up a new secret army codenamed Österreichischer Wander-Sport-und Geselligkeitsverein (OWSGV). "We bought cars under this name. We installed communication centres in several regions of Austria," Olah later explained and confirmed that "special units were trained in the use of weapons and plastic explosives."⁶⁸ More than anything else, Olah feared that Austrian communists would take over power. He stated,

It wasn't our intention to fight communism in the Soviet Union but to fight against the attempts of communism in our own country. We took weapons. We also had modern plastic explosives that were easy to handle. I had a small arsenal of weapons in my office. There must have been a couple of thousand people working for us. ... [O]nly very, very highly positioned politicians and some members of the union knew about it.⁶⁹

In 1990, when secret armies linked to NATO and the CIA were discovered across Western Europe, the Austrian government, fearing for the reputation of its neutrality, claimed that no secret army had existed in the country. Yet six years later, the United States newspaper, the *Boston Globe*, revealed the existence of secret CIA arms caches in Austria. Austrian President Thomas Klestil and Austrian Chancellor Franz Vranitzky angrily insisted they had known absolutely nothing of the existence of the secret army and demanded that the United States launch a full-scale investigation into the violation of Austria's permanent neutrality.⁷⁰ The US administration of

President Bill Clinton strictly declined to carry out such a full-scale investigation and sent forward State Department spokesman Nicholas Burns who insisted,

The aim was noble, the aim was correct, to try to help Austria if it was under occupation. What went wrong is that successive Washington administrations simply decided not to talk to the Austrian government about it.⁷¹

In response to journalists' questions, Burns confirmed that similar networks with arms caches had also existed in several other European countries, which he could not name, however, "for fear of forgetting some countries."⁷² In August 2001 President George Bush appointed Nicholas Burns as the United States Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization where, as ambassador to NATO, he headed the combined State-Defense Department United States Mission to NATO and coordinated the NATO response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.

SWITZERLAND

In neutral Switzerland, a parliamentary investigation into the defense department in November 1990 revealed a secret stay-behind army, first codenamed Special Service and then P26, had existed within the Swiss military secret service Untergruppe Nachrichtendienst und Abwehr (UNA) during most of the Cold War. The parliamentarians concluded,

Irrespective of its members, whom the commission does not suspect of any intentions to harm the state, a secret organization equipped with weapons and explosives in itself represents a potential danger for the constitutional order as long as it is not factually controlled by the constitutional political organs... The commission has found that this factual control of the P26 organization through the highest national organs was not given [whereupon the secret army was dissolved].⁷³

Switzerland has neither suffered from any coup d'états nor from acts of terrorism throughout the Cold War. The parliamentarians, who had been surprised by the very existence of a secret army, were relieved they had found no links to terrorism from neither the P26, nor its predecessors. "I was shocked that something like that is at all possible," the president of the parliamentary commission Senator Carlo Schmid concluded, stressing that he was glad to leave "the conspiratorial atmosphere" which during the investigations had weighed upon him "like a black shadow."⁷⁴

In a follow-up investigation, the parliament gave Swiss judge Pierre Cornu the task of investigating whether the secret army had been part of the NATO network, and thus violated Swiss neutrality. Cornu found that P26 cooperated very closely with the British MI6 and their special forces, the SAS, with P26 cadres training in Great Britain as well as British officers going to Switzerland for specialized trainings. Taking note of this close and secret cooperation, the Swiss government classified the Cornu report as top secret, and only published a short summary in which it claimed that Swiss neutrality had not been violated.⁷⁵

BELGIUM

Socialist defense minister Guy Coeme in the evening of November 7, 1990 revealed to a stunned national television audience that a NATO linked secret army had existed in Belgium during the Cold War. He added, "I want to know whether there exists a link between the activities of this secret network, and the wave of crime and terror which our country suffered from during the past years."⁷⁶

Thereafter, a detailed parliamentary investigation of the Belgian Senate found that the Belgian secret army had consisted of two branches, known as SDRA8 and STC/Mob. SDRA8 was the military branch located within the Belgian military secret service Service Général du Renseignement (SGR) under the direction of the Defense Ministry. The members of SDRA8 were military men, trained in unorthodox warfare, combat and sabotage, parachute jumping, and maritime operations. In case of a Soviet occupation of the country, SDRA8 agents would have been in charge of accompanying the government abroad, establishing liaisons with the secret agents in Belgium, and fighting the enemy. STC/Mob was located within the civilian secret service, Sûreté de L'Etat (Sûreté), under the direction of the ministry of justice. The members of the civilian STC/Mob were technicians trained to operate a radio station with the task of collecting intelligence under conditions of enemy occupation which could be useful to the government in exile.⁷⁷

The Belgian senators also found that the secret NATO armies had carried out international exercises at regular intervals. They found,

*One must note two points regarding these exercises. First of all, we are dealing here with an international network that could evacuate clandestinely a person from Norway to Italy. This implies a very close collaboration and strict co-ordination on an international level between a series of secret services.*⁷⁸

The operations, according to the findings of the Belgian investigation, were carried out very professionally. The investigation noted,

*What is also astonishing is the perfect technical infrastructure which the stay-behind was equipped with: The persons and the material were moved on or intercepted by sea, by air, by parachute. Their arrival zones were marked and controlled. The persons were housed in secure buildings.*⁷⁹

While the Belgian Senators were able to clarify the stay-behind dimension of the secret army, they faced insurmountable obstacles with respect to the terror investigation that Defense Minister Coeme had urged them to carry out. Between 1983 and 1985, Belgium had suffered from the so-called Brabant massacres in the area around Brussels which left twenty-eight people dead, many more injured, and a country in shock. In one of the attacks, three armed men with hoods over their heads had entered a supermarket and with pump-action shotguns opened fire at point blank range. In the ensuing massacre, eight people died and seven more were injured. The terrorists showed no mercy, killing one entire family at the supermarket checkout,

while a father and his nine year-old daughter who tried to flee were killed in their car. The money taken in the raid amounted to a meager couple of thousand pounds, found later in a canal in an unopened sack. In another attack on a food store, the terrorists first killed a couple and then, instead of fleeing, recklessly waited for the police to arrive who ran right into the ambush. The Brabant terrorists were never identified or caught.

In order to clarify whether members of the Belgian secret army had been involved in the brutal Brabant massacres, the senators ordered M. Raes (director of the Sûreté from 1977 to 1990 and chief of STC/Mob) and Lieutenant Colonel Bernard Legrand (chief of the Belgian military secret service, and chief of SDRA8) to provide them with the list of names, or at least the birth dates of the secret soldiers. Both refused to cooperate. This was illegal, for both Justice Minister Wathélet, the superior of Raes, and Defense Minister Coeme, the superior of Legrand, had explicitly and imperatively ordered their subordinates to cooperate, who furthermore were bound by the constitution to answer to the legislative branch.

Legrand declared,

Whatever the Minister says, there remain very good reasons not to reveal the names of the clandestines... I will remain firm... When I read the articles in the press, I can not believe that one can be so intensively interested in such problems, while there are so many other important things.⁸⁰

The Senators were baffled and kept up the pressure for three more months. In the end, they could not gain access to the names of the secret soldiers, nor could they identify the men behind the Brabant terror. Legrand celebrated his victory with an encoded statement in the leading Belgian daily, *Le Soir*:

'Give us the names!' 'Never!' reply the 'Gladiators.' The hour of truth [l'heure du choc] has come. This is Brussels calling. Dear friends in Operation Stay Behind, section SDRA8 assures you of its very high esteem and thanks you for your devotion to your country. They guarantee that the pressures and threats will be empty and that undertakings will be honored. Adolphe is looking well!⁸¹

NETHERLANDS

As in neighboring Belgium, the Dutch stay-behind army was also made up of two branches. One branch was called Operations, or O for short. It was directed by Louis Einthoven, a cold warrior who died in 1973 and throughout his life had warned of the dangers of communism. Einthoven, who ran the O branch for sixteen years in secrecy, was also the first director of the Dutch post-war domestic security service Binnenlandse Veiligheidsdienst (BVD). "The double function of Einthoven as chief BVD and of O was of course very valuable for us," a former unnamed member of O recalled, for this helped to firmly integrate the secret army into the Dutch intelligence community.⁸² The second branch of the Dutch stay-behind was called Intelligence, or I. It had been set up after World War Two by J. M. Somer, but

was commanded by J.J.L. Baron van Lynden after Somer was dispatched to the Dutch colony of Indonesia in 1948 to fight the independence movement there.

Within the Dutch version of Gladio, tasks were split. The Intelligence unit under Van Lynden was responsible for the collection and transmission of intelligence from occupied areas, preparations, running of exile bases, and evacuation operations of the royalty, the government, the security apparatus, and personnel of I and O. The O unit, under Einthoven, carried out sabotage and guerrilla operations, and was charged with strengthening the local resistance and creating a new resistance movement. O was also in charge of sensitizing people to the danger of communism during times of peace. Moreover, O was trained in covert action operations, including the use of guns and explosives, and possessed independent secret arms caches.⁸³

Following the exposure of the secret armies across Western Europe in November 1990, Dutch Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers, of the Dutch Christian Democratic party, told parliament, "Successive Prime Ministers and Defence Ministers have always preferred not to inform other members of their cabinets or Parliament," taking pride in the fact that some thirty ministers had kept the secret.⁸⁴ The Dutch parliament trusted Lubbers that the secret army had not abused its power and, unlike secret armies in other countries, had no links with terrorism. Therefore, no parliamentary investigation was carried out. "I don't particularly worry that there was, and perhaps still is, such a thing," parliamentarian Hans Dijkstal of the liberal opposition, voiced his reflections. "What I do have problems with," he continued, "is that until last night Parliament was never told."⁸⁵

LUXEMBURG

"The word Gladio is a term used for the Italian structure. The term used internationally and inside NATO is 'Stay-Behind,'" Luxemburg's prime minister Jacques Santer explained in front of his parliament on November 14, 1990. He added,

This term reflects the concept of an organisation designed to become active behind the fronts of a military conflict, thus in case of enemy occupation of the territory. This concept has been designed by NATO. The idea has been derived from the experiences of World War Two, during which similar networks were established during occupation periods, thus in a particularly difficult environment and under enemy control.

The prime minister argued that never again should a country be so ill-prepared before a war and a potential occupation. He explained, "to avoid the same preparation gap in the future, it was decided to prepare the foundations of such an organisation already in peace time."⁸⁶

Santer stressed that "all NATO countries in central Europe have taken part in these preparations, and Luxemburg could not have escaped this international solidarity." He explained that the secret service of Luxemburg, the Service de Renseignements, had been running the network. Santer maintained,

The agents of this stay-behind network were recruited by the secret service on a voluntarily basis and according to criteria relating to their profession and place of living ... The essence of their mission was to inform NATO on the political and military situation of their region, to organise escape routes out of the occupied territory, and to support the special forces of the military.

Santer insisted there had been no links to terrorism and no abuses of power had occurred. However, when parliament asked him who had controlled the secret army he replied,

I can answer that I did not have any personal knowledge of the existence of the network, and exactly like the Minister of Belgium, I was surprised to learn about its existence. I do not think that another member of the government could have guessed its existence. Obviously, I cannot make this declaration in my predecessors' name also, for I did not have the time to consult them before my answer.⁸⁷

DENMARK

In Denmark, the anti-communist stay-behind army was codenamed Absalon after the medieval Danish Bishop who had defeated the Russians in the Middle Ages. Its commander, nicknamed *Bispen*, the Danish word for bishop, was E. J. Harder, who from 1966 to 1970 had worked at NATO headquarters. "Naturally, the organization was copied after the resistance movement," an unnamed member of the Danish network explained to the press. He claimed, "There were twelve districts, structured according to the cell principle, but not as tightly organized as during the War."⁸⁸ There were no alleged links to any terrorist operations, but the unit explicitly prepared against both a Soviet invasion and suspected danger emanating from the Danish communists. As a former member explained, "It was during the time of the Cold War and a Russian invasion or take-over of power by the Danish communists was—we felt—a clear and present danger."⁸⁹

As in all countries, the Danish stay-behind army was also hidden within the military secret service Forsvarets Efterretningstjeneste (FE). The special operations department directed by Gustav Thomsen supervised Absalon. "Ninety-five per cent were military people," an unnamed source revealed to the Danish press. Absalon members shared a conservative and strongly anti-communist political ideology, but they claimed this did not include right-wing extremists. "Not everybody could become a member," a former Absalon secret soldier told the Danish Press. "Among others, the right-wing activist Hans Hetler wanted to become a member. But we did not want him. He had been compromised and we did not think that he had the necessary qualities."⁹⁰

When the stay-behind armies were discovered across Western Europe in late 1990, Danish defense minister Knud Enggaard awkwardly in front of parliament declared it was not true that any kind of NATO-supported CIA organization had

been erected in Denmark. He added, "further pieces of information on a secret service operation in case of an occupation is classified material, even highly classified material, and I am therefore prohibited from giving any further information in the Danish parliament." Member of parliament Pelle Voigt, who raised the stay-behind question, thought the defense minister's answer to be "contradictory and an indirect confirmation of the fact that Denmark, too, had its secret network."⁹¹

NORWAY

In 1978, a Norwegian policeman tracking illegally produced alcohol stumbled across a large underground arms cache containing at least sixty weapons including many machine guns, 12,000 rounds of ammunition, explosives, and sophisticated communications equipment.⁹² Hans Otto Meyer, the owner of the property and a member of the Norwegian Intelligence Service (NIS), was arrested. But to the surprise of the investigators his claim that the arsenal had been put up by the NIS for use by a resistance cell was eventually confirmed when Defense Minister Rolf Hansen declared in front of parliament that Norway needed a stay-behind army for its national security. Hansen claimed at the time that the Norwegian network was not answerable to NATO or other countries, and he dismissed any connection to the CIA while at the same time he insisted that he could not discuss details of the organization's activities because they had to be kept secret.⁹³

In the wake of the discoveries in 1990 of the secret armies across Western Europe, journalists pressed the Norwegian defense department for an explanation. Defense Ministry spokesman Erik Senstad replied, "What Hansen said then still applies."⁹⁴ Subsequent research by Norwegian historian Olaf Riste revealed the Norwegian secret army was codenamed Rocambole (ROC), and run by the Norwegian secret service known as NIS. There are no proven links to any acts of terrorism, and as in Denmark, Belgium, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, and other countries, "the philosophy behind ROC was clearly based on the lessons learnt during the German occupation a few years earlier."⁹⁵

Vilhelm Evang, director of the NIS, and Jens Christian Hauge, the Norwegian defense minister, had built up the stay-behind army after World War Two. Both were convinced that, Norway had to be better prepared for a potential invasion and occupation. With regard to a potential domestic front, Evang drew up plans to be activated in case of an internal coup d'état, and planned for missions to guard against "fifth-column" communist subversive activities.

Cooperation with the CIA, MI6, and NATO was intense, but not always without complications. In 1957, Evang learned that the United States was not respecting Norway's sovereignty when a United States official was arrested. This official, operating on NATO's orders, was secretly collecting data on Norwegian citizens who shared strongly pacifist convictions and a negative attitude towards NATO. Evang was furious and demanded that this affair had to be the first item on the agenda at the

next meeting of the Clandestine Planning Committee (CPC) in Paris on November 19, 1957. At the meeting, Evang threatened that Norway would leave the CPC if NATO continued to secretly violate the sovereignty of its members. He claimed "[a]s far as Norway is concerned, our interest in CPC planning as such has declined steadily since 1954 because there is no future in it for us. We are of the opinion that we are developing a Stay Behind which is to be used at home for the purpose of liberation from an occupation."⁹⁶ Brigadier Simon, chief of NATO's Special Projects Branch at SHAPE with responsibilities also for CPC, could not calm the anger of Evang, and NATO had to present a letter of apology and a promise that it would never again violate Norway's sovereignty before Evang would agree that the Norwegian secret army ROC could continue to participate in the secret NATO operations.⁹⁷

SWEDEN

In 1990, the government of neutral Sweden found it difficult to face the fact that a secret stay-behind army linked to NATO had existed in the country during the Cold War. A few years later, in the absence of an official parliamentary investigation or governmental explanation, the Swedish secret soldiers spoke out themselves and added their perspective. "I have met, among others, Americans and Canadians during this work. Above all we cooperated with Great Britain. They were our masters in the art of running a secret resistance network," Swedish stay-behind member Reinhold Geijer explained. He insisted the Swedish government must have been aware of the secret army, as the domestic security police S kerhetspolis (S PO) had regularly helped with the recruitment of stay-behind soldiers.⁹⁸

"We selected suitable individuals, had them checked by the S PO, and, if accepted, we cautiously approached them with defence questions, and in the end confronted them with a direct question," Geijer recalled of the recruitment procedure. Thereafter, the key officers of the network were trained by the British secret service and special forces. "In 1959 I went via London to a farm outside Eaton," Geijer recalled of such a training session. Geijer stated, "This was done under the strictest secrecy procedures, with for instance a forged passport. I was not even allowed to call my wife. The aim of the training was to learn how to use dead letter box techniques to receive and send secret messages, and other James Bond style exercises. The British were very tough. I sometimes had the feeling that we were overdoing it."⁹⁹

Some Swedes were greatly surprised to learn a member of their family had served in the secret army while preparing for a Soviet invasion. "I always thought that all these Sunday excursions were for our benefit!" the daughter of a secret soldier explained to the press after the death of her father with disappointment and disbelief. She added, "And now I learn that these excursions have not been mere amusement. And although what he did was honorable, I now feel misled. My father had other sides, of which I have never heard." The daughter of another secret soldier declared, "I have never learned anything of all this," and insisted the name of her father must remain secret. According to her, "Who knows where the discovery of military secrets will lead to?"¹⁰⁰

Even today, the Swedish government has been very reluctant to comment on the secret army. In 1990, General Bengt Gustafsson, Sweden's chief of staff, confirmed that a stay-behind network had existed in the country, but incorrectly added that neither NATO nor the CIA had been involved.¹⁰¹ CIA officer Paul Garbler, who had served two tours of duty in Sweden, corrected that Sweden was a "direct participant" in the network, adding, "I'm not able to talk about it without causing the Swedes a good deal of heartburn."¹⁰² In the absence of an official governmental investigation into the Swedish secret army, it is impossible to judge whether the network against a Soviet invasion was also linked to acts of terrorism. Allegations in the press that the secret army had been involved in the assassination of Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme in 1986 due to his intention to transform Scandinavia into a nuclear arms free zone remained unfounded.

FINLAND

Finland is the only country in Western Europe which has been invaded and occupied by the Soviet Red Army. The so-called "Winter War," began in November 1939, where the Finns lost more than twenty percent of their soldiers in three months. They were forced to sign a peace treaty in Moscow, surrendering 16,000 square miles of their territory. The Finns then sided with Hitler's army in order to regain the lost territory, but when the Germans were defeated, the Finns were forced to pay war reparations to Moscow and promised to remain neutral after 1945.

The Finnish frontier with the Soviet Union, which runs for several hundred kilometers and passes through sparsely populated areas, was guarded by military men, fences, and land mines throughout the Cold War. At a stay-behind meeting in London in 1950, CIA and MI6 representatives lamented that Finland was "paralyzed through a friendship agreement with the Soviet Union." They made it clear any operations carried out on the territory had to be very quiet to prevent any provocation of the Soviet Union.¹⁰³ The CIA secretly approached Americans in Finland who in turn suggested the agency contact Finnish citizens who might be willing to join the topsecret stay-behind operation.

Finnish journalist Jukka Rislakki found that "there existed a secret resistance organization in Finland which had contacts to the West." His sources confirmed "the members of the network trained in secrecy and had arms caches. Several acting and retired officers of the Finnish army were part of the network, as well as men who still hold high functions." According to Rislakki's sources, the activities of the Finnish stay-behind allegedly increased after the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Some Finns feared the same could happen to their country, "but already before that invasion there had been secret groups in Finland, and there were arms and training."¹⁰⁴

Dave Whipple, CIA chief of station in Helsinki from 1970 to 1976, confirmed that the CIA had supported the Finnish secret army with "money, equipment, communication and support."¹⁰⁵ Allegedly, the networks were a major success for the CIA, because they "developed into a very, very good assurance" and could be

used against a Soviet invasion, as well as against a potential increase of power of the communist parties.¹⁰⁶ Whipple noted, "Something that worried us was what would happen if the communists would gain power in any of the countries where we had erected stay-behind networks." Therefore, secrecy was extremely tight. He added, "They knew how to keep their mouths shut. They knew how to live according to the 'need to know' principle, and not to talk about what they were dealing with."¹⁰⁷ Finish defense minister Elisabeth Rehn arguably did not possess the need to know, labeling the secret army "a fairy tale" when approached by the press in 1991, adding somewhat more cautiously, "or at least an incredible story, of which I know nothing."¹⁰⁸

CONCLUSION

"Prudent Precaution or Source of Terror?" the international press pointedly asked when the secret stay-behind armies of NATO were discovered across Western Europe in late 1990.¹⁰⁹ After more than ten years of research, the answer is now clear: both. The overview above shows that based on the experiences of World War Two, all countries of Western Europe, with the support of NATO, the CIA, and MI6, had set up stay-behind armies as what was felt was a prudent precaution against a potential Soviet invasion. While the safety networks and the integrity of the majority of the secret soldiers should not be criticized in hindsight after the collapse of the Soviet Union, very disturbing questions do arise with respect to reported links to terrorism.

There exist large differences among the European countries, and each case must be analyzed individually in further detail. As of now, the evidence available suggests the secret armies in the seven countries, Denmark, Finland, Norway, Luxemburg, Switzerland, Austria, and the Netherlands, focused exclusively on their stay-behind safety function and were thus not linked to any acts of terrorism. However, links to terrorism have been either confirmed or claimed in the eight countries, Italy, Turkey, Germany, France, Spain, Portugal, Belgium, and Sweden, demanding further investigation.

In this age of global concern about terrorism, in which secret services are thought of as part of the solution and not as part of the problem, it is greatly upsetting to discover that Western Europe and the United States collaborated in establishing secret armed networks which in the majority of countries are suspected of having had links to acts of terrorism. In the United States, such nations have been called rogue states and are the object of hostility and sanction. Can it be that the United States itself, potentially in alliance with Great Britain and other NATO members, should be on the list of states sponsoring terrorism, together with Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Iran? Or, alternatively, is it plausible to assume the secret NATO armies operated for years beyond the control of legitimate political authorities?

Today on both sides of the Atlantic, scientists and concerned citizens wonder what must be done in both the United States and the EU to prevent the future abuse of power and the continued manipulation of societies with terror. The data on

NATO's secret armies indicates some of the complexities involved in such questions. Future research will not only depend on an intensified global debate on fear, brutality, and manipulation, but also on courageous individuals who earlier in their life participated in such operations but now step out of the shadows, live up to their highest principles, and for the historical record before their unavoidable own death report their side of the story.

Notes

All quotes, other than from English originals, have been translated by the author who bears responsibility for their accuracy.

¹ For a detailed overview compare: Daniele Ganser, *NATO's Secret Armies. Operation Gladio and Terrorism in Western Europe*. (London and New York: Frank Cass, 2005). An Italian translation will be published by Fazi in Rome in spring 2005.

² While the UK was directly involved with setting up the stay-behind network, the islands Cyprus, Malta, Ireland, Iceland, as well as the European mini states Andorra, Liechtenstein, Monaco, San Marino, and Vatican were of limited strategic importance and are hence not included in this analysis.

³ British daily, *The Observer*, November 18, 1990.

⁴ Debates of the European Parliament, November 22, 1990. Official transcripts.

⁵ Senate de Belgique: *Enquête parlementaire sur l'existence en Belgique d'un réseau de renseignements clandestin international. Rapport fait au nom de la commission d'enquête par MM. Erdman et Hasqueuin*. Brussels. October 1, 1991. Hereafter quoted as "Belgian stay-behind 1991 Report."

⁶ Belgian Parliamentary Commission of Enquiry into Gladio. Also summarized in Belgium periodical *Statewatch*, January/February 1992.

⁷ William Colby, *Honorable Men. My life in the CIA* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1978), 81 and 82

⁸ British television program *Newsnight* on BBC1 on April 4, 1991.

⁹ British television program *Newsnight* on BBC1 on April 4, 1991.

¹⁰ Hugh O'Shaughnessy, *Gladio: Europe's best kept secret - They were the agents who were to 'stay behind' if the Red Army overran Western Europe. But the network that was set up with the best intentions degenerated in some countries into a front for terrorism and far-right political agitation*, in: British daily *The Observer*, June 7, 1992.

¹¹ Ed Vulliamy, *Secret agents, freemasons, fascists.. and a top-level campaign of political 'destabilisation': 'Strategy of tension' that brought carnage and cover-up*, in: British daily *The Guardian*, December 5, 1990.

¹² Ed Vulliamy, *Secret agents, freemasons, fascists.. and a top-level campaign of political 'destabilisation': 'Strategy of tension' that brought carnage and cover-up*, in: British daily *The Guardian*, December 5, 1990.

¹³ *Senato della Repubblica. Commissione parlamentare d'inchiesta sul terrorismo in Italia e sulle cause della mancata individuazione dei responsabili delle stragi: Il terrorismo, le stragi ed il contesto storico politico*. Redatta dal presidente della Commissione, Senatore Giovanni Pellegrino. Roma 1995, 20.

¹⁴ *Senato della Repubblica. Commissione parlamentare d'inchiesta sul terrorismo in Italia e sulle cause della mancata individuazione dei responsabili delle stragi: Stragi e terrorismo in Italia dal dopoguerra al 1974*. Relazione del Gruppo Democratici di Sinistra l'Ulivo. Roma June 2000, 3.

¹⁵ Italian 2000 Senate report on Gladio and the massacres, as quoted in: Philip Willan: *US 'supported anti-left terror in Italy'. Report claims Washington used a strategy of tension in the cold war to stabilise the centre-right*, in: British daily *The Guardian*, June 24, 2000.

¹⁶ Philip Willan, *Terrorists "helped by CIA" to stop rise of left in Italy*. In British daily *The Guardian*, 26 March 2001. Willan specialises on US covert action in Italy and published the book *Puppetmasters. The political use of terrorism in Italy* (London: Constable, 1991).

¹⁷ Selahattin Celik, *Türkische Konterguerilla. Die Todesmaschinerie* (Köln: Mesopotamien Verlag, 1999), 44. Under his pen name Serdar Celik published also a ten page summary of his book in English on the Internet entitled: *Turkey's Killing Machine: The Contra Guerrilla Force*. (<http://www.ozgurluk.org/mhp/0061.html>). I will quote hereafter both from his book (*Türkische Konterguerilla*) and his internet article (*Turkey's Killing Machine*).

- ¹⁸ Celik, *Turkey's Killing Machine*. His source is an Interview with the president of the Turkish General Staff Dogan Gures, in Turkish daily *Milliyet* 5./6. September 1992. The Turkish Special Forces changed their name repeatedly during the Cold War. First they were called "Tactical Mobilisation Group" (Seferberlik Taktik Kurulu, STK). STK headquarters were located in the building of the CIA organization American Yardim Heyeti (American Aid Delegation – JUSMATT) in the Bahcelievler district of the Turkish capital Ankara. In 1965 the STK was renamed "Special Warfare Department" (Ozel Harp Dairesi, OHD), and later changed its name to "Special Forces Command" (Ozel Kuvvetler Komutanligi, OKK).
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
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Operation Exporting Freedom: The Quest for Democratization via United States Military Operations

by John A. Tures

The wave of the future is not the conquest of the world by a single dogmatic creed, but the liberation of the diverse energies of free nations and free men.
—President John F. Kennedy, University of California at Berkeley Address,
March 23, 1962

INTRODUCTION¹

Since September 11, 2001, the United States has launched military operations against Afghanistan and Iraq. The names of these operations, Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom, imply that at least part of the mission will be devoted to promoting democracy in these countries. Proponents of exporting freedom extol the virtues of such policies, pointing to success stories in Germany and Japan after World War II, as well as more recent cases, such as Panama after 1989. Critics assail America's track record of using military force to promote democratization, citing failures in Somalia and Haiti, as well as incomplete efforts such as Bosnia. The question before us is whether Afghanistan and Iraq will look more like the former group, or begin to resemble the latter group.

The answer is critical for the future of American foreign policy. Other "Axis of Evil" states are awaiting confrontation with the United States. People in Central Asia, the Middle East, East Asia, and Africa could find themselves along the battle lines in the "War on Terrorism." Furthermore, Americans, who are being asked to sacrifice the things they hold dear, are anxious about the outcome. If the United States can effectively promote democratization, others might support the spread of freedom. Democratic revolutions may topple autocratic leaders, or authoritarian regimes may be pressured to reform. Such support for freedom could deny the terrorists bases of operation, as well as motives for attacking Americans. However, the consequences of failure would be severe. Cynicism resulting from unsuccessful democratization efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq would dampen support for freedom elsewhere. America's autocratic enemies and allies would point to such shortcomings

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as an excuse not to democratize. The purported “Third Wave of Democratization,” which began in Southern Europe, then spread to Latin American and Eastern Europe, could be rolled back. Such “counter waves” have undermined previous waves of democratization.²

Recognizing the importance of exporting freedom, a number of articles and books have been devoted to the subject. These efforts however well intentioned have provided inconclusive results. Such studies have typically focused on either a handful of cases or a limited time span. They have examined only local factors, ignoring the important external elements. Few articles support their arguments with any statistical evidence.

The present article addresses these problems by focusing on an extensive database of United States military operations (USMOs), which incorporates all cases from 1973 to the early days of 2004. It also looks at cases of humanitarian intervention and joint military exercises, as well as at the role that external factors play in shaping internal politics of USMO targets. Results of statistical tests identifying which international factors have a greater impact upon a military operation target’s chances of democratizing are used to explain how those findings can be applied to the cases of Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as to American foreign policy in general.

STUDYING USMOs AND THE GOVERNMENTS THAT FOLLOW

Given the important role that exporting freedom plays in American foreign policy, it should not be surprising that a number of studies have been devoted to the subject. Some are critical of the United States’ attempts to impose democracy by force, noting the scant number of successes.³ Other studies find more support for America’s ability to expand democracy by force.⁴ These articles have not resolved the debate over the question of whether or not America’s military presence facilitates democratization.

One of the possible sources of the inconsistency of results stems from the quantity and quality of cases analyzed. The problem with these studies is that they only look at a handful of cases that tend to involve the highest levels of conflict.⁵ While such events certainly have the highest profile, excluding all other cases produces several problems. First, wars represent only a fraction of all uses of the United States military.⁶ Military interventions involve a wider array of actions, including humanitarian missions, interdiction efforts, military training, border control, and peacekeeping.⁷ All of these events have the potential to influence a country’s governing institutions. Second, not all conflicts begin with guns blazing. The Vietnam War began with the provision of military advisers to train the Army of the Republic of Vietnam. The intervention in Somalia started as a humanitarian operation. It is often not apparent that bloody battles will break out until the operation is well under way. In other words, any use of the United States military abroad not only has the capacity to alter the target state’s regime, but also can result in conflict at a later time period. This is why, in this article, high profile combat cases are treated as a subset

of all USMOs. Conflict acts as a potential factor in policies of exporting freedom, not as a case selection mechanism.

This article also examines a broad time period (1973–2004), which is not context-bound, such as studies that merely focus on the Cold War era.⁸ The present study, which includes events ranging from the withdrawal from Vietnam to Operation Secure Tomorrow in Haiti, covers a broad chronological spectrum of cases from the Cold War to the years following September 11, 2001. While case selection is limited due to democracy data constraints, a more inclusive selection provides the advantage of seeing how Americans acted in several different international scenarios.⁹ Other studies fall short of explaining which factors help the democratization process, as well as which elements hinder such transitions. Unless we conclude that a USMO always generates democracy or never does so, this information is vital to policymakers, as well as students of American foreign policy. Otherwise, we run the risk of concluding that we should use America's military in every case or no case, rather than finding both the beneficial and detrimental effects of uses of the United States military.

Some articles do examine accelerants and inhibitors of democratization, but focus exclusively on the role that internal factors play in post-military operation transitions. These studies look at geographic location, colonial history, prior democratic culture, macroeconomic figures, natural resource distribution, ethno-linguistic divisions, educational systems, and religious influences.¹⁰ Such factors certainly do play a role in a country's attempts at democratization. However, limiting the analysis to domestic matters ignores the fact that the American military was present and that it influenced a country's government.

EXAMINING EXTERNAL FACTORS

To correct this oversight, I develop a model that examines a variety of potential external influences on a country's possible democratization in the wake of a USMO. As demonstrated in Figure 1, this model tests whether external factors combine with internal elements to affect the post-USMO government. Such results will tell us whether external factors matter, and, if they are important, which ones play a significant role in the process. Such factors can be bundled together with internal determinants to show a clearer picture of the process of democratization after a USMO has concluded its work.

I have grouped these factors into three categories: "Internal Politics of the Intervener," "Intervention Characteristics," and "International Institutions." The following paragraphs describe the external factors, as well as how they might influence a post-USMO government.

Internal politics of the intervener

First, I determine whether any political factors in America had a role in shaping the post-intervention agenda. I examine such factors because the United States, by

virtue of sending troops to the target country in question, exerted a great deal of influence over the target state. The United States has the ability to dictate its own political and security terms upon the target's leaders. As an international hegemon, the United States can call upon military and economic allies to pressure the target state into compliance. Political diversity within the United States also affects how much force its leaders will choose to project onto the target state. Different political actors can have differing agendas that make a target's democratization more or less likely to occur. Pressures related to America's own democratic system might also affect the outcome of democratization within the targeted country.

The two traditional American political parties have held widely different views regarding the use of US forces to generate democratization abroad.

Among the internal U S politics factors, I study the political party the president belongs to. The two traditional American political parties have held widely different views regarding the use of U.S. forces to generate democratization abroad. Democratic presidents have generally sought to uphold human rights and call for the use of armed force in order to remove tyrants from power. Republican presidents, while not engaging in undemocratic behavior, are less likely to support military operations that are perceived to be exercises in "nation building."¹¹

Another important factor is the role that election year politics in America may have had on the success of the USMOs, as well as regime changes in the target country. In the United States, no political period receives more scrutiny from the media, the people, and political actors than the election season. Each step taken at this time by the incumbent president is likely to receive more praise from supporters, more criticism from opponents, and more interest from independents attempting to decide for whom they will vote. Given these pressures, the US president is likely to be very sensitive to outcomes in the countries where American troops are operating. Bringing about democratization is likely to resonate well with voters, who consistently support such policies in polls.¹² Likewise, an American president who is seen as propping up an undemocratic foreign regime could be replaced by his or her constituency.

I check whether an American president's approval ratings affect his or her policies in conducting a USMO.¹³ As Commander-in-Chief, the US president has control over the military. The president also has a secretary of defense charged with running the day-to-day functions of the military. Whoever is America's chief executive is therefore held accountable for the actions of the armed forces. As mentioned before, the public has shown support for spreading democracy abroad. American leaders with high approval ratings are unlikely to risk public approval ratings by working towards something other than democratization. Unpopular American presidents, on the other hand, have a difficult choice to make. On the one hand,

they may desire higher approval ratings, and therefore take steps to improve their public image. On the other hand, democratization is not an overnight process. It takes a great deal of time. America's commander-in-chief may not have the luxury of waiting for democracy to bloom in the target country. The president may be tempted to skip the democratization process and install a relatively safe leader who will do America's bidding, while forgoing free elections and the establishment of key freedoms for the people of the target country.

Finally, it is important to look at how a divided government might influence American policies toward USMO targets. As noted earlier, the US political spectrum includes many diverse actors and institutions. When power is dispersed within such a system, America's ability to control the future of the post-USMO regime may be diminished. The US may not be able to guide the democratization process in a target state if the administration's attention is focused on domestic disagreements rather than on issues facing a foreign government.

Intervention characteristics

Elements related to the characteristics of the intervention also need to be examined. One such characteristic is whether or not combat was present during the intervention. If the United States uses its firepower against a foreign regime, such a display of force could serve to convince foreign leaders that the US "means business," and democratization should follow quickly. The present study also determines whether the deaths of United States military personnel impact a country's democratization in the wake of a USMO. Should American servicemen and women be killed in the line of duty, there would be great pressure within the US to ensure that their deaths were not in vain. One way that this could be accomplished would be to set up a democratic regime in the target state. If dictatorship prevails and American troops incur casualties, the families of soldiers, the press, domestic political actors, and voters are likely to regard the outcome of the intervention unfavorably.

The duration of a mission could also serve as a key determinant of whether a country will democratize following a USMO. If American forces remain in the target country for a long time, they may have a greater ability to provide lessons in the realm of civil-military relations, training necessary to maintain security, as well as protection for a nascent democratic government. Shorter military missions may leave the country more vulnerable to undemocratic elements.

Another intervention characteristic which could make a difference in the post-USMO environment is whether or not the target country consented to the mission. Normally, one might expect that maintaining genial relations with the target government might ease the democratization process, given the absence of friction over US military mandates. However, a clever target leader may accept America's demands to accept foreign troops, in order to tell the US what it wants to hear, and keep a tight control over his or her country. That is why this article also addresses the issue of whether or not the removal of the target state's leader has any impact on the post-USMO regime. If an undemocratic ruler is replaced, this should create the

conditions for democracy that would not have been possible if the ruler were kept in power. The ousted authoritarian leader would be unable to challenge a new regime dedicated to respecting the freedom of its constituents.

International institutions

Finally, this study examines the role international institutions have had on government changes in the aftermath of a USMO. These include whether the UN or NATO supported the mission, as well as whether or not an alliance existed between America and the target state at the time of the USMO.

The role of international institutions matters because operations commenced under the auspices of international organizations must conform to institutional dictates. In addition to charters that support freedom and the rights of individuals, many countries belonging to these organizations have democratic governments. Military operations undertaken in a unilateral fashion may give the initiating country more leeway in the conduct and outcome of the mission.

The latter element is important due to the historical ties between democracies. Scholars have found that democratic governments tend to refrain from war with each other, sign military defense pacts, and become economic partners.¹⁴ Therefore, democratic governments have a vested interest in maintaining or enhancing freedom in the other states where they may roam.

MEASURING MILITARY OPERATIONS AND DEMOCRATIZATIONS

In order to test the impact that each of these external elements has had upon interventions, and the government that emerges in their aftermath, I will explain how I operationalize both USMOs and democracy. I code all cases of USMOs since 1973, including those that did not result in democratization. The list of military operations, collected by the Federation of American Scientists and posted by GlobalSecurity.org, is supplemented by additional research.¹⁵ The data set thus arrived at contains 228 USMOs.¹⁶

In this study, I employ the Freedom House data set to measure democracy.¹⁷ Freedom House codes a country's respect for political rights and civil liberties.¹⁸ Examples of political rights include the presence of free and fair elections, the right to organize political groups, the right of elected leaders to make policy, the presence or absence of corruption, etc.¹⁹ Civil liberties comprise freedoms of expression and belief, rights to form societal organizations, respect for rule of law, and other personal freedoms and individual rights.²⁰ Scores are given to countries on a 1–7 scale (lower = more free). Countries are coded as “free,” “partly free,” or “not free” based upon their ability to honor these civil liberties and political rights.²¹

I look at several forms of democratization. I first examine whether the country has made a full transition to another category, such as from either “not free” to “partly free” or from “partly free” to “free.” I also look at cases of autocratization, where a country's rating has been downgraded from “free” to “partly free” or from

“partly free” to “not free.” Cases of full democratization are given a score of 2, while full autocratization cases receive a -2. I also include cases of partial democratization or partial autocratization. These occur when countries make improvements or deteriorations in their civil liberties and political rights scores without jumping categories. This allows for the observation of modest, as well as significant alterations in a country’s regime after America’s forces have left.

To determine whether partial or full democratization, autocratization, or the status quo persists, I examine the country’s government the year before the USMO began, given that Freedom House measures a country’s level of freedom based on a series of annual scores.²² I then examine a country’s Freedom House scores the year after the USMO concludes. I exclude cases ending in 2003 or continuing through 2004 because there is no data for one full year subsequent to the conclusion of the USMO.²³

RESULTS

This section begins with a discussion of the dependent variable, which incorporates changes in the target government that occurred during a USMO. As demonstrated in Table 1, the modal category was “no change” in the country’s governing institutions from the year before the USMO began to the year after the USMO was completed. Yet these 96 “status quo” cases only represent a plurality, not a majority, of the outcomes. Of the remaining 132 cases, there were 69 instances where the USMO target became less democratic over the period of time. In the remaining 63 cases, a country adopted partial or full democratization during the span of a USMO.

These findings mirror those of aforementioned inconclusive studies regarding whether or not American military forces have a positive effect upon democratization elsewhere in the world. On the one hand, optimists might note that a minority of cases has had a deleterious effect on the promotion of freedom abroad. On the other hand, pessimists may point out that barely one quarter of all cases produced democratization in the countries where American military forces were operational. Given the ambiguity of the results, as well as the prevalence of cases with no change

Table 1. Did Target Change Regime During a USMO?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	-2	33	14.2	14.5	14.5
	-1	36	15.5	15.8	30.3
	0	96	41.2	42.1	72.4
	1	36	15.5	15.8	88.2
	2	27	11.6	11.8	100
	Total	228	97.9	100	
Missing	-999	5	2.1		
Total		233	100.0		

2=Improved Designation; 1=Improved Only Scores Within Designation; 0=No Change,
-1=Worsening Scores Without Changing Designation; -2=Worsening Designation

in regime, it is imperative to redirect research towards uncovering those external factors specifically associated with democratization, autocratization or maintenance of status quo.

Additional research indicates that some of the external factors described above played a significant role by encouraging or discouraging democratization after the American military departed from the area. All findings are included in Table 2, which also lists the variables. The table also specifically lists those variables that had a statistically significant relationship with the dependent variable. The direction of the relationship, noting how the variable is associated with democratization, is also indicated. The article concludes with a detailed discussion of the findings and their implications for American foreign policy, USMOs, and the prospects for democratization abroad.

Table 2. Evaluating Potential External Determinants of Democratization in USMO Targets

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Significance</i>	<i>Impact of Variable</i>
<i>Internal Politics of the US</i>		
Political Party Control of the White House	Significant	Democrat Party Control Associated with Post-USMO Democratization
Elections	Not Significant	
Presidential Approval Ratings	Significant	Higher Approval Ratings Associated with Post-USMO Democratization
Divided Government	Not Significant	
<i>Intervention Characteristics</i>		
Combat during the USMO	Significant	Presence of Combat Associated with Post-USMO Autocratization
US Military Deaths	Not Significant	
Length of USMO	Conditional Significance	Longer USMOs Associated with Post-USMO Democratization
Target Consent to USMO	Not Significant	
USMO Ousts Target Regime	Significant	USMOs that Oust Target Regime Associated with Post-USMO Democratization
<i>International Institutions</i>		
UN and/or NATO Approval of USMO	Not Significant	
Presence of Alliance between US and Target	Not Significant	

Two American internal politics variables affect the post-USMO regime. Who controls the US executive branch is one such factor. Democrats are more likely to initiate military operations that result in democratization; Republicans, on the other hand, lead military operations that result in the establishment of less democratic regimes. Presidential approval ratings of the US leader are also an important factor in the governance of the target county. If the President of the US is popular at

home, he or she is more likely to initiate a USMO that facilitates democratization in the targeted state. The presence or absence of elections in the US, as well as divisions within the US government, have little impact upon the post-USMO regime. Several intervention characteristics are also likely to affect democratization in the aftermath of a USMO. These include the presence or absence of combat during a USMO, the length of a USMO, and whether or not the USMO removes the target regime. Contrary to my expectations, if fighting breaks out during a USMO, the prospects for democratization are generally poor. Cases in which the United States ousts the target regime exhibit improved chances of democratization in the target country. The duration of a USMO has only conditional significance, depending upon which cases are analyzed. In the data set, the relationship between the USMO duration and the dependent variable is not statistically significant. However, it is important to note that if ongoing cases that ended in 2003 are included, the length of a USMO is significant. Using this expanded data set leads to the conclusion that longer USMOs tend to facilitate democratic transitions.²⁴

Other intervention characteristics do not have an impact on democratization. Those other external factors which did not display a statistically significant relationship included the presence or absence of US military personnel deaths, as well as the target state's decision to grant permission for the USMO. Likewise, in the framework of this study, international institutions do not seem to play a significant role in the process of democratization.²⁵ Neither the role of the UN or the influence of NATO support facilitates or stifles democratization. Similarly, the presence of an alliance between the US and the target regime preceding the USMO does not affect the post-USMO government.²⁶

IMPLICATIONS

To summarize the results, I find that the political affiliation of the US president at the time the USMO began does influence the prospects for democratization within the target country. American presidents with higher approval ratings also initiate military operations that are more likely to spread democratization. Active combat during a USMO tends to slow down democratization after the USMO is completed. If US troops remove foreign leaders, the chances of democratization in the target country improve dramatically. Depending on which cases are analyzed, the duration of the USMO can affect democratization. Longer USMOs tend to usher in democratic reforms within the target regime.

To demonstrate how external influences on democratization work in the practical world, I apply these variables to the contemporary cases of Afghanistan and Iraq. I did so in order to forecast the prospects of bringing freedom to these countries. In each case studied, a Republican president has been in office. In addition, democratization may be hindered by the presence of combat in each case. This has been especially true in Iraq.

However, the chances for democratization in Afghanistan and Iraq are not bleak. President George W. Bush had high approval ratings at the time of both USMOs, which tends to improve a target country's chances of undergoing democratization. In both cases, the US chose to remove the existing regimes (the Taliban and Saddam Hussein, respectively). Ousting target regimes tends to facilitate the democratization process. The "wildcard" may be the length of the USMO. Despite waning popularity for both missions in America and in the occupied countries, evidence shows that the longer US forces stay in Afghanistan and Iraq, the greater the chances are for both countries to become more democratic.²⁷

RECOMMENDATIONS

Now that we have isolated the variables that are more likely to influence democratization in the aftermath of a USMO, what can be done to facilitate the establishment of freedom in target countries? Rather than attributing success to the US Democratic Party, I offer that the issue may have more to do with which theory an American president supports. Traditionally, Democrats have followed the idealist prescriptions of Woodrow Wilson, who advocated, "making the world safe for democracy." Democratic presidents Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jimmy Carter and Bill Clinton generally followed Wilson's policies. Republicans, on the other hand, have relied on realist theory, as voiced, for instance, by Henry Kissinger. Realists prefer maintaining the status quo and preserving national security. If Republicans were to adopt pro-democratization theories, this may change how a US president conducts a USMO, and therefore the chances of democratization in the target country. Preliminary evidence shows that George W. Bush may already be adopting a more liberal strategy. Not only has his rhetoric embraced calls for democratization, but also his USMOs have produced modest gains in democratization in targeted countries.²⁸

The finding that longer military missions are generally more conducive towards democratic outcomes in many cases should not be ignored by decision makers.

Presidential approval ratings also play a role in USMOs, as well as any democratization that follows them. Results show that presidents with higher approval ratings act as though they have a mandate to fulfill the wishes of the public, and facilitate the advent of democracy in target countries. US chief executives with low approval ratings have a greater temptation to "gamble," and settle for something less-than-democratic in a USMO target. For example, an unpopular U.S. president may believe that promoting democratization after a USMO is too costly a process. He or she may prefer to settle for a "short-cut" or an undemocratically chosen leader who is easy to install and purports to do America's bidding. America's congressional leaders and public must be aware of such temptations, and "hold the president's feet to the fire," to ensure that the president will help the target make the democratic transition.

As for the role of combat it seems that the best policy may be an “all-or-nothing” strategy. If the US elects to dispatch its military forces abroad, it should either be to sustain freedom by training a democratic government’s forces to repel threats to its regime, or to oust the targeted regime. Cases where the US uses military force against a foreign regime, but does not remove such a leader, seem to be the most problematic for democracy. Foreign leaders might use America’s actions as a justification for their undemocratic practices, thereby labeling those who clamor for freedom as supporters of the occupying forces and traitors to their own country.

The key variable may well be the duration of a USMO. USMOs that last longer give democratization a greater chance of implementation. USMOs with a greater duration allow American decision makers to work longer with democratic-minded individuals in the target countries so as to enact democratic reforms. They also provide American troops with time to secure the target country against undemocratic forces. Any temptation to “cut-and-run” in order to avoid the perception of a quagmire could actually weaken any chances for democratization in the targeted country. Such findings corroborate with evidence that shows that a lack of long-term commitment by United States military and policymakers imperils democracy in the target country in subsequent years.²⁹ It is paramount for the American leaders to advise new democratic leaders in target states about the long-term difficulties and benefits of democratization.

LESSONS LEARNED

The purpose of this study is to shed light on the external sources of democratization. To date, most studies of US military actions abroad have been pessimistic about the ability of the US to boost democracy. This study finds a relatively mixed record linking USMOs and democratization.³⁰ However, unlike other studies, this one looks at the factors that made democratization more or less likely to emerge. The analysis of new factors points to the conclusion that the political affiliation of the US president, presidential approval, the use of combat, removal of the target regime, and, in some cases, the duration of the USMO, all play a role in changing the target state’s government in the aftermath of an intervention. Rather than having a study with a narrow focus or vague prescriptions, we now have a clearer idea about the circumstances that make democratization more likely to occur after American forces are sent abroad.

Those factors displaying statistical significance are scrutinized and placed into context along with other important elements to create a coherent picture of USMOs and their potential as catalysts of democratization. For example, we learn that it is perhaps the ideology of the party leaders, and not partisan differences that account for different mission outcomes in the target regime. The study also shows which military operations deserve closer examination by Congress, the media, and the public before approval is granted. Another lesson is that combat during a USMO may be counterproductive for democratization, unless it displaces the leader of the target government. Finally, the finding that longer military missions are generally more

conducive towards democratic outcomes in many cases should not be ignored by decision makers as well.

Given a clearer understanding of the important external elements associated with democratization after USMOs, the next logical step is to combine the key external and internal factors to form a model that describes, explains and predicts the level of democratization within countries undergoing a USMO.

Notes

¹ Acknowledgments: This article would not be possible without the hard work of Julie Beasley, John Blackburn, Lloyd Buchanan, John Camp, Nicholas Drescher, Patrick Fischer, Patrick Gaumont, Joseph Grau, Mallory Hoard, Brandon Holcomb, Harrison Levy, David McMillian, Andrea Messer, Blake Morton, Michael Nunn, Allison Rains, James Robinson, Russ Stayanoff, Ryan Tibbetts, David Ward and Eric Weidinger. These LaGrange College undergraduates compiled information for much of the dataset analyzed in this article.

² Keith Jagers and Ted Robert Gurr, "Transitions to Democracy: Tracking Democracy's Third Wave with the Polity III Data," *Journal of Peace Research* 32 (1995): 469-482.

³ Pei, Amin and Garz (See Minxin Pei, Samia Amin and Seth Garz, "Why Nation-Building Fails in Mid-Course," *International Herald Tribune*, March 17, 2004.) find that nascent democracies built by the United States begin to unravel in the decade after American forces leave, as a result of political elites changing the rules to suit their purposes. Bueno de Mesquita and Downs (See Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and George W. Downs, "Why Gun-Barrel Democracy Doesn't Work," *Hoover Digest*, 2, 2004) discover that few countries become democratic after an American military intervention. Both authors find that, in most cases, democratization is either arrested or never begins. Lawson and Thacker (See Chappell Lawson and Strom C. Tucker, "Democracy? In Iraq? *Hoover Digest*, 3, no. 3, 2003) contend that American attempts to democratize Iraq are likely to be difficult because the country lacks characteristics traditionally associated with democracy.

⁴ Hermann and Kegley (See Margaret G. Hermann and Charles W. Kegley, Jr., "The U.S. Use of Military Intervention to Promote Democracy: Evaluating the Record," *International Interactions* 24, no. 2 (1998): 91-114) discover that military interventions designed to promote or protect democracy abroad increase freedom in those countries. Peceny (See Mark Peceny, *Democracy at the Point of Bayonets*, University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999) notes that democratization was more likely to occur and be stable in cases where U.S. military interventions supported free and fair elections. But some, like Gleditsch, Christiansen and Hegre (See Nils Petter Gleditsch, Lene Siljeholm and Havard Hegre, "Democratic Jihad? Military Intervention and Democracy," paper presented at the workshop on Resources, Governance Structure and Civil War, Uppsala, Sweden, April 13-18, 2004) find the process of democratization by force to be more unpredictable when assessing long-term results.

⁵ Pei, Amin and Garz ("Why Nation-Building Fails in Mid-Course") point to 14 cases of military intervention in the twentieth century, while Lawson and Thacker ("Democracy? In Iraq?") cite 19 cases "in the last century." Peceny (*Democracy at the Point of Bayonets*) locates 25 cases between 1898 and 1992. Using Tillema's (See Herbert K. Tillema, *Foreign Overt Military Interventions, 1945-1991: OMILIST Codebook*, University of Missouri, Columbia, MO; 1997) military intervention dataset, as Hermann and Kegley ("The U.S. Use of Military Intervention to Promote Democracy: Evaluating the Record") do, I find 30 military interventions between 1945 and 1991. Finally, de Mesquita and Downs ("Why Gun-Barrel Democracy Doesn't Work") generate a list of 35 cases in the developing world since World War II.

⁶ Mesquita and Downs ("Why Gun-Barrel Democracy Doesn't Work") should be lauded for their decision to include "small actions like flyovers or 'advisory' missions." But the numbers they generate are still surprisingly small, considering the numerous flyovers and advisory missions since the end of World War II.

⁷ Richard N. Haass, *Intervention: The Use of American Military Force in the Post-Cold War World* (Washington: Brookings Institute, 1999).

⁸ Lawson and Thacker ("Democracy? In Iraq?"), for example, only focus on the years 1996 through 2000 for their test of social, economic and political conditions, although they expand their study of occupations to include the last century.

⁹ While the study does not reach as early as those that extend back through World War II and even the end of the Spanish-American War, this is offset by a more rigorous analysis of interventions in those analyzed years.

¹⁰ See David P. Forsythe and Barbara Ann J. Rieffer, "U.S. Foreign Policy and Enlarging the Democratic Community," *Human Rights Quarterly*, 22, no. 4 (2000): 22, 4: 988-1010; Robert J. Barro, "Democracy in Afghanistan: Don't Hold Your Breath," *Hoover Digest*, Spring 2002, No. 2.; Thomas Carothers, "Promoting Democracy and Fighting Terror," *Foreign Affairs*, January/February 2003 p. 84.; Stephen D. Krasner, "We Don't Know How To Build Democracy," *Los Angeles Times* November 26, 2003; Lawson and Tucker, "Democracy? In Iraq?"; Larry Diamond, "The Long Haul," *Hoover Digest*, 2, 2004.

¹¹ Republicans have been perceived to prefer stability to democracy during this time frame, as evidenced by the role played by Henry Kissinger in several G.O.P. administrations. In his book *Diplomacy*, Kissinger (1993: 811-812) says "That there is an area of discretion which should be exercised in favor of governments and institutions promoting democratic values and human rights is also clear. The difficulty arises in determining the precise price to be paid and its relationship to other essential American priorities, including national security and the overall geopolitical balance." During the second Presidential debate in 2000, Governor Bush was asked to evaluate a series of United States military operations since 1980. He singled out cases in Somalia and Haiti as missions he would not support because they engaged in "nation-building" (Commission on Presidential Debates, "Transcript of the Second Election 2000 Debate," Wait Chapel, Wake Forest University, Winston-Salem, North Carolina, October 11, 2000).

¹² "Gallup/CCFR Survey of American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy 1986," The Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, conducted by The Gallup Organization, October 30–November 12, 1986; *ABC News/Washington Post* "Do You Think the U.S. Government Should Try to Promote Democracy Around the World?" conducted by ABC News/Washington Post, February 10–14, 1989; *Americans Talk Security* "New World Order—What the Peace Should Be," conducted by Market Strategies, March 19–24, 1991; *Times Mirror* "International Policy Opinion Survey," conducted by the Princeton Survey Research Associates, September 9-15, 1993; The Pew Research Center "People and The Press: Global Attitudes Survey," conducted by the Princeton Survey Research Associates, September 9-15, 2002. Data for all of the polls was provided by The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut.

¹³ The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, http://roperweb.ropercenter.uconn.edu/cgi-bin/hsrn.exe/roperweb/PresJobRatings40/PresJobRatings40.htm?start=HS_presapproval_home.

¹⁴ Bruce Russett, John R. Oneal and David R. Davis, "The Third Leg of the Kantian Tripod for Peace: International Organizations and Militarized Disputes, 1950-1985," *International Organization*, 52, no. 3 (1998): 441-487; Gleditsch, Siljeholm and Hegre, "Democratic Jihad? Military Intervention and Democracy" (paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Montreal Canada, March 19, 2004).

¹⁵ This data can be located at <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/index.html>

¹⁶ John A. Tures et. al., "United States Military Operations in the New World Order: An Examination of the Evidence," *American Diplomacy*, 2, no. 22 (2002).

¹⁷ Most studies linking intervention with democratization tend to employ the Polity data set. While well respected, it has its limitations. Polity tends to focus on institutional criteria, including the dispersion of power throughout the government; such information does not necessarily reflect how the government treats its citizens. Its data lead many researchers to code apartheid governments in South Africa and Rhodesia as democracies. It would be interesting to see what conclusions can be drawn from different measures of democracy.

¹⁸ *Freedom in the World*, Freedom House, 2004, <http://www.freedomhouse.org/ratings/index.htm>

¹⁹ *Freedom in the World 2003: Survey Methodology*, Freedom House, 2003, <http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2003/methodology.htm>

²⁰ *Freedom in the World 2003: Survey Methodology*.

²¹ There have been many valid critiques concerning the way scholars have analyzed the concept of democracy in their studies. It has been suggested that there are differences concerning country specificities on how democracy is perceived in theory, as opposed to its implementation in practice. Others have questioned whether democracy reflects people power or mobocracy. Still others insist upon a measure examining constitutional liberalism, backed by the rule of law. This is why I employ the Freedom House dataset. This measure conceptualizes freedom using the standards adopted by the

Universal Declaration of Human Rights, signed by a large multitude of states and nations. Rather than examine a country's constitution for the presence of a law, its coders determine whether those rights are protected in practice. Instead of ascertaining that an election took place, Freedom House examines respect for political rights and civil liberties. The former constitutes the right to vote, compete for elective office, and have representatives that have a meaningful input in public policymaking. The latter reflects the freedom of people to develop opinions, organize groups, and behave with a minimum of governmental intrusion (see Freedom House, *Freedom in the World 2003: Survey Methodology*, <http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2003/methodology.htm>).

²² Freedom House began coding countries in 1972.

²³ In a separate analysis, I look at cases ending in the year 2003 or are currently on going. To code these, I use the most recent country score from Freedom House, to determine if any democratization progress has occurred or not, then report the findings in the results section.

²⁴ The duration of the USMO is the only variable to be affected by adding in all cases that are ongoing or ended in 2003. No other variable changes in significance or direction of the statistical relationship.

²⁵ It has been suggested that there are other reasons why international institutions may have an anemic showing when it comes to facilitating democratization in the context of a USMO. Critics of these organizations have pointed out that organizations like the United Nations have a poor record of effective peacekeeping, as evidenced in cases of Bosnia and Rwanda (see William Shawcross *Deliver Us from Evil: Peacekeepers, Warlords and a World of Endless Conflict*, 2000, Touchstone Books and Kenneth Cain "The Real Reason Kofi Annan Must Go" *The Wall Street Journal*, December 20, 2004) as well as programs such as Iraq's "Oil for Food" program, where complicity with local authoritarians is now being revealed (see "Oil-for-fraud," *The Economist*, Global Agenda, April 22, 2004). Certainly, the latter may stem from corruption; in the conflict cases, it represents the difficulty of the United Nations' pledge of neutrality. The United States military operation is not bound by such a doctrine of impartiality; it can confront a faction not committed to freedom and democracy. Furthermore, the United States government answers to its citizens, whereas the United Nations is only accountable to governments, many of which have questionable democratic credentials (see Ramesh Thakur "Human Rights: Amnesty International and the United Nations," *Journal of Peace Research*, 31, 2, 1994, 143-160). These international organizations may deliberately or unintentionally undermine any attempts at democratization in a target state. This is not to imply that the United States always prefers democracy and the United Nations does not, but the former is not bound by some of the latter's membership and accountability standards.

²⁶ The overall model is also statistically significant at the .01 level, indicating that the combined presence of all of the external factors in the same model have some influence on democratization in the targets of United States military missions.

²⁷ Critics wonder if there are certain countries, which have an "authoritarian culture;" these areas may have a culture, history or traditions that is antithetical to democracy (see The National Endowment for Democracy, "Strategy Document," January 2002). Such regions have been identified as the Middle East, Africa, Central Asia and South Asia. Yet history shows that there is no guarantee that being labeled an "authoritarian culture" is a stumbling block to democratization. After World War II, skeptics of nation building efforts in Japan, Germany and Italy claimed that these countries did not have a democratic culture. Some scholars felt that the Catholic countries of Latin America and East Europe were unlikely to democratize due to their nations' autocratic tendencies. Both groups failed to anticipate the stability of democracy in these former Axis countries, or the democratic waves that spread throughout Central and South America, as well as the Warsaw Pact in the 1980s (see Carl Gershman, "A Democracy Strategy for the Middle East," Conference on Mideast Regional Security, National Endowment for Democracy, December 12, 2003). Furthermore, Alfred Stepan and Graeme Robertson find that non-Arab Muslim countries have higher levels of democracy than would be expected, given their level of economic development (see Alfred C. Stepan and Graeme B. Robertson, "An 'Arab' More Than 'Muslim' Electoral Gap," *Journal of Democracy*, 14, 3, July 2003, pp. 30-44). What this means is that no culture is authoritarian by nature, and the relative dearth of democracy in areas such as the Middle East is by no means a permanent feature.

²⁸ Political scientists have debated whether or not the realist-liberal theoretical divide provides an adequate explanation of international relations behavior. Some focus on the constructivist approach, which claims that a state's subjective views of international politics influence their behavior more than any objective criteria (see James Lee Ray and Juliet Kaarbo, *Global Politics, Eighth Edition*, Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Co.). This affects USMOs and democratization based upon both American

political party views of freedom. Republicans tend to see freedom in terms of economic freedom, as well as religious freedom (for an example, see George W. Bush, "Remarks by President Bush at the 20th Anniversary of the National Endowment for Democracy, United States Chamber of Commerce, Washington, DC, November 6, 2003). Democrats view freedom in terms of political participation rights and respect for civil rights, as well as access to economic, social and cultural rights (see Dorothy Q. Thomas, "Into the Bright Sunshine," *The American Prospect*, October 1, 2004). Resolving this debate is beyond the scope of this article, but it should be mentioned that some of the differences in democratization could be attributable to the dataset employed, which may favor an interpretation closer to the Democratic Party view of freedom. Critics complain (see Manuel Vega-Gordillo and Jose L. Alvarez-Acre, "Economic Growth and Freedom: A Causality Study," *Cato Journal*, Vol. 23, No. 2, Fall 2003) that Freedom House does not provide as strong of a measure of economic freedom as free market liberals would prefer.

²⁹ Pei, Amin and Garz, "Why Nation-Building Fails in Mid-Course."

³⁰ As noted earlier, many United States military operation cases result in maintaining the regime's status quo, but other USMO outcomes are closely divided between democratization and autocratization.



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Should We Try to Predict Transitions to Democracy?: Lessons for China

by Bruce Gilley

INTRODUCTION

It has been 20 years since the Harvard political scientist Samuel Huntington predicted that “the limits of democratic development in the world may well have been reached.”¹ That forecast, substantiated by a survey of the evidence as it existed in Asia, Eastern Europe, Latin America, and the Middle East, was famously wrong. In particular, Huntington’s prediction that the possibility of democratic change in Eastern Europe was “virtually nil” was disproved within a few years. Between 1984, when he wrote, and 2003, Freedom House reckons that the proportion of the world’s states that are electoral democracies rose from 41 to 61 percent, while the proportion of the world’s population living under “free” or “partly free” conditions rose from 56 to 65 percent.² In terms both of politics and of people, democracy’s limits had clearly not been reached.

So, was Huntington’s exercise in prediction a waste of time? Not at all. Huntington performed a signal service to the scholarly and policy-making community despite being largely wrong (except perhaps with respect to the Middle East). He highlighted an important issue concerning the global political future and discussed the factors that remain central to the study of democratization. A retrospective look at the literature on regime change prior to the Third Wave of democratization³ suggests that it was the failure to think seriously about macro-level political change in authoritarian states, not the failure to predict accurately, that was the main shortcoming of research in the 1970s.

Today, we confront the same issue with respect to many authoritarian states, the most important of which may be China. With 1.3 billion people, China represents about 60 percent of the world’s “unfree” (neither “free” nor “partly free”) people.⁴ Were it to democratize, it would represent the equivalent of a democratization wave by itself, and would almost certainly create more favorable conditions for an actual wave involving other Asian dictatorships like North Korea, Vietnam, and Burma. In a recent book, *China’s Democratic Future*,⁵ I made some bold predictions about the

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possibility of a democratic transition in China before 2020. Yet with a few notable exceptions, the world's scholarly community has not engaged in any serious thinking about the political changes that are almost certain to occur in China over the coming few decades. Most scholarly energies today are devoted to the study of China's transition from a command to a market economy and from an ideological to a technocratic dictatorship. One historian, reviewing *China's Democratic Future*, called on Sinologists "to eschew prognostication and focus on understanding China's complicated present." The reason given: "Knowing for sure where China is heading is impossible."⁶

In the sections to follow I will critique this appeal to "eschew prognostication" as both logically flawed and professionally irresponsible. Predictions about China's political future are not only logically implicit in most of the studies of the "complicated present" of China, but also a fulfillment of the mission of social scientists. Without them, we find ourselves in a muddle of thought and a muddle of policy. Second, I will argue that in the case of China, a prediction of an elite-led and fairly rapid transition to an electoral democracy is the most reasonable forecast. Nonetheless, and to complete the point, this prediction not only leaves open many important questions about the nature of democratic transition and consolidation in China, but will remain useful even if wrong. By orienting scholars and policy-makers towards the critical issues of the future, prediction serves to concentrate minds admirably. The gravest danger is no prediction at all.

THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES

Most of the literature on prediction in the social sciences concerns *how* to predict social phenomena rather than *whether* to predict them. But in the 1960s and 1970s, the very notion of prediction came in to question. Since then, in some circles, prediction has come to be seen as fundamentally impossible or undesirable for a number of reasons.

One set of reasons relates to the degree of difficulty. Social life is said to be too much of an "open system" in which key causal variables continually change, whereas in natural life we can be pretty sure we have identified the key variables. The political world looks more like ever-changing clouds than rule-governed clocks.⁷ Alternately, even if it is a fixed system, the sheer number of random effects is so great as to make all predictions subject to large errors. These margins of error are said to be especially large in the case of large-scale and radical changes, such as democratization.⁸ Even accurate probabilistic models are drowned in a sea of uncertainty. The combination of faulty causal inference and random effects means that all predictions always end up being wrong. Any prediction of, say, democratization, would come with a bright red label that says: "Warning: While minimal democracy is most likely, actual outcomes may vary between tyranny or liberal democracy."

Another group of reasons concerns meaning. If social terms could only be understood through interpretation of their *local* meaning, then prediction using cross-cultural terms like “democracy” is too blunt to be of any use. “We cannot achieve the degree of fine exactitude of a science based on brute data,” wrote one philosopher of meaning.⁹ Indeed, even if by sheer coincidence, a given term has the same meaning across all cultures today, its meaning will alter in the future in ways that we cannot predict. Predicting “democracy” in the future is useless since the meaning of democracy is sure to alter significantly.¹⁰ “Human science is largely *ex post* understanding...Hard prediction before just makes one a laughingstock.”¹¹

We can accept the cautions of these insights without necessarily accepting their injunctions against the prediction of large-scale political change. An awareness of the difficulties of accurate prediction is certainly important, especially when wrongful policy decisions have fatal consequences. In *China's Democratic Future*, I was explicit about these uncertainty levels.¹² However, it is the comparison of the moral costs of inaccurate prediction with the moral and other costs of failing to predict at all that should decide whether prediction is worthwhile in spite of uncertainty. In almost every case, the latter are far heavier than the former. Indeed, the whole “risk industry” of consultants, insurance companies, and forward markets exists precisely because it is almost always better to predict something than to predict nothing at all.¹³

Democracy's core facet—the equality of persons in choosing leaders through free and fair elections—has not changed.

As to meanings, it is also true that the word democracy today implies a different (higher) standard than it did in the past. As Larry Diamond has noted, the higher standards, as well as the greater information available about abuses in the most distant lands, means that many regimes once called democracies—PRI-ruled Mexico, apartheid South Africa, and today's Singapore—no longer qualify as even minimal democracies.¹⁴ Yet the relevant question is whether meanings continue to hold *enough* similarity to be useful for the purposes of policy-making. In this respect, the answer is certainly, yes. Democracy's core facet—the equality of persons in choosing leaders through free and fair elections—has not changed. The new meaning is just more robust than before. Some databases have been created that capture the changing meanings of democracy over time.¹⁵ Yet even taking into account those changed meanings, predictions in the past of “more democracy” would have been accurate, even if their magnitude was overstated. As long as meanings change in accordance with the principles at stake—in this case the fair selection of executives to government—prediction remains possible. It is only when concepts become totally “reconstructed” that prediction is futile. Yet on most topics that people spend time predicting in political science, this is not the case.

It is a key purpose of academic research to make accurate descriptive and causal inferences that will help citizens and groups to make better decisions in the future. Implicit in this is the idea the knowledge gained today has some validity in the future, that the social world is not mere chaos leaping from one node of path dependence to another, nor is it mere entertainment or irony. Properly done, social inference holds true in different contexts—temporal and spatial. Indeed, even historians, who seem most averse to the future, need to “predict.” In order to accurately describe what causal influences were most important in the unfolding of a historical event, a historian needs to “predict” that a different outcome would have resulted in their absence. The validity of any historical inference rests on prediction. Prediction, then, is not merely for policy-junkies but for every intellectual who takes their role seriously.

It is a venerable philosophical point that prediction of a future is inherent in the very word “present.” A more prosaic version of that tenet is that every policy decision taken today relies on implicit assumptions about what will happen in the future. The more those assumptions are made explicit and are justified, the more prepared the actors will be for the future. Futurology is inherent in human action, and the more rigorous we are with predictions the better. As John Gerring notes, “We have no choice but to prognosticate.”¹⁶

Countries undergoing rapid socio-economic change and political ferment are particularly in need of theories based on change. Otherwise, we may find that we have been studying the wrong things.

Of course, it is entirely reasonable to predict no changes. A forecast of constitutional development in Sweden today, for example, would likely include no change in its basic democratic and liberal structure based on obvious empirical evidence of things like legitimacy, consensus, and social values. But predictions of no change are often based on a methodology that “eschews prognostication” as a matter of principle. The positivist legacy in social sciences is to have created schools of thought based on static rather than dynamic analysis of states and societies. Huntington was an early critic of so-called “structural-functional” theories of political development because they were based on an assumption of “no change.”¹⁷ David Beetham lodged a similar critique of classical theories of legitimacy.¹⁸ Countries undergoing rapid socio-economic change and political ferment are particularly in need of theories based on change. Otherwise, we may find that we have been studying the wrong things.

THE RECORD OF PREDICTION

Even if theory says we should, or must, predict, the actual record of those who have predicted regime transitions in particular might give us pause. The history of

political thought is littered with famous examples of inaccurate predictions of regime changes. Karl Marx's prediction of a replacement of bourgeois regimes in Europe by communist ones in the revolutions of 1848 was badly wrong. So too were American fears that communist victory in Vietnam would lead to a rise of communist regimes across Southeast Asia. As for predictions of democratic transition, the heady forecasts of democratic development in newly-independent states like Tanzania and Malaysia after World War II show how wrong predictions can be. Famous predictions of collapse of the North Korean regime have been, to say the least, premature.¹⁹

Still, it seems collective memory is strongest with respect to inaccurate predictions. For there are just as many examples of accurate predictions of change—from the many writers who foresaw the collapse of the Soviet Union to the modernization theorists' predictions of political change in Asia, Eastern Europe, and Latin America.

Still, it seems collective memory is strongest with respect to inaccurate predictions.

In addition, collective memory has also erased many of the wrongful predictions of political regression or stasis. Since independence in 1947, for example, India has been the object of a steady stream of predictions of democratic failure, all of which have been false. Those who predicted a continuation of authoritarian rule in places like Spain, Taiwan, Thailand, Brazil, and Yugoslavia were badly wrong-footed by events. To express pessimism about prospects for democracy or democratization has long been seen as a reflection of the conventional wisdom within the academy, not subject to the normal rules of validation. The host of gloomy assessments of new democracies that arose in the 1990s was only the latest example of scholars making wrong predictions that were nonetheless remembered as valuable because of their "admirable cynicism." The same might be said of predictions of doom for Latin America, which despite the unremittingly negative views of its Marxist-oriented area specialists has enjoyed steadily rising living standards and expanding democracy for the last quarter century.

As a general statement, predictions of democratization have been one of the best bets about regime change that one could have made in the past century, notwithstanding periods of retreat. They have tended to outperform predictions of democratic retreat or failure. Still, even the wrongful predictions have served a useful role in stimulating debate about the future.

These two points are evident in a retrospective look at the democratization of the republics in the former Soviet Union. In the study of these places in the 1960s and 1970s, we can see these same dichotomies—those predicting the future and those which do not; and, among the former, those predicting some form of democratization and those predicting something else, usually a post-communist neo-authoritarianism.

The non-prediction point of view was summed up by the authors of one widely used textbook titled *How the Soviet Union is Governed*, which offered the opinion in its 1979 edition that little was likely to change in the Soviet Union given entrenched conservative forces in society and the state. The authors curiously supported this prediction but they retreated to a position of “eschewing prognostication” suggesting that their methods were driving their conclusions:

The job of the scholar is not to predict but to understand. To be sure, understanding should be an aid to prediction, but the future still depends on such a complex interaction of accidents of personality, of the health of leaders, of unexpected crises, of responses to them that inevitably must be made... Ultimately it may be little more than chance that makes one prediction come true and another fail... The Soviet future should not be looked upon simply as something to predict; it should also be seen as the source for additional data for our understanding of the Soviet system and the processes of political development.²⁰

Indeed, even a decade after the fact, many Sovietologists continue to defend those in the field who rejected attempts to predict the future. “No serious conception of the scholarly enterprise should include (much less give pride of place to) crystal ball gazing,” wrote one scholar in reviewing a book that condemned the failure to predict the demise of the USSR.²¹ As I argued above, this position, in addition to being logically inconsistent with the very notion of inference, is a terrible abandonment of the scholarly mission. To continue to insist, more than a decade since global politics was transformed by the end of the Cold War, that scholars had no business trying to foresee such changes seems irresponsible in the extreme.

It is important to note where this failure took place. It is unfair to pin all the blame on the “cold warriors” of Sovietology who perceived only an unstintingly conservative culture and system in the Soviet Union.²² The other group who failed to predict systemic change was filled with those who saw a responsive, legitimate, and effective system that was beyond the grasp of “Western” theories. Huntington, despite his profession for dynamic theories, argued for no changes in the Soviet Union in his 1968 book *Political Order in Changing Societies*, seeing it as a highly legitimate and responsive regime.²³ Both cold warriors and system theorists relied too heavily on structural-functional theories to understand the “complex reality” of the Soviet system rather than asking questions about its evolutionary future. Both were mired in static analysis, and not a little Orientalism.

Whatever the likely future, it should have been clear that a prediction of “no change” was the least plausible one given economic industrialization and rising political dissent in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The common problem of cold warriors and Orientalists alike was to assume a method of analysis that by rejecting prediction led only to a prediction of no change.

Among those who did predict changes, many saw some form of liberalization. In 1970, Andrei Amalrik answered in the negative to his book's title *Will The Soviet Union Survive Until 1984?*²⁴ In 1976, Emmanuel Todd predicted Soviet failure because the political system could not deal with demographic and economic problems.²⁵ Alexander Eckstein saw a similar fate for all communist systems.²⁶ Accurate predictions were also made by moral philosophers. In 1968, philosopher Leo Strauss argued that a one-party state that denied basic freedoms would be deemed a great moral bad by citizens whatever its orderliness, and predicted the Soviet Union's demise as a result.²⁷

By 1984, signs of change were everywhere. Princeton historian Stephen Cohen ventured that despite deep-seated conservatism "signs that...a consensus for change may be forming...have already appeared".²⁸ By that time, the evidence of change throughout the communist bloc was too pervasive to be ignored. The entire Sovietology community, which had ignored the possibility of massive systemic change, merely set a new course on the "complex reality" of this historical turn. But by then, the American electorate had already put into power a Reagan administration which, given conventional wisdom of no changes to come, had ramped up a dangerous arms race between the two superpowers. A better understanding of the future might have averted this costly enterprise.

The costs of inaccurate prediction are to be ready for the wrong changes. The costs of a failure to predict are to be not ready for change at all.

Prediction of regime changes, then, has been accurate in some cases and inaccurate in others. Like all inferences made in the social sciences, some have been right and some have been wrong. But in all cases, scholars who choose to predict have been forced to line up what they believe are the factors relevant to regime change and then inferred a prediction. Many have been wrong. But in doing so, they have concentrated minds, allowing policy-makers to be open to the potential sources and direction of change. What sets such efforts apart is not that they predicted correctly, but that they predicted at all. Those who have "eschewed prognostication" have implicitly endorsed some form of continuation of business as usual, or else have been so overwhelmed by a sea of data to have been hamstrung in making any inferences at all, descriptive, causal, or predictive.

The costs of inaccurate prediction are to be ready for the wrong changes. The costs of a failure to predict are to be not ready for change at all. At least in the former case, there is a possibility of accurate prediction and preparedness for the right changes. Even where one is prepared for the wrong outcome—a liberal democracy rather than a form of electoral authoritarianism as in Putin's Russia, for example—many of the same policies will be applicable, support for the rule of law and media, for example. In the latter case, policymakers are doomed from the start.

Not predicting means they are prepared for nothing, as was often the case in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. All their policies are oriented towards the present system. They can merely open the morning newspapers with trepidation, hoping that whatever changes might occur will be long after their superannuation. The populations affected will lack any hope of being rescued from timely and far-sighted interventions if the changes go awry. For scholars to abet this paralysis seems to be a terrible forfeiture of the academic mission.

CHINA: WHETHER TO PREDICT

It is one of those treasured old chestnuts in the field of China studies that predictions of change in the Middle Kingdom are always wrong. The inscrutable Orient may have fallen on scrutable times in much of the rest of Asia, but China remains untouched, its mysteries complete.

There is no end to the examples of failed predictions about politics of contemporary China, especially with respect to party collapse after Tiananmen,²⁹ or political and social collapse after Deng.³⁰ But, as with other examples of prediction in the social sciences, this belief in wrongfulness is empirically selective. Many predictions have been made about China that have come all too true. In the twilight of the Cultural Revolution, Lieberthal predicted a re-institutionalization of the Party's structures, the dominant theme of the next quarter century.³¹ Munro and Bernstein were writing their bestselling prediction of American military conflict with China over Taiwan when PLA missile tests against Taiwan led to the biggest American naval movement since Vietnam.³² Economists said China's growth would destabilize world grain markets:³³ it is happening today.

Everyone agrees that China is in the throes of great social and economic changes—the metaphors know no bounds. Yet if the silence of many scholars on China's political future is to be interpreted at face value, many also believe that none of this will make any difference.

Moreover, the idea of wrongful prediction is also selective in its choice of inferences. Historical inferences about China have proven just as prone to error as predictive ones, although most never are exposed to the same publicity as the unfolding of future events. Shirk argued that economic reforms were a result of central elites seeking support from the selectorate.³⁴ Dali Yang quietly demolished this thesis.³⁵ Arguments by historians that attributed ideational motivations to 19th-century peasant rebels were undermined by evidence that material considerations better explained observed outcomes.³⁶

Everyone agrees that China is in the throes of great social and economic changes—the metaphors know no bounds. Yet if the silence of many scholars on China's political future is to be interpreted at face value, many also believe that none of this will make any difference. Either nothing will change politically, or we will see a long and slow evolution towards a....a something.³⁷ Scholars explicitly “eschew prognostication” in the case of China for the very reasons why they should be engaged in it with intensity: too much is changing.

If the arguments offered above are valid, then this shortage of predictions about China is not only unnecessary, but also dangerous.

If the arguments offered above are valid, then this shortage of predictions about China is not only unnecessary, but also dangerous. Of course, the uncertainty of China's future may indeed be greater than elsewhere. But this needs to be proven and it is by no means obvious. Large, populous developing countries with clear structural changes may actually be more easily subject to prediction than smaller ones where elites can manipulate outcomes more easily. More important, it is precisely in confronting the substantive issues relevant to the future that the scholarly community provides a useful service, even if differences arise about predictions of future stability or foreign policy. Critics of prognostication in Sinology shirk a core duty of scholars.

Lieberthal, for example, in his 1995 book *Governing China* finds a China where society has become “a potential source of major instability,” where the regime's legitimacy strategy is “based on a flawed premise” of economic growth satiating political demands, and where the future country will be “more open, decentralized, corrupt, regionally and socially diverse, militarily strong, and socially tempestuous.”³⁸ Nonetheless, he concludes that the system will persist with only minor changes.

This whole issue came to a head in an exchange of letters in *Commentary Magazine* in 2003. At issue was an article by University of Pennsylvania professor Arthur Waldron called “The China Sickness,” which predicted regime change and all its destabilizing implications as the most likely outcome for China.³⁹ A dozen critics, all credentialed Sinologists, including Lieberthal, took him to task for his bleak predictions.⁴⁰ China, they said, was in a state of “relative stability” despite its systemic weaknesses.

It is not that a position of “no change” or even “evolution into a new unknown form” cannot be defended. Indeed, it would be a great tragedy if we did not have an open mind to the possibilities of trajectories hitherto unknown. But if this is the position, it has to be defended against other, arguably more historically grounded, predictions such as those of Waldron. Instead, the critics attacked his predictions merely for being predictions. They did not offer reasons for thinking that other predictions were more likely. As Waldron noted in response, the correspondents accepted most of his premises while simultaneously recusing themselves from thinking about the implications.

They even grant my point about regime change, wearily stipulating that "most serious scholars, businessmen, and government officials believe that the Communist party will eventually be compelled to share or even relinquish power." But if regime change is likely, as "most serious scholars" allow, or even possible, then surely experts like the twelve, not to mention the rest of us, should be actively thinking about the when, the how, and the why. China is an immense country, and regime change there would be an event comparable in significance to the collapse of the USSR and the end of Communism in the West. Yet [none of the critics]... has anything at all to say about this possibility, its modalities, or its implications. All of them... are China specialists. What do they spend their time thinking about, if not this biggest of all the big questions?"⁴¹

The need to predict is acute in the case of China and there are good reasons for thinking that a prediction of no change is the least plausible. As in the Soviet case, such predictions appear to be grounded more in methodological than substantive reasoning. Such inaction risks leaving the world unprepared for momentous change in China.

CHINA: WHAT TO PREDICT

Even if they do foresee changes, many scholars prefer to cover all the bases with long lists of alternative "scenarios."⁴² There is nothing wrong with this per se, except that it is like taking the scholarly version of the Fifth. Prediction requires making choices about what factors matter most and what their causal consequences will most likely be. There is nothing that concentrates the mind as well as having to defend a claim about which scenario is most likely and why.

Among those making unambiguous predictions about China's future, we can discern four broad groups: no change, neo-authoritarianism, chaos, and democracy. These schools are a natural outgrowth of the two ways of viewing the role of the state in China today. If political permanence is a result of the state containing social pressures, then it implies a sharp, chaotic state collapse if those pressures were to run over but a continuation of present trends if they do not. If it is a result of the state responding successfully to social pressures, then it implies a comparatively smooth evolution towards a modernized authoritarian regime. If the state is simultaneously responding yet also repressing, we may see an evolution towards democracy.

There is nothing that concentrates the mind as well as having to defend a claim about which scenario is most likely and why.

The “no change” school can be a serious predictive school rather than a mere default of those who eschew prognostication. It echoes the same view as in the Soviet case. This “cold warrior” view was dominant following the Tiananmen crackdown of 1989, and bases its claim largely on evidence of a strong, repressive state that is simply crushing society. Under this view, China is fated to such a conservative system.⁴³ This prediction has the intuitive appeal of “linearity,” that is more of the same. But it is often hard to square with the premises of its own analysis, which espies great underlying socio-economic transformations.

Despite its failure in South Korea, Taiwan, and Indonesia, some form of Asian neo-fascism continues to be seen by many scholars as a stable regime type for China’s future.⁴⁴ In this scenario, the CCP continues to shed its communist pretensions and emerges as an authoritarian regime that co-opts most of the population with rapid development and national greatness. These predictions imply forward-looking planning for an aggressive nationalist regime, security challenges in Asia, and human rights pressures mainly from the outside.⁴⁵ The virtues of this theory are its accuracy so far: since 1989, despite predictions of CCP collapse, the CCP has moved towards this model with significant changes like welcoming capitalists into the party, selling off many public enterprises, repressing worker and peasant movements, encouraging a new ethnocentric nationalism, and even planning a Berlin-style Olympic Games for Beijing in 2008.

Chaos theorists are a wider church and include those who write about a crisis of governability,⁴⁶ a collapse of the state,⁴⁷ and an involution of the party.⁴⁸ This school can also claim some accuracy with post-1989 events, although it is forever living on evidence of increased risks of collapse rather than actual collapse. These predictions imply a forward-looking plan for crisis management to respond to mass emigration, diseases, financial contagion, civil war, and external aggression.

Democracy theorists combine the above into an alternative view, namely the rise of an effective post-communist state, but one that is democratic because of the problems of governance and state crisis.⁴⁹ Among the three, this school arguably has the least to show for the post-1989 period, aside from some scattershot renegade elections at the township and county levels, as well as changes to make human rights, the rule of law, and legislative oversight more institutionalized within the state. These predictions suggest for the US a forward-looking policy of engagement with, and support for, the domestic civil society and democratic institutions that will help consolidate a new system, and should ease external pressures and security containment in favor of a more inclusive and non-threat-based relationship with China.

All four predictive efforts serve a useful purpose in helping both people and policy-makers to prepare for change and mitigate its negative potentials. When Pan Wei's article on a neo-authoritarian future was presented and debated in a prominent journal of China studies, it served as a rare opportunity for this scenario to be debated in a sober and scholarly forum. Gordon Chang's book on collapse provided reviewers with a real chance to grapple with issues of instability in China. Authorial egocentrism leads me to believe that my own book has rekindled the debate on democracy that had waned as the post-Tiananmen period lengthened.⁵⁰

As mentioned, the policy advice of the three schools that turn out to be wrong (assuming the outcome is among the four) will be useful, nonetheless. If China descends into African-style ungovernability, for example, the security preparedness of authoritarianism will be useful, as will the domestic institutions intended to aid democracy. Nonetheless, the potential overlaps of policy preparedness are not perfect and might be small consolation in the event. We simply need to try to make the right prediction in order to ensure the best outcome for all concerned.

Given that any democratic transition is sure to be a tense and hurried affair, this absence of serious thinking about the democratic future of China risks leading to worse outcomes since it will be implausible to simply develop this policy research overnight. It is here that the world's policy community could make a substantial contribution.

In my own book, I developed the arguments for why a democratic future for China seems the most likely outcome. To a large extent, this argument relies less on detailed parsing of data from China as on global trends in regime types as income levels grow and the idea of democracy becomes a universal value. The burden of proof in light of these trends should more appropriately be on those who would argue that China will *not* become a democracy. Even so, the argument for a democratic future in China can be well-substantiated by an analysis of present trends in the country—economic, social, and political. These arguments take up the bulk of the material in the book, most of them relying on arguments about these trends being made in China itself by liberal-minded scholars, officials, and activists.

Of course, each of the four broad predictive outcomes includes a number of quite different versions, and the democracy school is no different. To say that China will become a democracy is perhaps to say not much in our era. Some scholars predict a democracy in China that is a vague mixture of communal utopia and social welfare.⁵¹ Others foresee a strong presidential system. My own prediction is of a fairly recognizable system with a weak president and a strong legislature based on the existing National Peoples Congress.

If the democracy prediction is right, then its disfavor among current predictive efforts is dangerous. For democracy will require a lot of thinking beforehand about alternative choices for institutional design. The issues are many: constitutions, emergency powers, legislative structure, electoral laws, secession, federalism, presidential powers, and more. Beyond that, every democratic transition faces massive socio-economic challenges such as historical justice, economic liberalization, and ethnic and regional fragmentation — all of which will require well thought out responses. Given that any democratic transition is sure to be a tense and hurried affair, this absence of serious thinking about the democratic future of China risks leading to worse outcomes since it will be implausible to simply develop this policy research overnight. It is here that the world's policy community could make a substantial contribution.

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US POLICY

It would be unfair to say that the US government is not thinking about China's future. CIA and Pentagon conferences have been held on the issue. Everyone from presidents Clinton and Carter to vice-presidents Cheney and Gore have gone to China in the last two decades and commented on the seeming inevitability of democratizing reforms. Yet a commitment to democracy by US leaders wavers for two reasons, neither of them always acceptable. One is that contemporary issues need to be resolved, which requires a certain amount of intercourse with the regime "as it is." The problem is that such issues—counter-terrorism, business ties, and strategic peace—can often be abused well beyond any plausible consideration of their moral value to a better China. The other reason is uncertainty about the future. There is also a significant part of the policy community that views neo-authoritarianism or collapse as more likely future outcomes. As a result, policy planning tends to be hedged by simultaneous policy planning for these two outcomes. While there is some overlap, this means a sub-optimal emphasis on democratic planning.

While the rhetorical commitment to democratic advance of the 2000 to 2004 Bush administration was welcome, the administration's policies did much to undermine that goal. In the case of China, the administration shelved concerns about political freedoms in favor of an alliance with Beijing on fighting terrorism. This was ironic since terrorism is most closely associated with a lack of civil liberties and democracy worldwide. Along with Europe, the US also continued to be lured away from hard-nosed democracy promotion and planning by expanding business opportunities in China. If Bush were true to his rhetoric, then it would seem China is the best place to start.

*No longer should we think tyranny is benign because it is temporarily convenient. Tyranny is never benign to its victims, and our great democracies should oppose tyranny wherever it is found.*⁵²

If we take democracy as the most likely outcome, then several items need to change in US policy towards China. One is a return to the monitoring of abuses and more importantly pressuring American allies to support it. The US returned to tabling a motion to condemn human rights abuses in China at the UN Commission on Human Rights in Geneva in 2004 after a two-year hiatus that was nonetheless defeated by abstentions by US allies Mexico and South Korea and opposition votes by democratic countries like Brazil, India, and South Africa. Second is a more forthright democratic diplomacy. Bush apparently did not even raise democracy or human rights while entertaining Jiang Zemin on his ranch in 2002. Third, general developmental assistance to China should be tied to human rights improvements, while specific democracy assistance should be targeted towards undermining rather than shoring up the institutions of power in China. What is needed is the support of NGOs, independent scholars, reform-minded non-party legislators, the free press, and even overseas dissident groups. Instead, much effort today goes into training for judges, military officers, party ideologues, and provincial leaders—which comes closer to being “autocracy assistance” than “democracy assistance.” While the integrity of state structures will be important in the transition to democracy, the first order of business is to encourage the existing forces for change.

CONCLUSION

Prediction of democratic change in authoritarian regimes is both professionally respectable as well as empirically robust for the political scientist. Given rapidly changing socio-economic conditions in China, a failure to engage in the difficult business of prediction is irresponsible and illogical. While predictions of no change can be made, they seem the least plausible. More plausible scenarios are those which see some fundamental restructuring of state-society relations in the country. Whatever the result, a vigorous debate on the likely paths and appropriate policy responses is crucial today. While we may hope for a democratic China, we should above all be prepared for a different China.

Notes

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Democracy By Force?: Lessons from the Restoration of the State in Sierra Leone

by J. Peter Pham

INTRODUCTION

Founded by a group of British philanthropists in 1789 as a haven for freed black slaves (thus the name of the capital, “Freetown”)—including some 1,200 who had supported the loyalist cause during the American War of Independence—Sierra Leone boasts of being one of the oldest modern polities in Africa. The foundation of the oldest university-level institution in sub-Saharan Africa, Fourah Bay College, in 1827 also permits the West African country to take pride in having pioneered higher education on the continent. When Sierra Leone achieved its independence in 1961 under the leadership of Sir Milton Margai and the Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP), it inherited as its legacy from the nearly two centuries of British colonial rule a Westminster-style parliamentary democracy that was the envy of the region, especially after the general elections of 1967 constitutionally handed the reins of government, then held by the deceased Sir Milton’s brother, Sir Albert Margai, over to the opposition All Peoples’ Congress (APC). However, the new prime minister, Siaka Probyn Stevens, had barely been sworn in by the governor-general on March 21, 1967 when he was overthrown in a *coup d’état* that marked the beginning of Sierra Leone’s steady descent into autocracy and chaos from which it is only now slowly emerging. Although the West African country is definitely not out of danger yet—Sierra Leone was so devastated by its fratricidal civil war that despite the billions of dollars in international assistance it has received in recent years, the United Nations Development Program annual *Human Development Report* for 2004 still ranked the country dead last in terms of Human Development Index, among 177 countries surveyed¹—a number of lessons relevant to democratization can be learned from its state collapse and the forceful role the international community played in its journey back from the abyss.

Of course, democratization is a process, a means to an end—constitutional government based on the principles of democratic participation and popular sovereignty that are accepted by the polity—rather than a good to be desired for its own sake. As Jean-Germain Gros has observed, democratization “is neither unilinear

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nor static: it can move forward, stagnate, or be reversed.”² Since the end of the Cold War, many states have embarked on the process of democratization, opening up the political process, only to abort the process along the way, either because those who have come to power democratically have returned to previous arbitrary patterns—the tragic phenomenon of “one man, one vote, one time” that has plagued many African states—or because internal and/or external pressures have overwhelmed the weak state. Consequently, the experience of Sierra Leone’s unlikely transition from a failed state characterized by criminal anarchy to a nascent *état de droits* hopeful about its long-term prospects for sustainable peace and effective government is worth examining by those interested in finding durable solutions to state collapse in Africa and elsewhere.

FROM MODEL TO FAILED STATE AND BACK AGAIN

After a year in exile, Stevens was restored to power in 1968 when an uprising threw out the *putschists*, but things would never be the same again. Unhinged by the experience of his overthrow and thereafter haunted by fears of plots against him, Stevens used a constitutionally dubious legislative maneuver in 1971 to turn Sierra Leone’s parliamentary democracy into a highly-centralized presidential republic. Seven years later, Stevens completed the country’s transformation into a one-party state when a farcical referendum made the APC its only legal political organization.

Even worse than what Stevens did to the political system was what he did—or, as the case may be, failed to do—economically. Stevens inherited a sound, if poor, economy based on diamonds and iron mining as well as agriculture—primarily coffee and cocoa production—that expanded between 1965 and 1973 at the respectable, if not stellar, annual rate of 4 percent against an annual population growth rate of 1.9 percent. Unfortunately, in 1973, the global oil crisis coincided with a decline in diamond and iron ore prices, creating a deficit in Sierra Leone’s international balance of payments. The conventional response to this economic downturn would have been cuts in public spending and a devaluation of the national currency in the immediate term, coupled with a concerted effort to diversify exports over the long term. Instead the APC regime did the exact opposite, opting to finance the deficit by borrowing from the central bank—effectively, printing money—as well as from international governmental and commercial institutions and extending state control of the economy. Not surprisingly, inflation went through the roof, averaging 50 percent per annum in the 1980s where it had been 2.1 percent between 1965 and 1973. The annual rate of growth dipped to an average of 0.7 percent between 1980 and 1987, before going into negative figures.³

Dwindling revenues, compounded by governmental corruption and profligate spending on non-essential “prestige projects,” accelerated the sharp economic decline. Sierra Leone went from being the model for democratic governance and economic prosperity to being the exemplar of Africa’s post-colonial “neopatrimonial” malaise whereby national resources were redistributed as “marks of personal favor to followers

who respond with loyalty to the leader rather than to the institution that the leader represents.”⁴ In no sector was this more evident than in Sierra Leone’s fabled diamond industry. Before the APC took over, the diamond trade constituted one-third of national output and contributed over 70 percent of Sierra Leone’s foreign exchange reserves. By the mid-1980s, less than \$100,000 worth of the precious minerals passed through legal, taxable channels.⁵ Most of the rest was appropriated by Stevens and a coterie of his closest associates, who also embezzled profits and other assets from various state enterprises, including the oil and rice monopolies.

Having looted an estimated \$500 million and leaving a balance of barely \$196,000 in foreign reserves in the Bank of Sierra Leone on the day he left office,⁶ Stevens retired in 1985, designating the army chief, Major General Joseph Saidu Momoh, as his successor (armed with Stevens’s endorsement, Momoh’s accession was duly “ratified” by a plebiscite in which he claimed to have won 99 percent of the vote). Unfortunately for Sierra Leone, Momoh’s regime was not only more venal than its predecessor—at one point in 1986, it even hosted a “state visit” by Yasir Arafat, just driven out of Beirut by the Israeli army, and contemplated making a quick \$8 million by selling the Palestinian leader an island on which to regroup his forces⁷—but an even more incompetent captain of the ship of state. Sierra Leone’s straitened circumstances fed a vicious cycle of political, economic, and social malaise. As one former United States ambassador to Sierra Leone, John Hirsch, observed:

Unpaid civil servants desperate to keep their families fed ransacked their offices, stealing furniture, typewriters, and light fixtures. . . One observer has noted that the government hit bottom when it stopped paying schoolteachers and the education system collapsed. Without their salaries, teachers sought fees from the parents to prepare their children for their exams. With only professional families able to pay these fees, many children ended up on the streets without either education or economic opportunity.⁸

Bereft of the resources to provide its potential clients with jobs and educational opportunities, the ruling APC lost its base of support and began to unravel altogether at the very moment when contracting services and collapsing infrastructure left the Sierra Leone state itself most vulnerable to attack. The *coup de grâce* came in the form of a spillover from the civil war in neighboring Liberia, a country whose history has unfolded along parallel lines with that of Sierra Leone since the former’s foundation as a haven for freed slaves from the United States. Liberian warlord (and later president), Charles Taylor, had initially wanted to launch his insurgency from Sierra Leone and had traveled to Freetown in 1988 where he offered to pay Momoh for permission to operate out bases in the country’s east. However, as Stephen Ellis succinctly observed in his study of the Liberian civil conflict: “The notoriously venal Momoh promptly sought from [then Liberian president] Samuel Doe a higher sum, turning the approach into an auction, an action for which his country was later to pay dearly.”⁹

To make matters worse as far as Taylor was concerned, just as he was on the verge of victory in early 1990, the Economic Community of West African States

(ECOWAS), decided to intervene in the Liberian conflict with its own military Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). For his part, Momoh not only permitted ECOMOG to use the Lungi International Airport, near Freetown, to bomb areas in Liberia controlled by Taylor's rebels, but sent Sierra Leonean units to join the intervention force. Taylor never forgave the Sierra Leonean ruler. On March 23, 1991, Foday Saybana Sankoh, a charismatic former Sierra Leonean army corporal who had been jailed for several years in the 1970s for his alleged role in the failed 1971 revolt against the Stevens regime and who subsequently underwent military training with a small group of Sierra Leonean dissidents in Libya (where Taylor had also drilled his insurgents), invaded eastern Sierra Leone from Liberia. Sankoh, supported by Taylor, issued a call for anti-government uprising in the name of the previously unknown "Revolutionary United Front" (RUF).

Despite the fact that many of the leaders present at the meeting had themselves come to power through military coups and in contrast to the OAU's usual practice of non-interference in the internal affairs of member states, the sixty-sixth session of the OAU Council of Ministers called for "the immediate restoration of constitutional order" in Sierra Leone.

The RUF, originally a diminutive force consisting only of several dozen disaffected rural youth to whom Sankoh had promised free education and medical care and who, in turn, hailed him as "Papa," ostensibly fought for a redress of the iniquities of Sierra Leonean society whereby the APC regime exploited the rich diamond resources for the benefit of its elite even as the living standards in the country sunk to the very bottom of international scales. Instead, as they sent the government's forces reeling and quickly seized control of most of the eastern part of the country, including the diamond fields, the rebels themselves soon became a by-word for terror—routinely amputating the limbs of civilians as a terror tactic, raping women and girls, and abducting young boys to fill their ranks—and inspired Robert Kaplan's celebrated article on "The Coming Chaos."¹⁰

In April 1992, a group of soldiers on leave in Freetown from the fighting on the front, led by a 27-year-old captain named Valentine Strasser, overthrew President Momoh. The coup was actually popular at the time as most Sierra Leoneans had grown disgruntled with the APC's corrupt and ineffectual rule. The present president of Sierra Leone, Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, then a senior official with the United Nations Development Program, even offered his services to the young *putschists* and became the chairman of their national advisory council. Strasser, however, formed a military junta that grew increasingly despotic in its turn, thus shifting popular momentum to the RUF, which not only seized control of the diamond fields, but subsequently also

took the iron mines, the other major source of state revenue for the Freetown government. Confronted by these reversals as well as the waning capacity of the national army,¹¹ Strasser turned to mercenaries, bringing in the Jersey-based Gurkha Security Group, a firm with close ties to the British military, and then the South Africa-based firm Executive Outcomes, to assist in pushing back the RUF offensive.

In January 1996, Strasser was overthrown by his deputy, Brigadier Julius Maada Bio. (Strasser nonetheless met a kinder fate than many deposed African rulers. The British government procured for him a scholarship—funded by the United Nations—to study at Warwick University. His academic career proved, however, to be short-lived: the military ruler-turned-scholar was recognized by a fellow student from Sierra Leone and ensuing campus protests led to his removal.) Under increasing foreign and domestic pressure, the new Sierra Leonean leader, Bio, was forced to hold elections, which were boycotted and sporadically disrupted by the RUF. To discourage people from voting, Foday Sankoh ordered his guerillas to cut off the hands of people who had cast a ballot (the mutilations represented a macabre *double entendre*: those who voted received an indelible ink mark on their hands to prevent them from voting more than once while the campaign itself was organized under the slogan *The future is in your hands*). In the rural areas where these amputations took place, they were especially cruel since they destroyed the livelihoods of the subsistence farmers who were thus rendered incapable of working if they survived their injuries. The elections took place nonetheless and were won, after two rounds and several serious disputes, by the newly-revived Sierra Leone People's Party, led by Kabbah, who became the country's first directly elected head of state.

In November 1996, a peace agreement was signed in Abidjan, Côte d'Ivoire, between the new SLPP government of President Kabbah and the RUF. The accord granted an amnesty for all acts committed prior to its signing and called for the transformation of the RUF into a political party. The agreement quickly unraveled, however, as violence resumed after only the briefest lull. When Sankoh was arrested, allegedly for arms trafficking, while visiting Nigeria in March 1997, the complicity of the Kabbah government in the arrest was widely suspected, contributing to the final collapse of the peace accord. Two months later, yet another group of disgruntled Sierra Leonean soldiers led by Major Johnny Paul Koroma drove President Kabbah into exile, replacing his government with an Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) that invited the RUF to join it. The country fell into complete chaos as most of the judiciary system—judges, attorneys, police officers, and other law enforcement professionals, all of whom had previously been targeted by RUF rebels—fled the country before what it imagined to be the imminent entrance of the dreaded insurgents into government. The angry populace, fearful not only of the RUF but also of the continuing decline of the country as schools, banks, and commercial services ceased to function, launched a series of civil disobedience campaigns.

The international reaction to the coup was swift and unequivocal. The overthrow of President Kabbah took place on the eve of the annual summit meeting of the heads of state and government of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in

Harare, Zimbabwe. Despite the fact that many of the leaders present at the meeting had themselves come to power through military coups and in contrast to the OAU's usual practice of non-interference in the internal affairs of member states, the sixty-sixth session of the OAU Council of Ministers called for "the immediate restoration of constitutional order" in Sierra Leone and urged "all African countries and the international community at large to refrain from recognizing the new regime and lending support in any form whatsoever to the perpetrators of the *coup d'état*."¹² In particular, the African leaders called upon "the leaders of ECOWAS to assist the people of Sierra Leone to restore constitutional order to the country" and to "implement the Abidjan Agreement which continues to serve as a viable framework for peace, stability and reconciliation in Sierra Leone."¹³ When, in October 1997, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1132, imposing economic sanctions against the AFRC regime, the embargo was scrupulously enforced by another ECOMOG contingent. Koroma quickly capitulated and promised to allow Kabbah to return to power by April 1998. However, when the junta was slow to cede power, ECOMOG forces under the command of a Nigerian general and supported by yet another mercenary outfit, the British-based firm Sandline International, which had been hired by the exiled President Kabbah, launched an offensive against the now-combined AFRC/RUF forces in February 1998, which restored Kabbah to power the following month.

After ferocious fighting, ECOMOG forces managed to reestablish control over the capital and its environs, but at the cost of some 7,000 dead civilians and two-thirds of the city leveled.

The restoration, however, was tenuous, the government's writ extending barely beyond the municipal boundaries of the capital. Increasing numbers of regional peacekeepers were required—by the end of the year nearly a quarter of the entire Nigerian army, some 20,000 men, were in Sierra Leone—to prop up the Kabbah government. The RUF military commander, Sam "Mosquito" Bockarie, backed by Major Koroma, now designated deputy commander of the RUF, threatened to make the country ungovernable if Sankoh, sentenced to death for treason by the Kabbah government, was not freed and included in the government. In January 1999, rebel forces encircled the capital. During this phase, apocalyptic scenes—at one point, for example, 40,000 people sought refuge in Freetown's National Stadium—were commonplace at every rumor. Using women and children as human shields, some RUF units managed to bypass ECOMOG forces and join comrades who had already infiltrated the city. Kabbah fled the country once more.

Eventually, after ferocious fighting, ECOMOG forces managed to reestablish control over the capital and its environs, but at the cost of some 7,000 dead civilians and two-thirds of the city leveled. Compounding the human tragedy, as the RUF

units retreated, they abducted some 3,000 civilians, many of whom were never seen again. As a consequence of the mayhem, about 600,000 of Sierra Leone's estimated four million people sought refuge in neighboring countries, while two-thirds of those who remained were internally displaced. The Nigerians, worn out by the fighting which claimed an estimated 800 of their peacekeepers and was costing them about \$1 million daily, announced their intention to withdraw and forced the two Sierra Leonean parties to enter into negotiations which resulted in the July 7, 1999, Lomé Peace Agreement,¹⁴ signed in the Togolese capital. The deal made Sankoh the "Chairman of the Board of the Commission for the Management of Strategic Resources, National Reconstruction and Development" and accorded him "the status of Vice-President answerable only to the President of Sierra Leone." The accord also promised the rebel leader and his followers a "complete amnesty for any crimes committed...from March 1991 up to the date of the agreement."¹⁵ The Lomé Agreement was initialed by the two parties as well as by an impressive array of international guarantors, including a special representative of the UN secretary-general, although the latter signed with the reservation that the amnesty provisions did not apply to "international crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and other serious violations of international humanitarian law."¹⁶

The Lomé Agreement was ratified by the Sierra Leonean National Assembly and initially endorsed by a UN Security Council resolution. A second UN resolution also authorized the creation of the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) with 6,000 military personnel charged with assisting in the implementation of the peace agreement and facilitating humanitarian assistance. However, the accord, like its predecessors, quickly fell apart. In several incidents in late 1999 and early 2000, UN peacekeepers were themselves disarmed by RUF forces. In response, the Security Council increased UNAMSIL's personnel to 11,100 and revised UNAMSIL's mission to include protecting the government of President Kabbah. The situation only worsened, however. In early May, the RUF killed seven UN peacekeepers and captured fifty others. The number of peacekeepers taken prisoner soon increased to over 500 as the UN forces under the command of Indian Major General Vijay Kumar Jetley, who was experiencing difficulties with the Nigerian component of his command, apparently surrendered to the rebels without firing a shot. British forces, operating independently of the UN command structures, then landed in Freetown, ostensibly to help evacuate foreign nationals, but in fact to shore up the Kabbah regime and rescue the beleaguered UN force.

The capture of Sankoh while he led an incursion in Freetown, however, saved the situation as the UN prisoners were released as the leaderless RUF forces began to disintegrate after their leader's arrest. Meanwhile the Security Council authorized UNAMSIL to increase its strength to 13,000 military personnel (a limit that was later raised to 17,500, making it the largest UN peacekeeping operation in the world). UN Resolution 1346, approved on March 30, 2001, also stretched UNAMSIL's brief—already expanded from neutral monitoring of the ceasefire between the hostile forces to the active protection of the government—even further, declaring that:

The main objectives of UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone remain to assist the efforts of the government of Sierra Leone to extend its authority, restore law and order and stabilize the situation progressively throughout the entire country, and to assist in the promotion of a political process which should lead to a renewed disarmament, demobilization and reintegration program and the holding, in due course, of free and fair elections.¹⁷

As the country was gradually pacified during 2001, UNAMSIL celebrated the success of its disarmament program with an arms destruction ceremony on January 17, 2002, at which the force commander, Kenyan General Daniel Opande, declared the civil war officially over. No one really knows the total number of casualties in the decade-long conflict. It was conservatively estimated that some 70,000 people lost their lives in the fighting, while hundreds of thousands of others suffered amputations or were otherwise maimed. Some 2.6 million Sierra Leoneans were either internally displaced or refugees in neighboring countries.

The peace was culminated with presidential and parliamentary elections held on May 14, 2002 (members of the security forces voted four days earlier). The polling was largely peaceful, even though some irregularities were observed. Over 2.3 million Sierra Leoneans (approximately 85 percent of the eligible population) registered to vote, a significant increase over the 1.5 million citizens who registered to vote in the elections of 1996. Of those registered, some 2.2 million actually cast their ballots to give incumbent president Ahmad Tejan Kabbah just over 70 percent of the vote. Kabbah's SLPP won 83 of the 112 parliamentary seats up for grabs, compared with the 27 seats carried by the opposition APC, whose standard bearer, Ernest Koroma, received just slightly over 22 percent in the presidential poll. The RUF Party (RUF-P), the new political incarnation of the former insurgents, garnered barely 1.7 percent of the votes cast. The former leader of the AFRC, Johnny Paul Koroma, drew just 3 percent of the vote, although his People's Liberation Party did gain two seats in parliament. All in all, for a country that had endured more than a decade of civil war, preceded by three decades of political upheaval and stagnation, the elections represented an act of hope. Two months later, on July 12, 2002, at the state opening of the first session of the first parliament of the Sierra Leone's "third republic," Kabbah concluded: "All Sierra Leoneans, at home and abroad, suffered considerable loss. Some lost their cherished and loved ones, others their belongings, and still others, their dignity and honor. The bitter experience of armed conflict will linger in our memories for as long as we need to remind ourselves of the mistakes that we should never ever make again."¹⁸

THE ROOTS OF A CRISIS

Most of the literature on the subject of failed states has focused on the phenomenon's consequences, the symptoms of the conflict overshadowing its underlying pathology. This is not particularly surprising given that as one African human rights scholar has commented, the focus on conflict pathologies provides "academia, mainstream media, and political organizations an amiable platform from

which to configure their response.”¹⁹ In the case of Sierra Leone, moral indignation over human rights abuses, logistical concerns about the provision of humanitarian aid, the repatriation of refugees, and the rehabilitation of child soldiers, and plans for the trial of accused war criminals were among the many reactive programs that figured prominently on the international agenda for the West African country. However, a fixation on the manifestations of violence during the civil war—exemplified by the quasi-voyeuristic media focus on the “rebel hand choppers” of the RUF—risks obscuring the fact that the conflict neither began with the invasion of eastern Sierra Leone by Foday Sankoh and his little band nor truly ended with the rebel leader’s death while awaiting trial before the UN-sponsored Special Court for Sierra Leone. Rather, the eruption of violence and conflict was the culmination of a process that involved a host of factors, including the lack of cohesive national identity, weak governance structures and capacity, corruption and economic mismanagement, ethnic tensions, and the evolution of a *lumpen* culture of marginalized youth easily prone to violence given their alienation from traditional societal restraints.²⁰

While a chain of tragic events and grievances may spark the outbreak in violence that finally brings down a weakened state, civil conflicts will usually consume themselves unless some resource keeps the flames kindled.

While a chain of tragic events and grievances may spark the outbreak in violence that finally brings down a weakened state, civil conflicts will usually consume themselves unless some resource keeps the flames kindled. To understand the political economy of war-torn Sierra Leone, one must first grasp that of neighboring Liberia to whose civil war the Sierra Leonean conflict was grafted both in its immediate causation and in its eventual economic ties. Charles Taylor’s goal was always the Liberian presidency. Had he been successful in 1990, when his National Patriotic Front of Liberia controlled over 90 percent of Liberia and was on the verge of seizing the capital of Monrovia, it was likely that Taylor would have set up a patrimonial state with a centralized patronage network similar to that of other African heads of sovereign states. However, the ECOMOG intervention prevented him from taking the capital, and the installation of the ineffectual Interim Government of National Unity regime led by the scholarly Amos Sawyer denied Taylor the international recognition of juridical sovereignty. This left the Liberian warlord in a difficult situation: “he could not sell diplomatic support in exchange for aid or politically motivated foreign investment as [the late Liberian dictator Samuel] Doe had done” nor could he “convincingly attract aid in return for promised to hold elections until he captured Monrovia,”²¹ (the portion of Liberia he controlled never receive much by way of international relief aid during the civil war). Consequently, Taylor’s only option was to acquire resources for his military operations by resorting to a “warlord political economy” of tapping the

assets in areas under his control and exploiting the commercial opportunities afforded by increasingly flexible global economic conditions, characterized by decentralization and lack of territorially defined markets. Insofar as the “Greater Liberia” regime he established at his “provisional capital” of Gbarnga was not internationally recognized, Taylor was not constrained by the traditional requirements of a state actor and, consequently, enjoyed the advantages of a global market while Sawyer’s ECOMOG-supported *de jure* government in Monrovia were saddled with its disadvantages, including accountability for past sovereign debt. In this context, Taylor’s support of the RUF in Sierra Leone can be seen to be a rational response to the ECOMOG intervention and Sierra Leone’s backing of one of the factions fighting him, the United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia (ULIMO), created by the Momoh regime from Liberian exiles in Sierra Leone. While one should be cautious about treating any of the participants in the conflicts *solely* as rational economic actors, support for the RUF gave Taylor access to the rents provided by control of Sierra Leone’s diamond fields, which were readily accessible from the Liberian border.²²

The presence of large foreign forces can lead to the creation of a state that is unduly dependent upon aid and whose citizens are chiefly employed in servicing their rescuers, as has been the case in Sierra Leone since UNAMSIL helped end that country’s civil war.

Diamonds represented the most important source of extractable wealth in Sierra Leone and have been the focus of political competition in the country since their discovery in the Kono district in 1930. Unfortunately, this natural resource is almost perfectly adapted for illicit exploitation and commerce. During the Sierra Leonean civil war, all the parties in the conflict—including peacekeepers and other international agents who intervened ostensibly to stop the violence—were engaged in the diamond traffic: the Sierra Leonean government, the various mercenary forces it recruited to its cause (especially the South African security firm of Executive Outcomes), the RUF, the rebels’ Liberian supporters, soldiers and other armed factions acting on their own account (the so-called *sobel*s, “soldiers by day, rebels by night”), and officers of the ECOMOG and UNAMSIL contingents (especially the Nigerians).²³ In short, corruption in the management of diamond resources in Sierra Leone and elsewhere in Africa sowed the seeds of socio-economic decay that led to open conflict. Once the conflict began, those same resources fuel it with an income stream that finances the ongoing war.

The panorama of the political economy of the Sierra Leonean civil war would not be complete without mention of the large resource transfers from abroad, most of it as part of international operations ostensibly intended to halt the conflict. At the very least, the presence of large foreign forces can lead to the creation of a state that is unduly dependent upon aid and whose citizens are chiefly employed in servicing

their rescuers, as has been the case in Sierra Leone since UNAMSIL helped end that country's civil war. The budget of the military component of the international intervention, \$543.49 million for the fiscal year ending June 30, 2004, was nearly twice as much as that of the West African country's government, and accounts for about one-fourth of its GDP.²⁴

While international aid can help rebuild the collapsed economic and political institutions, it also encourages and, in fact, intensifies dependence—thereby, over the long term, reigniting the vicious cycle of the weakened state and renewed collapse and violence.

To these figures, one has to add the resources that aid organizations, both governmental and nongovernmental, have brought to the country, the long-term effects of which are unknown. With proliferation of the number of international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) present in Sierra Leone after UNAMSIL reestablished a modicum of order, there arose two additional issues whose import for the reconstruction of the Sierra Leonean political economy remains to be seen. First, the higher salaries and other benefits offered by the often-competing NGOs led to a virtual "brain drain" of the best qualified Sierra Leoneans towards these assistance organizations and away from both the public governmental and private commercial sectors. Second, there is the general question about accountability of the international NGOs with respect to the Sierra Leoneans on whose behalf they are ostensibly working since in their present framework, there is nothing to "guarantee either effectiveness or accountability to the people whose lives they most effect."²⁵

Embarrassingly for the international donors, the Sierra Leonean state was so weak and dysfunctional that the assistance intended to end the conflict was often just as likely to fuel it. When, for example, in December 1998, the RUF routed the ECOMOG peacekeepers at Kano, the rebels captured the unit's supply depot, taking a substantial cache of weapons. Additionally, a considerable body of anecdotal evidence exists that RUF commanders regularly bought weapons from Nigerian ECOMOG commanders in exchange for cash and diamonds. The UN forces suffered similarly at the hands of the RUF: in May 2000, when the rebels took a Zambian contingent serving with UNAMSIL hostage, they also relieved them of some five hundred AK-47s and several heavy machine guns. Further research is needed into the extent that non-lethal aid resources have been diverted. In any event, it remains that in a deeply dependent country like Sierra Leone, while international aid can help rebuild the collapsed economic and political institutions, it also encourages and, in fact, intensifies dependence²⁶—thereby, over the long term, reigniting the vicious cycle of the weakened state and renewed collapse and violence.

DEMOCRACY BY FORCE AND THE PERILS OF INTERVENTION

The Sierra Leonean civil war illustrates how conflicts are driven at three interdependent levels: national, regional, and global. At the national level, the conflict was essentially a deadlock. With no effective military force or other state capacity to speak of, the Sierra Leonean government under Joseph Momoh was a virtual sitting target awaiting its fate. This opening allowed the RUF to step in and seize control of the country's diamond wealth. However, the brutal tactics employed by the rebels as well as their lack of a coherent political program other than to overthrow the national government in Freetown rendered it difficult for them to rally Sierra Leoneans to their cause. As a result, the conflict stalemated, at which point regional actors intervened, either in support of the successive Sierra Leonean regimes or of the rebels.

When democratic rule was restored to Nigeria in 1999, frustration over the human and economic costs of the prolonged commitment abroad led to the withdrawal of most of the ECOMOG contingent and the subsuming of the remaining troops into a UN-led force, UNAMSIL, that suffered from its own tensions and divisions, culminating in the precipitous withdrawal of the significant Indian and Jordanian components from Sierra Leone. UNAMSIL itself was only saved from an ignominious defeat at the hands of the rebels by the decisive action of British expeditionary force in 2000. Despite this spotted history, Alan Kuperman has noted:

*No foreign policy seems more inherently benign than humanitarian intervention. It is rooted in the altruistic desire to protect innocents from violent death. It appears feasible, given the military superiority of Western forces over those in developing countries where most violent conflict occurs. And the only obvious costs are a modest financial commitment and the occasional casualty.*²⁷

In Sierra Leone, the case for this “logic” was rendered all the more easy by the media-driven demonization of the RUF—which, by and large, ignored the abuses perpetrated by the Sierra Leonean government and its allies—and the fact that few outside observers bothered to brief themselves on the underlying social, economic, and political grievances that led to the conflict in the first place. Unfortunately, this jaundiced perspective contributed to a situation wherein “humanitarian considerations were set aside by the ‘peacemakers’ in the name of the moral superiority of their aim: the fight against rebel ‘barbarity.’”²⁸ For example, from the *coup d'état* of May 1997 until President Kabbah's return to Freetown in March 1998, the embargo aimed at the AFRC-RUF junta was—in practice if not in law—extended to block humanitarian aid to Sierra Leone. Likewise, during the final phase of the conflict, the delivery of humanitarian matériel to rebel-controlled areas was held up on numerous occasions to pressure the RUF to implement various peace agreements. While the operation of aid programs in rebel-controlled areas should certainly be closely scrutinized, the blatant subjection of *humanitarian* assistance to *political* considerations did not enhance the international community's moral standing in the conflict. Of

course, the international community's blanket endorsement of the government of Ahmad Tejan Kabbah—who, it should be recalled, was elected in 1996 by a rather dubious majority with the participation of, at best, one-quarter of the electorate during a civil war—as the legitimate party in the conflict was itself a moral judgment, one still disputed by a number of Sierra Leoneans.²⁹

As Michael Barnett succinctly observed in his analysis of the moral responsibility for the Rwandan genocide, “peacekeeping was not a value-neutral activity.”³⁰ Rather, peacekeeping and other international interventions, by their very nature, imply political and ethical judgments that the existing institutions within the nation that is the object of the intervention are not only incapable of maintaining domestic security and the rule of law, but that their failure to maintain domestic order undermines the international order. However, with judgment comes the responsibility to not undertake a course of action that itself feeds the domestic conflict, increases the security threat, and causes the regional insecurity—all of which intervention was meant to remedy. During the Sierra Leonean civil war, by being—or allowing their forces to be transformed into, depending on what motivations one attributes to the creators of ECOMOG and UNAMSIL—a party to the conflict rather than a impartial enforcer of law and order, the peacekeepers, regardless of any good intentions, ended up guilty of all three offenses: intensifying the level of the conflict, thus exacerbating the security threat, and leading directly into the spillover of the fighting into neighboring countries.

Hence the political and ethical burdens rests with those who intervened in Sierra Leone as well as with those who will advocate humanitarian interventions there and elsewhere in the future to ensure that the military intervention does not itself create a set of circumstances where the result that was supposed to be prevented becomes instead the inevitable, even if unintended, consequence. Reflecting on the lessons of the Balkans conflicts of the 1990s during his 2000 Tanner Lecture at Princeton University, Michael Ignatieff commented *à propos*:

Intervention is also problematic because we are not necessarily coming to the rescue of pure innocence. Intervention frequently requires us to side with one party in a civil war, and the choice frequently requires us to support parties who are themselves guilty of human rights abuses... We are intervening in the name of human rights as never before, but our interventions are sometimes making matters worse.³¹

In short, the international community faces an invidious dilemma: while interventions may be essential in the short term to stave off worse calamities, over the long run they may potentially have a debilitating effect on the countries that are the objects of the concern from abroad, impeding the development of precisely the local processes that offer the only real prospect of peace and stability.

LESSONS LEARNED

Even with the *caveats*, the international support for the restoration and promotion of constitutional and democratic government in Sierra Leone was unprecedented in the annals of modern African history and represented a significant paradigm shift that was ultimately decisive in breaking the country's vicious cycle of instability and violent conflict. President Kabbah's March 1998 restoration marked the first time that a group of African countries had joined together to restore an elected president who had been illegally deposed. The Lomé Agreement of the following year was not only signed by the parties in the conflict, but also by the heads of state or plenipotentiaries of six neighboring states (Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria, Liberia, and Togo) and representatives of ECOWAS, the Organization of African Unity, the UN, and the Commonwealth of Nations. Jesse Jackson, special envoy of United States President Bill Clinton, had earlier been a signatory of the ceasefire that had opened the way for the negotiation of the peace accord. That Sierra Leone survives today despite the eventual collapse of the Lomé process is directly attributable to the persistence of the international community. This level of commitment, including the use of force to support it, has regrettably been absent from other cases of state failure—witness the lack of perseverance in Somalia or, albeit on a different scale, the relative regional and international indulgence that has thus far permitted the Mugabe regime to continue to rape Zimbabwe's polity and resources. While each situation poses different challenges, drawing upon the relative success of the experience in Sierra Leone, several lessons can be drawn from that exercise (and the various glitches along the way) about rescuing and democratizing failed states, including:

Ensuring security first

If the cycle of violence in places like Sierra Leone begins often enough with the government's loss of the monopoly on the means of force that ought to be one of its key attributes of sovereignty, one would suppose that the establishment of security would be the condition *sine qua non* for the recreation of a stable national state capable of giving orders and seeing them carried out throughout national territory—in short, a state in the classic Weberian sense. Instead, peace agreements in many failed states contain provisions for quite the opposite: the emasculation, if not the wholesale dismantling, of the national military. In Sierra Leone, for example, Executive Outcomes not only effectively trained and led the Sierra Leonean army in 1995 and 1996, but its efforts brought the previously recalcitrant RUF to the negotiating table. Yet the Abidjan Agreement of November 1996 stipulated that the private security company had to be withdrawn without making provision for what would replace it. Three months to the day after the mercenaries left, the ill-disciplined army mutinied and joined the RUF to impose a nine-month reign of terror that only ended when the Nigerian-led West African military force threw the rebels out. The Nigerians left on May 2, 2000; the very next day, insurgency erupted again and some five hundred UN peacekeepers were taken prisoner. That latter uprising was only put down by a

British expeditionary force, elements of which still remain in the West African country to provide security.

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Strengthening political stability and national identity before promoting democracy

Beyond ensuring basic security, promoting democracy is the ostensible goal of most international interventions since the end of the Cold War. The experience of Sierra Leone in 1996—as well as that of its neighbor, Liberia, the following year—would suggest that proceeding posthaste to the polls is counterproductive. Whereas in Europe, some sort of nation or at least national consciousness preceded the establishment of the state, the reverse is true in many parts of the global south where the colonial-era state remains fixed and post-independence rulers were expected to somehow wield a nation out of a heterogeneous group of peoples and cultures. A thumbnail definition of a nation has been given as a “named human population sharing a historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members.”³² If that is the case, then there is no such chimera as the “Sierra Leonean nation”—or any other sub-Saharan nation for that matter. The Tanzanian jurist Makau wa Mutua has argued this point in moral and juridical terms:

[T]he post-colonial state, the uncritical successor of the colonial state, is doomed because it lacks basic moral legitimacy. Its normative and territorial construction on the African colonial state, itself a legal and moral nullity, is the fundamental reason for its failure. . . [A]t independence, the West decolonized the colonial state, not the African peoples subject to it.³³

The challenge was even greater in the case of Sierra Leone because the country was created by amalgamating two separate colonial-era political units, the Crown Colony of Freetown and the indirectly-ruled Protectorate of Sierra Leone, each of which came to independence with a distinct colonial experience grafted upon more ancient differences. Stillborn as a dysfunctional state with neither an authentic national identity nor, seemingly, the political will to achieve national cohesion despite an apparently “model” constitution, Sierra Leone’s descent into state failure and civil war may have come slowly over several decades, but the decline was steady. Those who succeeded founding Prime Minister Sir Milton Margai, beginning with his brother Sir Albert,

never bothered to construct legitimate political institutions capable of exercising effective leadership, preferring to exploit ethnic cleavages to further their hold on political power. If this was not bad enough, their ineptness made matters worse. Not surprisingly, the flawed but legitimate election of Ahmad Tejan Kabbah as president in 1996—the first truly democratic *and* national poll in Sierra Leone's history—destabilized, rather than united, the country.

Promoting local participation in post-conflict accountability, justice, and reconciliation

That the general elections of 2002 were neither the procedural fiasco nor the polarizing contest that the earlier voting had been—in fact, the incumbent Kabbah not only was reelected but also returned with a comfortable personal and parliamentary majority—has a great deal to do with the post-conflict mechanisms deployed in the lead-up to the poll. While neither institution is flawless, the parallel establishment in 2001 of the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) helped promote indigenous participation and responsibility in the post-conflict examination of past failures and violence. In particular, the efforts of the American prosecutor of SCSL, David Crane, to carefully explain his activities in various “town hall” meetings throughout the country and the public hearings conducted by the TRC chairman, Methodist bishop Joseph Christian Humper, helped engender among the Sierra Leonean masses a sense of being “stakeholders” in the two processes. In contrast, the comparatively remote proceedings of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda have occasioned indifference at best and, often enough, sentiments of hostility and new grievances.

Reinforcing state capacities

If Siaka Stevens set in motion a vicious self-destructive economic cycle, his handpicked successor, Joseph Momoh, presided over the final implosion of the dysfunctional system. While the preponderant share of the responsibility lies with the APC regime's incompetence and limitless venality—television broadcasts in the country, for example, ended abruptly one day in 1987 when Information and Broadcasting Minister Eya Mbayo sold Sierra Leone's only transmitter to an Afro-Lebanese trader and pocketed the proceeds—the international community did not help matters. Finally under pressure from the international lending community, Momoh undertook cost-cutting “austerity” measures that undermined what little was left of the government's strength and capacity. As Francis Fukuyama has noted, governments like Sierra Leone's, were advised to move rapidly to cut back on the scope of the state without regard for nuance. Consequently,

[t]he problem for many countries was that in the process of reducing state scope they either decreased state strength or generated demands for new types of state capabilities that were either weak or nonexistent. The austerity required by stabilization and structural adjustment policies became, in certain countries, an excuse for cutting state capacity across the board. . . many countries actually decreased both scope and strength.³⁴

Such was certainly the case in Sierra Leone and the reason why the eventual success or failure of the nascent constitutional regime will depend heavily on whether or not a historically “weak state” can develop the capacity to carry out political, administrative, and economic self-governance.

Creating economic opportunities that empower

The economic malaise that accompanied the two decades of predatory “neopatrimonial” rule by the APC in Sierra Leone helped create the conditions for the success of the RUF’s populist appeal. While clearly the insurgents did little to alleviate Sierra Leone’s long-festered social problems, their “revolutionary” program found resonance with significant segments of the country’s population. Sierra Leonean political scientist Earl Conteh-Morgan has observed:

Third World citizens generally view the Third World state’s policies as being responsible for their economic situation, whether good or bad. Consequently, with the persistence of economic downturns collective political violence may intensify support for a change of regime or destabilize a regime. Paradoxically, the strong linkage between good economic conditions and the sustenance of democratization may well make incumbent regimes more responsive to not only an efficient economy but to the needs of the various groups in society.³⁵

The Sierra Leonean government and its leading international supporters need to devote at least as much energy to rebuilding the economy as they have to establishing political institutions. In the eyes of many, particularly the unemployed youth who swelled the ranks of the insurgency or hire themselves out to various warlords during the recent conflict, the legitimacy of public institutions is inextricably linked to their stake in them. As one observer succinctly commented regarding the civil conflict: “To the economist this is war motivated by greed. For the young fighter, it is injustice.”³⁶

CONCLUSION

While responsibility for successful democratization—or state failure—ultimately rests with the citizens of the failed state itself on whom it is incumbent to exercise vigilance over their polity, in the post-9/11 world, there is no such thing as isolated failure in the international system. The instantaneous global reach of communications as well as the destructive transnational capabilities of violent non-state actors renders any state failure a potential threat to the entire international community. And while much of the political discourse regarding international security and the use of force, in both the United States and other countries, has been focused on “rogue states” and terrorism, an even greater threat to the global order over the intermediate and long term will come from weak states and their seemingly inexorable descent into autocracy, warlordism, and chaos. The endemic turmoil into which these states fall occasions not just human rights abuses and other humanitarian crises, but also fosters money laundering and other illicit commerce that, in turn, fuels violence, fanaticism, and, ultimately, even terrorism. It is only a short passage from the

seemingly “low intensity” conflicts of state sovereignty and order and the full-blown geopolitical crises of the first order. Consequently, in discerning the way forward through the tangled thickets of the years ahead, a glance back at the tragedy of Sierra Leone and the—for once—forceful and perseverant international response that turned the tide might indeed be salutary.

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⁵ See Fred Hayward, “State Consolidation, Fragmentation and Decay,” in *Contemporary West African States*, 2nd ed., ed. Donal Cruise O'Brien, John Dunn, and Richard Rathbone (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 165–180.

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⁸ John L. Hirsch, *Sierra Leone: Diamonds and the Struggle for Democracy*, International Peace Academy Occasional Papers Series (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001), 30.

⁹ Stephen Ellis, *The Mask of Anarchy: The Destruction of Liberia and the Religious Dimension of an African Civil War* (New York: New York University Press, 1999), 70–71.

¹⁰ See Robert D. Kaplan, “The Coming Anarchy: How Scarcity, Crime, Overpopulation and Disease are Rapidly Destroying the Social Fabric of Our Planet,” *Atlantic Monthly* 273, no. 2 (February 1994): 44–76.

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²⁶ See, *in alia*, George B.N. Ayittey, *Africa Unchained: The Blueprint for Africa's Future* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005). The author, a native of Ghana who is presently Distinguished Economist at American University, documents, among other unintended consequences of international aid and development policies, how food aid has induced import food dependency in the West African country, turning it into the world's sixth largest recipient of food aid despite its relatively small size. For a largely anecdotal account of the challenges faced in Sierra Leone, see Peter Griffiths, *An Economist's Tale: A Consultant Encounters Hunger and the World Bank* (London: Zed Books, 2003).

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²⁹ To cite but one example, during the first round of the election, voting took place in all of the country's electoral districts except APC candidate John Karefa-Smart's home district of Tonkolili, where it was cancelled for "security reasons" on the eve of the poll. In at least four districts in the SLPP's southern stronghold, the returns suggested that more votes had been cast than there were registered voters. Interim National Election Commission Chairman James Jonah, a veteran UN colleague of Kabbah's, made the rather controversial call of simply reducing Kabbah's total votes by 70,000, thereby effectively adjusting the total vote in each of the four districts to award the SLPP candidate "only" 100 percent of the vote.

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Building Democracy in 21st Century Africa: Two Africas, One Solution

by Darren Kew

INTRODUCTION

Few observers of African politics are strangers to irony. The most recent of many occurred in December 2004: Ghana, which only 20 years ago seemed lost in the intrigues of military rule, successfully held its fourth national election since 1992, to the well-deserved praise of local and international observers alike. At the same time and half a continent away, Rwandan forces again crossed the border into the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), threatening to reignite a region-wide war that resulted in the deaths of at least three million people between 1997 and 2003.

Thus, we see a growing division across this vast continent of 54 states: Ghana and other consolidating democracies at one end, having developed fragile democratic institutions growing in strength and increasingly good governance, and the DRC and other failed states at the other, seemingly caught in a downward spiral of authoritarianism, ethnic chauvinism, warlords, and collapsing state institutions. Several observers have noted variations of this “Tale of Two Africas”¹ that is unfolding across the continent, and many countries lie somewhere in between these two paths toward progress or decline.

Yet, African countries at both ends of this divide appear to have come to a common consensus that the democratic path is the only institutional vehicle that can deliver the socioeconomic progress demanded by populaces across the continent. Successful nations like Ghana, South Africa, Kenya, and Senegal are well on their way to consolidating democratic rule. Collapsed states like the DRC and Somalia, meanwhile, are searching to develop democratic frameworks that can stitch their countries back together, and even authoritarian states like Togo and Cameroon hold sham elections to claim a veneer of legitimacy with their people. Nigeria, Uganda, and a host of other states in transition between these two poles are also struggling to strengthen the rudiments of democratic governance, and their relative level of success in this endeavor is a strong indicator of their level of overall socioeconomic progress (see Tables).

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Clearly, democratic consolidation is essential, if not a prerequisite, to political stability and socioeconomic development across Africa. Given the massive diversity of cases across the continent, however, can we still discern some common elements to the democratic solution for African political and economic development?

Almost all African countries share one political fact: their state structures were imposed by imperial powers over a century ago. This imposition of the state created a remarkably similar set of dilemmas that Africans have faced across the continent: an *ethnic security dilemma*, in which ethnic groups are caught in a reciprocal struggle for power to secure the interests of their group, and a subsequent *economic dilemma*, in which growing numbers of people must vie for portions of shrinking economic output. A review of how these dilemmas unfolded, and how the successful states have addressed them through democratic development, offers a set of options for strengthening democracy across the continent and for bringing the states of Second Africa back on the path to prosperity with the First.

THE LEGACY OF THE PAST: TWO DILEMMAS

The European imposition of the state system on Africa created a political development process that was different from the European experience in two key respects. First, African states were not each primarily the construct of a single hegemonic ethnic group, as was the case in Western Europe or the United States.² Several African countries contained groups that could assert hegemony on independence, but state institutions did not grow out of any indigenous political process of their making. One notable exception was Ethiopia, which was never colonized.³ In addition, British “indirect rule” policy incorporated indigenous political institutions into the colonial administration to a degree, but only so far as to maintain public order and to reinforce the extraction of primary commodities to the metropole, at the expense of the legitimacy of these institutions with their publics. Second, African states had only a handful of years to prepare for independence as coherent political units, unlike the centuries over which the European states evolved. Thus, African political elites at the time of independence inherited state institutions that were largely alien, and they had little practical experience governing together under single political entities.

Not surprisingly, few Africans felt much connection to these rootless states. Independence leader Obafemi Awolowo’s characterization of Nigeria as “a mere geographical expression,”⁴ and nothing like the seemingly mono-ethnic nations of Europe, captured the mood of the age. Instead, most Africans identified strongly with the precolonial nationalities or ethnicities to which they belonged.⁵ Racist colonial policies of “divide and rule” reinforced these ethnic identifications, and in many cases the colonialists built political units around ethnic groupings, which also encouraged ethnic political identification.

Moreover, the political structures that African political elites did inherit were primarily developed around coercive mechanisms and centralized political and

economic controls, such as the bureaucracy, police, and military. Corruption became endemic, and critical democratic institutions like legislatures and local governments were weak, although some colonies had fairly extensive judiciary systems. Consequently, political cultures were based on ethnic ranking and distinction, authoritarian patterns of governance, and increasingly, state corruption.

With ethnic groups seen as the primary units serving the interests of individuals, promoting ethnic-based interests became paramount, and the increase in power of one ethnic group was perceived as a relative decrease in the power of others and therefore a threat to their security and their interests.

Thus, for most newly independent African countries the most readily identifiable political category both for identification and mobilization was ethnicity, rather than class or territorial nation. Given this relative strength of ethnicity in comparison to the weak institutionalization and legitimacy of African states, political leaders and supporters alike generally perceived themselves in a *security dilemma*⁶ with members of other ethnic groups vying for control of the state. With ethnic groups seen as the primary units serving the interests of individuals, promoting ethnic-based interests became paramount, and the increase in power of one ethnic group was perceived as a relative decrease in the power of others and therefore a threat to their security and their interests. All political matters thus came to be viewed first through the ethnic lens and judged fundamentally in regard to how they influenced the balance of power among ethnic groups. Ethnic groups were never monolithic, but a rise in intra-ethnic divisions came at the cost of losing ground to more unified groups.

This ethnic security dilemma persists in many African countries today, and remains a constant source of instability. So long as the dilemma persists, national politics remain fixed on the question of *who governs*, rather than moving to the question of *how* to govern. Policy in these cases is less a matter of the substance of initiatives, and more a question of how they affect the ethnic calculus.

Because of this dilemma, the early democratic phase of the 1960s in Africa saw intense inter-ethnic competition and increasingly ethnic political parties. Although some groups formed coalitions, more often than not one group rose to dominate the state and lock others out of power. Consequently, groups increasingly saw control of the state as a zero-sum matter, which legitimized any action to win power, even at the expense of the democratic system. Rigged elections, one-party states, and abuses of power became the norm, forcing excluded groups to find other alternatives to protect their interests, such as military coups, secession, and revolution.

As young democracies failed across Africa in the 1960s, the continent moved into a long authoritarian period during which the ethnic security dilemma persisted

in many countries and was exacerbated in others. Authoritarian rule, whether one-party or military rule, accelerated the political centralization of state structures begun under the colonialists and added an additional dimension of economic centralization under variations of socialist policies. The result was the stifling of foreign investment by nationalization and import substitution policies, and the strangling of broad-based agricultural development by colonial-style product boards and regressive tax policies. Foreign debts rose, as did foreign aid dependence.

This economic and political centralization produced a second dilemma for African states: an *economic dilemma*. Who gets the limited economic fruits amid growing poverty? Placing the most productive elements of the economy under state control increased the benefits of power dramatically, and political authoritarianism reduced the circle of individuals with access to that power, thus making its access all the more lucrative. Given the government's growing role in the economy, the search for public office and/or government contracts became the most gainful and thus, dominant economic activity.⁷ Fulfilling the terms of these contracts became of lesser importance than the transaction itself, which typically involved some remuneration for the public official who gave it out. Moreover, under pressure from international financial institutions in the 1980s to implement structural adjustment policies, African political elites gutted what remained of the meager social nets for their publics. Economic growth ground to a halt, constricting tenuous standards of living even further, and making control of the state and its monopoly of economic benefits truly a life-or-death affair.

Leaders across the continent who were able to retain power for a measure of time grew fabulously rich and powerful, which signaled the rise of the so-called Big Men – leaders who used their control of state resources to build vast networks of clients.

Authoritarian rule did little to solve the ethnic security dilemma or the economic dilemma directly. In fact, in most cases it exacerbated these problems, given the massive centralization in political and economic power, which made political losers even more disaffected, while the winners became more adamant about staying put. Through a mix of ethnic balancing and brutal methods, some leaders such as Cote D'Ivoire's Felix Houphouet-Boigny or Zaire's Mobutu Sese Seko, grew especially adept at staying in power. Leaders across the continent who were able to retain power for a measure of time grew fabulously rich and powerful, which signaled the rise of the so-called Big Men, leaders who used their control of state resources to build vast networks of clients. This "neopatrimonialism"⁸ put the Big Man at the top of a pyramid of supporters and saw the same pattern replicated at lower levels; provincial and local clients also sat atop their own patron-client networks.

Interestingly, however, although these neopatrimonial networks typically sat atop a solid ethnic base, the more powerful Big Men built alliances across ethnicities through political and financial patronage. To some extent, this undermined ethnic loyalties in some cases, in the sense that personal, cash-based fealty to the Big Man proved more individually rewarding than promoting one's ethnic group. Although these relationships fed corruption, they also ameliorated the ethnic security dilemma to a degree, in the sense that political elites grew to view their political alternatives in a more individualistic fashion. This individualistic approach opened more alternatives to negotiate, typically in cash terms, than the more zero-sum perspectives of ethnic politics. This proved critical in Nigeria, Kenya, Zambia, and elsewhere after the authoritarian period, where political elites were able to forge multi-ethnic political parties, in part on the basis of financial incentives for politicians across the ethnic spectrum.

The ethnic security dilemma assured that whoever was in power faced the constant threat of removal by rival groups and that states grew only marginally in terms of having the identification and legitimacy of their own people.

AN IMPERFECT DEMOCRATIC WAVE

By 1989, much of Africa was dominated by politically and economically centralized states. The ethnic security dilemma assured that whoever was in power faced the constant threat of removal by rival groups and that states grew only marginally in terms of having the identification and legitimacy of their own people. National political cultures, in turn, were characterized by neopatrimonialism, clientelism, corruption, and authoritarian intolerance for opposition and preference for executive fiat. The economic dilemma, meanwhile, kept states weak and populations increasingly impoverished. Economies remained dependent upon primary products and were deeply indebted to foreign creditors.

With the end of the Cold War, security concerns of Western nations abated in the African region, allowing secondary goals such as economic trade and spreading democracy to dominate Western policy concerns. This led to dramatic cuts in foreign assistance for old "friends" of the West like Mobutu Sese Seko in Zaire and Samuel Doe in Liberia, and to a general press across the continent for political liberalization both from internal actors and international ones. The result was a wave of democratization⁹ that swept Africa throughout the 1990s. A number of states, like Togo and Gabon, resisted this trend. Others, like Somalia and Zaire, were so weakened by misrule amid the ethnic and economic dilemmas that they imploded.

Most African states, however, spent the 1990s undertaking a range of political reforms and varying degrees of democratization. The young democracies inherited weak state institutions in many cases, and all faced ethnic security and economic dilemmas. Two general trends in democratization were evident over the past 15 years:

1. *Sudden transitions*: States like Zambia and Burundi, in which new political organizations or opposition groups unseated longstanding authoritarian rulers shortly after political liberalization was allowed.

2. *Gradual transitions*: Countries like Senegal, Ghana, and Kenya, in which ruling parties or authoritarian rulers only partially liberalized or allowed only the trappings of democratic reforms, such that opposition parties spent years mobilizing their support base and civil society groups in order to force credible elections and win control of the government.

Most of the sudden democratic transitions in Africa have proven less stable than their gradual counterparts. Within several years of the sudden transitions, most of the new governing parties quickly displayed many of the authoritarian political cultural patterns of their predecessors in how they governed, seeking to restrict opposition and looking for institutional ways to maintain their hold on power. Burundi, meanwhile, collapsed into civil war within three months after its Tutsi-dominated military assassinated its newly elected Hutu president.

One thread running through the poor records of the sudden transitions is the failure of the new governments to resolve the ethnic security dilemma. The rapid nature of the transition itself in some cases exacerbates the dilemma, such that some ethnic groups see their hold on power evaporate within a context of deep uncertainty as to whether the new groups will ever allow them significant access in the future. In Burundi, fears that the new Hutu-dominated government would integrate the Tutsi-dominated military and scale back other prerogatives had disastrous consequences. Zambia, meanwhile, saw its new president seek to change the constitution to promote his own tenure in power and to restrict the influence of the former ruling party.

Gradual democratic transitions, however, appear to ease the ethnic security dilemma to some degree. Delayed democratization and authoritarian recalcitrance in most of these cases appears to have provided for an extended period of hard bargaining, public engagement on the part of opposition parties, and eventually, some form of elite compromise¹⁰ that directly or indirectly addresses the overarching governance question posed by the ethnic dilemma. This compromise typically provides for some form of powersharing arrangement among the major ethnic groups, as in South Africa and Kenya, and/or it instills sufficient confidence in the election system and other state institutions that losing parties feel they have a reasonable chance at winning in the future, as in Senegal. Moreover, public engagement in these transitions is sufficient enough for supporters to demand higher accountability of the new governments once in power, which can restrict their ability to exclude competitors from the policy process.

Although many of the gradual transitions appear to have made some progress toward arresting the ethnic security dilemma and are moving toward consolidating their democratic frameworks, they still feature political cultures significantly characterized by Big Man neopatrimonialism. These powerful mandarins dominate both ruling and opposition parties, often at the expense of larger public engagement in, and benefit from, the political process, in a fashion that resembles competitive oligarchy more than democratic development. The Big Men generally retain their patronage power bases and continue to view warily some critical elements of democratic development, such as accountability and transparency.

If African countries are to continue down the path to democratic development, the persistence of authoritarian and neopatrimonial patterns of governance must be addressed in a manner that resolves the ethnic security dilemma, which in turn will likely allow states to manage the persistent economic dilemma as well.

The progress made by the gradual transitions toward resolving the economic dilemma, however, is generally promising. The tables show that on average, the consolidating democracies, which were all produced by gradual transitions, have higher rates of economic growth and overall human development than transitional democracies, authoritarian governments, or countries that are backsliding toward authoritarianism. Their lead by these indicators is, however, still moderate, and the transitions for most are still fairly recent, such that their progress in resolving the economic dilemma will require closer study as the decade progresses.

CHALLENGES FOR AFRICAN DEMOCRACY IN THE 21ST CENTURY

If African countries are to continue down the path to democratic development, the persistence of authoritarian and neopatrimonial patterns of governance must be addressed in a manner that resolves the ethnic security dilemma, which in turn will likely allow states to manage the persistent economic dilemma as well. Although no single template or model can apply to all of Africa's 54 countries, the states that have been more successful in moving toward democratic consolidation in the past few years offer a number of possible elements to encourage democratic deepening.

First and foremost is a balance of power among critical centers of power in the country. This balance must be struck not only among the formal structures of power—as in checks and balances among the various branches and levels of government—and between the state and actors in society, such as businesses and civil society groups, but among the informal structures of power as well. Most important among the latter is the development of a balance of power among the various networks of the neopatrimonial Big Men, particularly through the vehicles

of political parties. Such a balance can help competitive oligarchy to evolve democratically through the competition among these oligarchs when none of them – alone or in coalition—can impose their wills on the rest. This in turn forces them to compromise. So long as power is generally balanced and this competition operates largely within the contours of the democratic system—through elections, court battles, policy debate, public inquiries, and so on—rather than through organized gangs of thugs, armed militias, and abuses of systemic powers, then it will commit the interests of political elites more closely to the health of the system.

Moreover, balanced political competition among the Big Men will encourage them to engage more of their supporters in the process, which in turn will force them to deliver on their political promises in exchange for that support. Over time, this increased public engagement can bring neopatrimonial practices under greater public scrutiny, introducing increased transparency and accountability into political relationships. Furthermore, as leaders of various ethnic factions negotiate with one another in this manner, it can help to ease the ethnic security dilemma by introducing political compromise and structures that accommodate broader participation through the democratic framework.

As was clear in Ghana and Kenya, if political competition among elites is to foster engagement of broader publics, leading in turn to increased accountability, then an essential element in the democratization process is a credible elections system.

One of the central reasons for the success of the gradual transitions is that they allowed time for this power balance to develop. The balance, in turn, provided the framework for the elite compromise, which drew the architecture for democratic transition. Kenya's National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) developed after divided opposition groups fought Daniel Arap Moi's KANU through two stolen elections in the 1990s. During this period, opposition groups built public and civil society support and forged the NARC, creating sufficient power to ensure that the government held credible elections, which the NARC won. KANU, meanwhile, negotiated the contours of these elections such that they retain some confidence of regaining power, and have set about wooing voters for elections in 2007. Ghana followed a similar path two years earlier, with the main opposition party unseating Jerry Rawlings' NDC after eight years of constituency-building and constant pressure on the NDC over the electoral commission.

As was clear in Ghana and Kenya, if political competition among elites is to foster engagement of broader publics, leading in turn to increased accountability, then an essential element in the democratization process is a credible elections system. Central to the elite compromises that produced successful transitions were

agreements that assured the integrity of the electoral commission. By contrast, some of the marginal cases of democratization have faltered particularly because their election processes are questionable and pose deep problems for further democratic consolidation. Nigeria is emblematic in this regard, as its electoral commission produced deeply questionable results in at least two-thirds of Nigeria's 36 federal units in elections in 1999 and 2003.¹¹ Shockingly, Nigeria's President Obasanjo himself directly admitted in December 2004 that he knew that elections had been rigged in one Nigerian state in 2003, and implied that other states were rigged as well. Nigeria's ruling party clearly had influence over the electoral commission throughout the process. Since 2003, however, the more blatantly rigged Nigerian states have grown increasingly violent as political factions, headed by local Big Men, resort to other means to gain control of the system.

The closer that serious political choices can be brought to the local level, the more comprehensive the balance becomes and the more likely that policies will reflect the interests of a broader scope of citizenry.

Political and economic decentralization are also important factors that both encourage the development of a balance of power and the availability of sufficient political and economic choices for individuals. The closer that serious political choices can be brought to the local level, the more comprehensive the balance becomes and the more likely that policies will reflect the interests of a broader scope of citizenry. In addition, civil society groups typically wield more influence with local governments. Economic decentralization, meanwhile, can shift economic power from the state to the private sector, and can also put some regulatory oversight distance between the state and business. Most of the advanced democracies in Africa have made progress toward scaling back the role of the state in the economy, while several have sought to devolve some political powers from the national level as well. South Africa in particular reorganized its federal structure prior to the 1994 transition, such that regional governments gained greater powers to resolve local issues.

Political cultures must also change if African democracies are to flourish. National political cultures must develop prevalent values of compromise and respect, and national political identities need to increase in relation to subnational or religious identities. The development of a balance of power among the political elite helps to promote political learning of compromise and other values critical for negotiation within a democratic framework, as does open political debate when systems grow more transparent. Mozambique provides one of the most hopeful examples in this regard—after 15 years of civil war, the main combatants transformed into political parties and have peacefully contested three elections since peace negotiations produced a democratic framework in the early 1990s. Deep differences remain, but the

parties continue to value dialogue and negotiation as a nation united rather than the violent methods they chose in the past.

All of these factors together point to what is perhaps the most important need for African democratic development in the early 21st century: the rise of loyal opposition parties capable of winning elections. Successful cases like Ghana, Kenya, South Africa, and Senegal have solid opposition movements that provide voters serious alternatives and that constantly vet government policies and seek to check abuses. Transitional cases like Nigeria and Niger have weak opposition parties currently incapable of unseating ruling parties, while failing or failed states actively seek to crush political opponents. Zimbabwe's rapid decline over the last five years has been a direct result of government efforts to squelch opposition, yet the opposition continues to mobilize, and may, over time, follow the paths of Kenyan and Ghanaian opposition movements to victory.

All of these factors together point to what is perhaps the most important need for African democratic development in the early 21st century: the rise of loyal opposition parties capable of winning elections.

An essential element in the development of a loyal opposition is an active and diverse civil society sector. Not only do these groups help to check the power of the state, but they also play critical roles in mobilizing public support both for opposition parties and the government. Moreover, state legitimacy and the social contract between citizens and the state were severely denigrated or broken during the authoritarian phase in Africa; civil society groups can help to reconnect states to their populaces. Labor unions, for instance, have been critical allies of democratic opposition movements throughout Africa, most notably in South Africa, Zambia, Zimbabwe, and Kenya. The Nigerian Labour Congress (NLC) is currently the only serious check on the power of the Nigerian government, far more than Nigeria's weak opposition parties. When the Nigerian government made widely unpopular moves to increase fuel prices over the last three years, NLC strikes have been the only efforts that have forced the government to scale back the burdensome policies.

In addition to the growing role of civil society groups, a very important democratic development has been the rise of multi-ethnic political parties. The early African democracies of the 1960s were plagued by mono-ethnic parties, which assured that the ethnic security dilemma played out in all facets of national policy. Multi-ethnic parties, on the other hand, shift the locus of inter-ethnic competition to the party level, where the incentive for compromise is much stronger, so that one multi-ethnic party may successfully compete with the next one. In this regard, Nigeria's ruling Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), although it is deeply corrupt and is primarily an alliance of convenience among Nigeria's Big Men, has done much to bring ethnic groups across the nation into a common governing process. An important reason

why Nigeria's flawed 2003 elections did not immediately spark widespread unrest was that most of the key ethnic-based concerns had been settled through the tumultuous PDP primary season. Kenya's NARC, in contrast, being a coalition of parties, many of which are ethnic based, remains in constant danger of dissolution over issues driven by the ethnic security dilemma, threatening the promising reform process there.

Each of these elements has done much to ease the ethnic security dilemma in African countries that are more advanced in consolidating their democracies. The economic dilemma, however, remains problematic, although the more consolidated democratic states have made greater strides toward economic development. Nonetheless, a consensus is emerging that the distinction between the growing number of successful African states and the continent's failing states is the degree to which they have democratized. The more consolidated democracies are successful precisely because they are more capable of resolving the ethnic security dilemma, which in turn allows them to undertake sustained efforts to address their economic concerns.

Democratic development in Africa is not the only solution to the continent's many troubles, but the growing list of success stories gives strong credence to the notion that democratic deepening is indeed a necessary condition for addressing Africa's predicaments. Moreover, if the widening gap between the Two Africas is to be closed — and if Second Africa is to be kept from dragging down First Africa through regional insecurity — then the states of the Second must follow the First on the path to democracy.

Table 1. Consolidating Democracies

Country	% GDP Growth			Average % GDP Growth	HDI from 2002
	2001	2002	2003	2001–2003	
Benin	5.0	6.0	5.5	5.50	161
Botswana	5.2	3.9	5.4	4.83	128
Gambia	5.8	-3.2	8.7	3.77	155
Ghana	4.2	4.5	4.7	4.47	131
Kenya	1.2	1.0	1.5	1.23	148
Mali	13.3	4.4	3.2	6.97	174
Mozambique	13.0	7.7	7.0	9.23	171
Namibia	2.3	3.3	3.7	3.10	126
Senegal	5.6	1.1	6.3	4.33	157
South Africa	2.7	3.6	1.9	2.73	119
Average:				4.62	147

Table 2. Transitional Democracies

Country	% GDP Growth			Average % GDP Growth 2001–2003	HDI from 2002
	2001	2002	2003		
Burkina Faso	5.9	4.4	6.5	5.60	175
Burundi	2.2	4.5	-0.5	2.07	173
Chad	9.5	9.9	10	9.80	167
Madagascar	6.0	-12.7	9.6	0.97	150
Malawi	-4.2	1.8	4.4	0.67	165
Niger	7.1	3.0	4.0	4.70	176
Nigeria	3.0	1.5	10.6	5.03	151
Sierra Leone	5.4	6.3	6.5	6.07	177
Tanzania	6.0	6.3	5.5	5.93	162
Uganda	5.3	6.7	4.9	5.63	146
Zambia	4.9	3.3	4.2	4.13	164
Average:				4.60	164

Table 3. Undemocratic or Reverting toward Authoritarianism

Country	% GDP Growth			Average % GDP Growth 2001–2003	HDI from 2002
	2001	2002	2003		
Angola	3.2	15.3	4.5	7.67	166
Cameroon	5.3	6.5	4.2	5.33	141
Central African Rep.	1.0	-0.8	-5.8	-1.87	169
Congo	3.6	3.5	0.8	2.63	144
Congo, Dem. Rep.	2.1	3.5	0.5	2.03	168
Cote d'Ivoire	0.1	-1.6	-3.8	-1.77	163
Ethiopia	7.7	1.2	-3.8	1.70	170
Gabon	2.0	0	2.8	1.60	122
Guinea	3.8	4.2	2.1	3.37	160
Guinea-Bissau	0.2	-7.2	-1.2	-2.73	172
Lesotho	3.3	3.8	3.9	3.67	145
Mauritania	4.0	3.3	4.2	3.83	152
Rwanda	6.7	9.4	0.9	5.67	159
Swaziland	1.7	3.6	2.2	2.50	137
Togo	-0.2	4.6	3.1	2.50	143
Zimbabwe	-8.8	-12.8	-13.2	-11.60	147
Average:				1.53	154
				(2.41 without Zimbabwe)	

Table Sources:

GDP annual growth rate found at <http://www.ifpri.org/divs/dsgd/dp/papers/dsgdp09.pdf>

HDI (Human Development Index) rankings found at <http://undp.org/>

Notes

¹ See, for instance: Joseph Siegle, "A Tale of Two Africas," *Los Angeles Times*, July 13, 2003; and Arik Bachar, "A Tale of Two Africas: Ten Years On," *Agence Global*, May 15, 2004.

² Anthony D. Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986).

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⁵ See, for instance: Peter Ekeh, "Colonialism and the Two Publics in Africa: A Theoretical Statement." *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 17, no. 1 (1976): 91-112.

⁶ Compare this perspective to the notion of the security dilemma in Realist thought in international politics. See, among others: Joseph Nye, *Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History*, 4th ed. (New York: Longman, 2002).

⁷ This development is described as the "rentier state". See: Darren Kew and Peter Lewis, "Nigeria," in Kesselman, Krieger, and Joseph, eds. *Introduction to Comparative Politics: Political Challenges and Changing Agendas* (Houghton Mifflin: New York, 2003 ed.).

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¹⁰ Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter. *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1986.

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The International Community in the Role of State Creator: The Experience of Bosnia and Herzegovina

by Branislav Popovic

INTRODUCTION

In recent years, the international community has shown its willingness to undertake military action to enforce regime change and attempt the reconstruction of states. The most recent and continuing endeavors are Afghanistan and Iraq. The following article describes the experience of Bosnia and Herzegovina, with a multicultural setting and challenges similar to those of current engagements. In particular, it examines a) the responsibility associated with such intervention and undertaking to remain as governors; b) the viability of determining the path of a nation's future in light of a multitude of factors; c) the psychology of the local population vis-à-vis the international force; and d) whether a relatively brief period of international guidance and governance will have lasting effects.

The UN and other international organizations, both governmental and nongovernmental, sought to implement reforms in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosnia) to achieve compliance with the Dayton Peace Agreement of 1995.¹ The Dayton Agreement marked the end of the war in Bosnia and provided a structural framework that covered the political, legal, and economical regime for the newly formed country. The three ethnic groups—Croat (Roman Catholics), Serb (Serb Orthodox), and Bosniac (Muslim)—that waged war for territorial domination following the break-up of Yugoslavia accepted² the Dayton Agreement after the NATO intervention while the international community committed itself to assist in the implementation of the agreement and provide financial support. The Office of the High Representative was created to oversee execution of the Dayton Agreement with the prerogative to adjudicate disputes arising out of the Agreement and to make necessary decisions to maintain progress when the ethnic groups could not come to a consensus or attempted to stall the implementation process.

There were several priorities for the Office of the High Representative. A sufficiently secure political environment had to be created without delay to enable

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the return of displaced persons. The return of displaced persons was an effort to reverse ethnic segregation that resulted from the war and to facilitate the “united Bosnia” as envisaged by the Agreement. The country had to become ethnically diverse again in order to ensure that one ethnic group did not control the decision-making process in a particular region and that the multi-ethnic administrative framework of the Dayton Agreement worked. Essential to the effort was a functional judicial branch, law enforcement, and the office of the prosecutor. In a larger framework, a competent and willing judicial system had to be constructed to address allegations of corruption and coercive political influence at every level of government and within the business community. Lastly, the international community sought to create an environment amenable to business development to ensure the economic survival of the country after the assistance period.

The international community regards ethnic segregation as a defiance that must be quashed. Rather, it should be accepted as the modality through which integration will occur as a consequence of being economically interdependent, culturally related neighbors.

This article demonstrates the approach the international community has taken in Bosnia and Herzegovina to create a country from a region of the former Yugoslavia, which contains the three aforementioned ethnic groups that continue to show defiance in relation to the international plan framed by the Dayton Agreement. The defiance, by mainly the Serbian and Croat nations, is based on the fear that they will become subjects of a Muslim state since the Bosniacs, as the largest ethnic group, will gain political power. The international projects to promote ethnic diversity are therefore resisted.

Only the security of the respective ethnic groups within Bosnia, meaning territorial and governmental integrity for each ethnicity, can lead to effective development of that country. Cooperation, then integration of the ethnicities, is inevitable due to economic necessity, which consequently requires political cooperation. Integration of the ethnicities and political cooperation are the main goals of the international community in Bosnia. However, the international community seeks to accomplish these goals by forcing the concept of conflict resolution and emotional rehabilitation among the ethnicities. The international community regards ethnic segregation as a defiance that must be quashed. Rather, it should be accepted as the modality through which integration will occur as a consequence of being economically interdependent, culturally related neighbors. First, however, the ethnic groups must feel unthreatened in their designated territory.

LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF BOSNIA CREATED BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

The political structure of the Dayton Agreement was a legal novelty. It divided Bosnia into two “entities,” the Serb (Republika Srpska) and the Bosniac-Croat Federation (Federacija Bosne i Hercegovine). Both entities had quasi state status with governments independent of one another. The Serb entity was composed of municipalities, and the federation was further divided administratively into ten cantons, some run by Croats and others by Bosniacs. Each canton, with independent governments, ministries, and judicial systems, required judicial cooperation laws between cantons and entities such as those in place between sovereign states. In addition, there was a “district” of Brcko, another self-governing region that was managed by the three ethnicities in conjunction with the international community. Lastly, there was a government at the state level that, to date, could not operate without the coercive intervention of the Office of the High Representative. Bosnia had thirteen constitutions: one for each entity, canton, and state. There were thirteen governments and thirteen assemblies to govern these units, operating through approximately 150 ministries. The Dayton Agreement had been created by the international community in light of the demographics of Bosnia, allowing the preservation of the region’s ethnic partitions for the purpose of immediate cessations of hostilities. However, the region is faced with an impractical reality of a state framework for the present and future.

ACTORS AND STRUCTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY—IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY

Numerous agents were involved in the endeavor to create a viable state, such as the UN (its various agencies, including the UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina), the Council of Europe, the Office of the High Representative, and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. It is estimated that thirty organizations, including nongovernmental organizations, were involved in the realm of reform, and each had a significant impact on the Bosnian legal regime and society. Yet, the origin and purpose of many agencies present in Bosnia was difficult to follow. It seemed that any interested party could appear in Bosnia and undertake operation in the legal reform effort or any other field. The underfunded local government did not have a system for the purpose of scrutinizing the vast international presence, while the major international agencies lacked jurisdiction to control or exclude the presence of foreign representation in the field.

The structure therefore was *ad hoc* with no managerial regime. Each agency operated independently, answering to the conceptualized strategies in head offices abroad. The Dayton Agreement was essentially a treaty—an agreement between sovereign states that provided a basic framework of co-operation between international agencies—but did not attribute exclusive powers. In fact, it was difficult to ascertain

how many international representatives were working in a particular area of reconstruction and reform at a given moment. Often, one was advised by a local official who had already seen someone in that regard, which, in turn, created competition between the agencies.

Currently, many of the reform projects are dictated by the political trends of a financial donor country or organization.

As the international community embedded itself deeper in reforms, the question of the role of the international community arose with each new endeavor. It was the lack of a defined ambit of reform that made the task difficult,³ leaving reconstruction an open-ended project limited only by the final pull out of the international community from Bosnia. One reason for the lack of a complete picture was the limited jurisdiction and capability of each international agency. The international community, it appeared, hoped that if each agency accomplished its reform project, a complete overhaul of the system would be achieved. It was suggested that the international community could not offer completion of comprehensive reform and reconstruction; it could only be a resource of expertise and technical assistance in the effort of the Bosnian authorities to reform their system, in line with the new realities of the country. Ownership of the reform effort must be assumed by Bosnia. This, in turn, required Bosnians to have an understanding of the state it wished to be. Without the understanding and common effort of the three ethnic groups to come to an agreement on the constitution of their state, a complete picture of the regime could not be attained. The result was continuous project initiations by international community agencies without a view of conclusiveness.

To regulate matters, the international community should consider a structural hierarchy of priorities with respect to reforms and offer one counterpart to the Bosnian state that will negotiate an approach and define goals. The international community counterpart should create a resource roster of all agencies that can offer assistance, register the agency, and place it in the international community framework, drawing upon the agency's resource, as the need arises, according to the negotiated reform framework. The suggested approach, however, presupposes that the international community can act as one body, which it cannot, because it is an undefined and dynamic entity with an elusive personality. It is a conglomerate of international representatives with independent political ideas, and it would be a daunting task to force a political hierarchy of the various international players.

Currently, many of the reform projects are dictated by the political trends of a financial donor country or organization. A trend or topic arises, and donors will allocate funds for the promotion of the issue in developing countries. Such trends have disrupted the patterns of reform that a particular agency has implemented because of the need to accommodate the donor's desires to ensure continued funding of projects.

COMPETITION WITHIN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

Competition existed among agencies to accomplish projects. Smaller international organizations and nongovernmental organizations appeared to have an advantage because they were able to adapt quickly to the dynamic political situation in Bosnia and to take advantage of unexpected opportunities. Larger multinational organizations were burdened by heavy bureaucratic rules and regulations and had a difficult time adapting to projects, which had been already construed and approved, limiting their ability to adjust project content as the needs in this volatile country changed. Accordingly, the more flexible structure of nongovernmental organizations was likely to accomplish its goals, operating outside the forum of international governments and therefore, implementing strategy of a particular interest group or state. Nongovernmental organizations hired staff for specific projects and were often not in tune with the sensitivities of the type of work they performed. On the other hand, nongovernmental organizations were perceived by Bosnian authorities as less political in nature and therefore, less threatening, while every action of an international agency was perceived as part of a political agenda.

LOCAL RESPONSE

Pressure was significant in the local ministries of Bosnia to meet with international agency representatives, partly to avoid the label of "uncooperative." Financial resources of Bosnia, surviving on aid, were meager, leaving insufficient funds for the public sector workforce. Ministerial employees had to manage their jurisdiction and the numerous international agents with their projects. Every aspect of life in Bosnia was penetrated by the international community, using the general authority of "human rights" to give jurisdiction for any desired intervention. The overwhelmed public sector soon realized that there was competition for their time and utilized the circumstances for personal advantage or obtained more resources. Commitment by the Bosnian public sector was often attributed according to the amount of money an agency was willing to spend or by the political weight of an agency. Project content became a tertiary issue. Local officials and professionals found themselves in a new country, created with the assistance of the international community. The economy was virtually non-existent, factories were outdated, and cooperation between the Serb and Croat-Bosniac entities, it was felt, was forced upon them. The effort to perform according to international community expectations was limited by the general distrust in the feasibility of the newly created state as self-sustaining. Dealing with reforms was not a priority for local officers as they sought to hold on to the entity's political power structure that provided their livelihood; detaching from the structure to pursue reforms could have jeopardize their position. Under such circumstances, reform projects appeared vain to the local officers.

Given the experience with reforms undertaken in Eastern European countries, there was no conviction that compliance with the demands would lead to prosperity.

In light of the instability of Bosnia and doubts regarding the viability of the Dayton Agreement, Bosnians questioned the motivation of the international community to proceed with the implementation of an agreement, which clearly did not acknowledge the dominant causation of the war, namely, the cohabitation of Serbs and Croats in a state outnumbered by a Muslim population, thereby questioning the international community's understanding of regional history, culture, and tradition. Bosnians perceived that the international community must have had a purpose in failing to give recognition for the causes of the war, such as maintaining stability in the region or that the international community truly had no better solution to offer. In case of the latter reason, it implicitly recognized that rewriting of the Dayton Agreement would be eventually necessary.

IMPERFECTIONS IN THE EXECUTION OF THE VALUES OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

The delicate nature of the work that international community professionals were required to perform was often compromised by the behavior of international agents. On occasion, the image the international community sought to portray became compromised. Evidence brought to the attention of the international community revealed that International Police Task Force officers⁴ frequented establishments that employed women who were allegedly part of the trade in human beings for sexual exploitation, even alleging involvement in trafficking,⁵ the very activity the international community attempted to curtail. It was this lack of respect that made local authorities often perceive the international community as "adventurers," rather than professionals.

SUSTAINABILITY OF NEW STANDARDS IN VIEW OF TRADITION AND THE CLASH OF CULTURES

While the progressive jurisdictions in the realm of democracy have had centuries of political emancipation to develop conclusions and a political culture that was promoted as a standard of modern nations, Bosnia and Herzegovina was required to assimilate such standards immediately. While legislative reform was a technical process, the behavior of society to act in accordance with the enunciated reforms was a long-term process that could not be controlled by the international community. The question arose whether the fast-track approach would be sustainable and have lasting effects given the very different political evolution of the region. This question was urged by the fact that the United Nations Mission ended on December 31, 2002. The Secretary General termed the mission successful, listing the accomplishments in his report.⁶ Particularly noteworthy was the change to professionalism. In contrast, the list of removed officials by the High Representative to date was staggering, a practice likely to continue in 2005, nine years after the international community took charge.

For instance, a current international community practice, which will not be sustained once the international community turns the ownership of Bosnia to its citizens, is to affect change in the government by simple dismissals. Elections that would bring the return of individuals not politically aligned with the plans of the international community were simply not implemented by the international community, either by declaring the election invalid on some premise or by removing the elected official. Could the efforts to create a structure by force, as envisaged by the international community, survive past the period of international presence? The central government of Bosnia did not have the means to control who came to power in either entity, the Serb or Bosniac-Croat, nor the power to control the cantons of the Bosniac-Croat federation. Even if the mechanism existed, it would be seen as an accusation by one ethnic group against another. Such accusations would fuel inter-ethnic conflict and block the function of the already reluctant central government. An ethnic group would not accept judgment by another group of undesirability of one of its officers. Each ethnic group held its war-time politicians or activists in high regard because they were seen as individuals who had acted for the good of the nation.

The international community had removed from office politicians, police officers, prosecutors, judges, and journalists. The slow rate of progress had drawn international organizations into decision-making at all levels of the Bosnian political system, hoping to expedite the achievement of a self-sustaining country. The dominant approach implemented by the international community in pursuit of reforms was to force change in the legislation, and subsequently, to assist local authorities in the implementation. In accordance with this policy, the replacement of staff was forced by the international community in an attempt to remove suspected sources of corruption and non-cooperative behavior. The international imposition of a system, which presupposed a certain political culture, raised the question of sustainability. The framework constructed for Bosnia required changes in local culture. Had the international community been mandated to perform such a function? Was it at all possible to expedite cultural transformation, and, could it be justified in what is considered acceptable levels of interference?

EFFECTS OF INTERNATIONAL INVOLVEMENT

Criminal justice and law reform

Significant advancements in the realm of criminal justice had been made, perhaps most notably were transparency, judicial independence, and cooperation among the judiciary, the Prosecutor's Office, and law enforcement. Other advancements were more effective border control, vis-à-vis criminal activity, and greater sensitivity of law enforcement in relation to other ethnic groups.⁷ Yet, due to a weak central government, under which jurisdiction international borders fell, trafficking in human beings, such as women from Eastern Europe for sexual exploitation,⁸ and drug

trafficking appeared to be a continuous problem. The trade in human beings and illegal substances was operated by well-established organized crime groups, which had flourished because law enforcement and border control officials were either involved in illegal activity themselves or were unable or unwilling to engage in the curtailment of crime.⁹ Those who were willing may not have obtained the required resources or could not gather sufficient support within the force. Judges had limited exposure to these cases of misconduct because law enforcement and prosecution did not bring them to the courts, either because of a lack of resources, fear, or involvement.¹⁰ In the few instances when the cases did appear, fear for safety may have deterred a judge from imposing a deserved sentence. The bribes offered at every level¹¹ were difficult to refuse. It could make a significant difference to a customs officer who earned \$200 to \$300 per month, which was also the average salary of judges. For such compensation, hardly anyone found the motivation to tackle organized crime. The international community had compelled the governments of the Entities to increase salaries of judges in an attempt to motivate officials, hoping that a respectable salary, now approximately \$1,500, would return dignity to the profession. This move by the international community was commendable and likely to have had results to some extent. The problem was whether these salaries could have been sustained after the financial assistance period of the international community. Judicial salaries were now disproportionately higher than other public sectors, and once international funds were needed in new crisis areas, salaries were likely to come down again.

Economic development

At the lower level of the criminal scale, contraband trade, generally referred to as the “gray economy,” continued to be, for many Bosnians, the only way to make a living since the legitimate economy could not employ the entire workforce. The more powerful crime rings had accumulated such influence that it could be argued that the legitimate economy could not exist without their assistance. In many instances, desired merchandise or raw materials for manufacturing, could only be obtained from questionable sources. Often, it may have been necessary for legitimate businesses to employ certain corrupt tactics to move their goods across the border. It almost became a necessity when the goods were of a perishable nature, and expedient handling of the cargo may have been achieved only by financial motivation of officials. Once the goods arrived at a destination in Bosnia, locals purchased such goods in order to resell them at the local market. An attempt to eliminate the gray economy would likely be the fall of the implementing political party and cause significant hardship to the population. The gray economy provided a service to Bosnians, in particular, it made goods available at competitive prices. On the other hand, legitimate business could not develop while goods were available at lower prices obtained through illegitimate networks. For the foreseeable future, it is unlikely Bosnians would boycott contraband goods, as is the case with the international staff, unless the staff were able to bring along supplies in bulk to last for the duration of

their field service. Another reason for affordable products was local illegitimate and uncontrolled production, creating faulty products that had claimed lives in Bosnia, such as "basement" liquor production bottled and labeled in accordance with recognized brand names.

Contraband trade, generally referred to as the "gray economy," continued to be, for many Bosnians, the only way to make a living since the legitimate economy could not employ the entire workforce.

Illegal trade remained a life-line for many Bosnians and was essential during the years of war. Many profited in war-time trade. Basic necessities were disturbingly expensive. Prices were high because the market could bear it. People depleted their savings to purchase these essentials. Once the population became financially exhausted, prices came down. The infamous business men and women of the time were called "war profiteers." Some had made successful transitions to legitimate business, purchasing what the privatization process offered and what financially ruined people had to sell, such as land or real estate, in order to survive. Due to their acquisitions, the "profiteers" were now essential service providers in Bosnian commerce. Others may have ascended to higher levels in the international criminal hierarchy. Given the significance of acquisitions of state-owned enterprise with such money, this *nouveau riche* class was well integrated in Bosnian leadership, commerce, and politics. In many instances, the so-called "profiteers" were already at lucrative positions when the war started, such as upper management, while others were simply individuals who managed to make the circumstances work to their advantage. The international community sought to remove as many war-time leaders as possible in anticipation that the links with unethical business practice would be broken, attempting to bring to the forefront the true professional class. It appeared that, to some extent, this had been accomplished. It was always such a disappointment to the international community when it received news of missing funds during the service of an international community sanctified person. Corruption was on the increase during the war due to the lack of institutional control and expanded subsequent to the war because it became institutionalized.

Are international investors now more comfortable in investing in Bosnia? Will the letter of the law be executed past the international community presence or is the international community committed to a permanent protectorate of Bosnia? While there is criticism in regard to the approach taken by the international community in Bosnia, many of the suggestions have been undertaken. However, each new conflict in the world brings its own challenges due to a unique cultural framework; a unified approach to international assistance cannot be derived, and the experience of a previous conflict can only serve as an analytical tool.

Governance

Good governance required a politically mature regime to allow the judicial system to operate and refrain from political control. Governance remained a focal point of the international community. The primary impediment was the “pyramid” culture of governance, the *caudillo* style of operation of the oligarchy. With the lack of democratic governance over the course of history, the system had limited experience with the concept of a career civil service. The tradition was a chain of local leaders linked to the ruler. The head figure of a municipality was the executor of the will of his boss, the regional leader, and so on. Should he depart, the system underneath the leader crumbled and was replaced with loyalists of the replacement leader. Religion, banned during the communist era, had been added to this formula of leadership. Today, religious leaders were utilized by the political system to remind the population that the future of their culture and nation was at risk. While manifestation of the respective religions appears exaggerated, Croats and Serbs did fear domination of the Muslim faith because of the Dayton Agreement framework,¹² in which principles of unionism of governance would effectively result in Bosniac domination because they exceeded others in numbers.

Economic power in Bosnia was weakened by the lack of effective central regulation due to the unwillingness of ethnic groups to cooperate.

Economic reforms in the states of Eastern Europe had been, in part, modeled by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Policies that had governed the transition of the former socialist countries prescribed rapid privatization of state-owned industries. Unfortunately, those policies were not able to address staggering unemployment and other social consequences of the privatization process. Bosnia's unemployment rate remained high, which perpetuated instability. The negative effects of privatization were utilized by certain groups in Bosnia to foster the position that the policies of the West did not work there and that a domestic solution needed to be found. While the position to find a domestic solution was worthy of support, the proponents often lacked constructive suggestions. The political milieu offered little comfort to potential investors. Economic power in Bosnia was weakened by the lack of effective central regulation due to the unwillingness of ethnic groups to cooperate. This trend was likely to continue, making it difficult to ensure survival of Bosnia economically once removed from international financial life support.

Laws on privatization were among the first reforms in order to transform the socialist run economy from public to private ownership. Privatization, however, was impeded by the cumbersome bureaucracy inherited from the communist era and the lack of direction by local authorities to use this opportunity to benefit and replenish government budgets with the privatization process. Rather, corruption resulted in distribution of state assets to a restricted class of people, failing to attain fair market

value. Foreign investors were afraid to embark into the circle of state asset distribution knowing that the process of privatization may not have been ethical and was dependent upon the current government leaders who may not remain in power for a prolonged period and therefore, cannot be relied on for the purpose of long-term relationships. While legislation was enacted, implementation was difficult to achieve since ownership of state-owned enterprises had already shifted on a *de facto* basis to individuals who were in politically appointed management positions upon dissolution of Yugoslavia and were run as private enterprises by the ruling political party. In many instances, ownership was already legally transferred to party members, in accordance with the law. They paid, what would appear, fair market value by obtaining loans from banks that were also controlled by party members. Hyperinflation ensured that the value given in worthless currency amounted in fact to little value in real terms. Bosnian entrepreneurs had criticized the system for giving preferential treatment for loans to party loyalists, and, in addition, failing to assess the value of the property correctly. This trend was apparent in most states in transition. Furthermore, ordinary citizens had limited access to privatization offers.¹³ Out of the fear that the new state would not survive past the international assistance period in its current form, there was much debate whether changes should be addressed now to adapt the country to a format that ensured regional ethnic control, in recognition of the true evolvement of Bosnia since the secession of hostilities.

FUTURE PROSPECTS

As unfortunate as the history of Bosnia has been, it should have utilized the presence of the international community to arrive at an acceptable solution for its future. Once the international community reduces and eventually withdraws its presence, it is unlikely that the three ethnic groups will be able to amicably resolve any amendment to the Dayton Agreement. Renown experts in every imaginable discipline willing to share experiences and offer suggestions could be made available upon request through the international community. While the expert exchange appears to be truly a free service and should be taken advantage off, most financial assistance hinges upon the conditionality principle, which among other things involves the surrender of alleged war criminals, which is still a sensitive issue. Lawyers, judges, and other legal professionals are well educated and suffered dramatically when the system collapsed, leaving them with little money and no opportunity for professional development; yet, they still manage the day-to-day work load in their respective positions to maintain an impression to its citizens that lawful behavior is still the norm and that trespassers of the law will be punished. The great majority of professionals, and general population for that matter, seem to agree that they must move on.

Most Bosnians survive at a subsistence level. The population is generally poor, an observation which may escape a visitor due to new construction, modern cafés, restaurants, and new vehicles in the streets. It is a small portion of the population

that has created some wealth, many on the basis of illegitimate trade of goods. Very few derive revenue from home grown industry. The display of wealth creates a false image of Bosnia's progress. It will require significant investment to develop a domestic industry and put people to work. Little significance should be placed to the apparent signs of improvement in the standard of living. Bosnia should be treated as a critical situation. The situation in Bosnia becomes an increasing concern with new conflicts arising, causing a diversion of international attention and funds to new crisis regions.

The international community in its zealous effort to create a functional Bosnia may be exhausting the attention span of Bosnian judicial officials, as well as Bosnian officials in general. Bosnians are experiencing "reform fatigue." There is a limit to the input that can be absorbed and effectively processed.

The Dilemma for Bosnians

How is the actual functioning of the very confusing internal organization of the country addressed? It may have been the intention of the framers to provide an *interim* arrangement only,¹⁴ as the name of the agreement, "General Framework Agreement," would indicate. The implementation of the very basic provisions proves to be such a difficult task that further elaboration appears impractical. It may be true that persistence of the international community to maintain Bosnia in its current framework has given Bosnians the impression that this will be a long-term solution. This perception, however limited, may be a step toward Bosnians assuming ownership of their country. On the other hand, the perception appears to further institutionalize the entity level, not the state level. This would mean strong entity and canton political power with a weak central government. Croats and Serbs continue to fight for strong regional control, at the entity or canton level, because the centralization of governance and principles of democracy, as envisaged by the Dayton Agreement, mean domination of Bosniacs because of their greater numbers. The return of Bosniacs displaced persons to Croat and Serb regions only escalates this fear as their regional control weakens by the requirement to give Bosniacs proportional representation. One significant dilemma for Croats and Serbs is how to function on democratic principles and modern egalitarian law if those principles threaten national cohesion.

The presence of international agencies includes agents that only further polarize the three ethnic groups. Freedom of association promotes further polarization of ethnicities along religious lines, seeking associations with countries and organizations of the same religious background that only deepen ethnic segregation; this trend is particularly apparent within the Muslim population of Bosnia. Funds obtained from such donors went towards heightening cultural awareness of its group. Generally, a democratic practice—the freedom of association—indirectly resulted in segregation of Bosnia's nations, given its recent history. Freedom is the prominent term after the fall of the Soviet Union, and new alliances are formed on cultural and religious grounds. In Bosnia, this trend is certainly present, which brought the issue of a viable unitary state in question. Five hundred years of co-existence with Muslims in the

Balkans had not created an assimilation of the cultures, which was clearly manifested in the war. The international community did not oppose, nor could it, Serbs, Croats, and Bosniacs forming ties with states of the same religion. In fact, the international community promoted it to levels that placed significant strain on the United Nations Charter right to self-determination. It appears, therefore, an acceptable pattern to promote a world order based on cultural and religious affiliation, a pattern and evolving paradigm that was denied in the forced arrangement of the Bosnian state.

Generally, a democratic practice—the freedom of association—indirectly resulted in segregation of Bosnia's nations.

What this will ultimately mean for Bosnia remains to be seen. On the evidence, it appears that while the international community stays in Bosnia and continues its role as financier, tutor, and last authority to decide any dispute among the ethnic parties, Bosnia will remain in its current form. A product of this presence is a temporary improvement in governance, including bringing the judicial system closer to accepted international standards.

Once the international community withdraws or weakens its presence, to what levels the advances will be curtailed also remains speculation. The strength and determination of the three cultures will settle the format of co-existence. How the determination of co-existence will be played out will be defined by the constraints of their political and social culture and emancipation. It is pertinent that Bosniacs, Serbs, and Croats utilize the current freeze on hostilities that the country enjoys to find an acceptable framework of co-existence.

The Dilemma for the International Community

Since the Bosniacs do not have, nor had in the past, a defined and joint territory as the Croats and Serbs have had, the country was structured to enable Bosniacs to be equal participants in the governance of Bosnia by democratizing entities and cantons to ensure Bosniacs have a voice in Serb and Croat regions. This requires reduction of administrative power within entities and cantons while strengthening institutions at the state level. As there are more Bosniacs than any other ethnicity, it is felt by Croats and Serbs that the higher birth rate of Muslims will ensure that Bosnia will eventually be run by Bosniacs. Muslim population increases¹⁵ have caused popular domination in Kosovo, are approaching popular domination in Macedonia, and increasing their presence in Serbia and Montenegro. This trend causes apprehension by Croats and Serbs, who attempt to keep them out of their territories.¹⁶ It is this fear of becoming subjects of a Muslim state that interferes with democratic development of Bosnia.¹⁷ The international community pushes democratic governance ignoring this fear, limiting assistance to the non-cooperative, i.e., Croats and Serbs, and providing assistance to the compliant Bosniacs, who support the direction of the international community since they see it to be in their interest. The discrepancy in

the assistance dissipated only supports the fear that the international community is supporting the emergence of a Muslim state, a fear exploited by hardliner Croats and Serbs, which the international community removed from office; it is another sign, from the point of view of Croats and Serbs, that the international community has Bosniac interests at heart. Since the Ottoman Turks came to the Balkan peninsula in the 14th century, Serbs, Croats, Greeks, Bulgarians, and the Austro-Hungarian empire had vigorously fought the occupiers who were forced to completely retreat by the end of the 19th century. The international community is faced with the fact that the prevalence of the Muslim civilization appears as an unacceptable solution for Serbs and Croats.

In addition, the western rules of governance fail to take into consideration cultural elements, which makes the behavior that the international community wishes to instill impossible for all three ethnicities. Can the imposition of this notion of existence be a permanent solution? In pursuit by the international community of its envisaged Bosnia,¹⁸ Bosnians are kept in a suspended state without ownership of its affairs until the international community feels its citizens are responsible enough to assume conduct of the country created by the international community. Can the international community emancipate the three ethnicities to change cultural behavior patterns? Can the international community teach Bosnians not to show admiration for certain leaders? Election results¹⁹ demonstrate the loyalties of Bosnians even when the international community makes it clear that support will be withheld if the public does not stand behind an individual the international community recommends.

Many of the reforms proceed on a semi-independent basis. Unfortunately, it may be the only approach, as the wider spectrum of questions pertinent to Bosnia's future can not be answered since the issue of co-existence of distinct civilizations is not the focus of the international community in its implementation plan. In light of the grim relationship between the ethnic groups, no progress would be accomplished if a determination of the feasibility of the Dayton Agreement is placed before assistance. The inter-ethnic relationship, however, must be addressed sooner than later. If this issue is much further delayed, consequences can be detrimental if left until after the pull-out of the international community. Sustainable peace may be achievable if Bosnians assume ownership of their affairs, and the international community should apply pressure on the ethnic groups to address their relationship. A manifestation by Bosnians of willingness to continue along the lines of the Dayton Agreement would be a ratification of Bosnia's framework and law by its citizens through parliament or a popular referendum. It would endorse the agreement and consequently, responsibility for its survival. It appears, however, that the international community is worried about the potential outcome of a popular vote and may not be able to deal with the consequences of an unfavorable result.

A potential solution may be to accept the fact that the animosities are too deep between the ethnic groups, accordingly, to accept a decentralized and segregated Bosnia. Once each ethnicity feels safe within its borders, it may be more likely that relationships will be developed for no other reason but economic necessity.

Entrepreneurs were the first to cross the boundaries between entities and cantons after the war. Trade will require appropriate law and order to follow in its desire to expand, and trade will require the service of inter-ethnic political relations. As long as the Serbs and Croats feel that they are being subjected to a Bosniac run state, co-operation is not likely to improve. A review of international community accomplishments will reveal that those issues which did not threaten the territorial, cultural, religious integrity, and social cohesion of an ethnicity could be dealt with. Where cohesion appears threatened, disruptions follow. To mend disruptions, the international community imposes penalties and deadlines upon the "trouble makers." Such an approach is seen by the international community as furtherance of the Dayton Agreement, which stands for reconciliation and peace process.

CONCLUSION

The dilemma for both the international community and Bosnians originates from the unattainable policy resolve imposed by the international community—a ban on the acceptance of inter-ethnic animosity and the benefits of preserving ethnic cohesion and political integrity of the three nations by prescribing areas of autonomy to the three nationalities. The international community considers the realities of continuing inter-ethnic animosity and lack of reconciliation as well as the acceptance of the failing of inter-ethnic political cohesion as regressive and contrary to the Dayton policy; therefore, these realities are not acknowledged as fact and consequently, not factored into Bosnia's progress plan. To exceed the accomplishments attributable to the international community and the current plateau of progress, the Dayton Agreement must be adjusted to the dynamics of the country. The insurmountable cultural clash is a main factor in all the symptoms of Bosnia's stagnation. Principles of democracy, equality, and governance have been improved with foreign tutor and guardianship; however, to foster a self-sustaining political solution to ensure lasting peace in the region requires the acceptance of a set of facts distinct from the current idealistic assumptions.

Notes

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² Office of the Spokesman, U.S. Department of State. "U.S. Troops to Bosnia," November 30, 1995. <http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/briefing/dossec/1995/9511/951130dossec.html#top>. Accessed February 12, 2005.

³ International Crisis Group, *Courting Disaster: The Misrule of Law in Bosnia & Herzegovina*, Balkans Report No. 127 (Sarajevo/Brussels, March 25, 2002).

⁴ Tony Robson, "Bosnia: The United Nations, Human Trafficking and Prostitution," The World Socialist Web Site, August 21, 2002. http://www.wsws.org/articles/2002/aug2002/bosn-a21_prn.shtml.

⁵ Office of the High Representative, Press Office, Excerpt of Transcript of the International Agency's Joint Press Conference, November 27, 2002. <http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/presso/pressb/archive.asp?m=&yr=2002>. Accessed February 12, 2005.

⁶ Ibid., p. 28.

⁷ For review of accomplishments from the perspective of the United Nations, consult the "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina," S/2002/1314, *December 2, 2002*. <http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/reports/2002/sgrep02.htm>.

⁸ Nick Hawton, "Balkan human trafficking 'to rise,'" BBC News online, November 26, 2002.

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¹¹ Interview with the President of Bosnia and Herzegovina's Branch of Transparency International, "Greatest Corruption In Customs And Entities' Governments," *Nezavisne Novine*, August 11, 2001.

¹² Office of the High Representative. "Cantons must not undermine Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) authority." Press Release, May 13, 2004. Office of the High Representative. "High Representative warns UN about risks to reform in BiH." Press Release. March 3, 2004. <http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/preso/pressr/archive.asp?m=&yr=2004>. Accessed February 12, 2005.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ In an interview with BBC News, November 18, 2000, Richard Holbrook, US Ambassador to the United Nations said, "We must seek to correct those flaws and defects which have become apparent over time... Dayton is a living document that must adapt to new realities and confront new challenges as Bosnia grows and matures... we must not only implement [it] fully, we must seek to correct those flaws and defects which have become apparent over time."

¹⁵ Tomislav Kresovic, "Geo-politics of the Albanian Separatism," Center for Peace in the Balkans, May 2004. <http://www.balkanpeace.org/cib/kam/kam03.html>.

¹⁶ Amnesty International. "Bosnia and Herzegovina" in *Amnesty International Annual Report 2002* (Amnesty International Publications, 2002).

¹⁷ Adnan Jahic, "Virtuous Muslim State," *Zmaj od Bosne*, August 23, 1996. (The author, is currently employed as official spokesman for the Bosnian Government) His article, translated into English by the Toronto based organization Balkanpeace, states that the territory of Bosnia finally is a Muslim State and it shall be one in all aspects of Muslim tradition, philosophy and life, intending to give Croats and Serbs basic civil rights in their Muslim state.

¹⁸ Excerpt from an interview with Paddy Ashdown, High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina, *Vjesnik*, November 10, 2002:

"We aren't going to be here forever. We aren't gods, we aren't protectors. My job is to create the institutions of the system and then leave. I haven't come here to make myself popular but to do a job, to establish a statehood for this country together with my BiH[Bosnia and Herzegovina] colleagues so it can join the EU. Existence of nationalism is easy to understand. Six years have passed since one of the most destructible wars in the second half of the 20th century. In Northern Ireland we needed more than thirty years to try to settle the conflicts and we haven't succeeded yet."

¹⁹ Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Bosnia and Herzegovina. "Analysis of the election process and the results of the general elections held on October 5, 2002," Report No. 10-10/2002. <http://www.bh-hchr.org/statements/10A-10-02.htm>.

International Regimes and the Prospects for Global Democracy

by Nayef H. Samhat

INTRODUCTION

Studies of democratization focus on two levels: the territorial state and, increasingly, the global system. Interest in the latter process follows from several well-recognized historical trends in international relations such as the growing role of non-state actors and the expansion of global governance institutions.¹ However, the growth of democracy at the state level, while enhancing the rule of law, has not been sufficiently translated into political practice at the global level. The significance of this gap resides in the reduced efficacy of state-based democracy when addressing the constellation of social, economic, and political challenges in world politics. As Daniele Archibugi suggests, the key question that follows is, what kind of institutional structures at the global level will permit various political communities to deliberate in a democratic fashion on matters of shared interest?²

This essay posits a response, conceptual in nature, arguing that the international regime, characterized as a global public sphere, provides a space for the practice of democracy above the state and therefore contains the potential for the transformation of world order. That is not to suggest global democratization will assume a form similar to democracy within the state; rather, global democracy is grounded in principles of consensual debate and public accountability within international institutions. The democratization of global politics is an ideal, yet processes of inclusion and openness foster opportunities to expand deliberation and accountability, which, in turn, strengthen the legitimacy of governance institutions. Hence, the potential of the international regime as a mechanism for democratic governance is that it can accommodate forces of pluralization in the contemporary international system. Regimes provide channels for participation and advocacy, thereby creating a normative framework for the obligations on and expectations of states. Furthermore, as a site for global democratization, the regime concept does not fall prey to criticisms often levied against advocates of cosmopolitanism in world politics that such a transformation as global democracy necessarily entails the construction of new institutions and the consequent erosion of state authority.³ Rather, the argument insists that states remain integral actors, whose authority is an essential attribute of effective and meaningful

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global governance. It is both the design of international regimes and their capacity to accommodate and reconcile diverse perspectives, interests, and needs that the gap between the fairness of obligations and benefits and the practices of states can be overcome.⁴ In this manner, the normative ends of global governance institutions and the potential for reconstituting new forms of political community may be realized in an inclusive and legitimate fashion.

International regimes facilitate a form of global citizenship that is an essential requirement of global democracy.

The argument proceeds in several steps. First, I conceptualize the international regime as a global public sphere which embodies an alternative form of political community to that which is provided by the territorial state. This essay uses Stephen Krasner's now standard definition of international regimes as "sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations."⁵ International regimes appear in numerous issue areas in world politics, ranging from formal agreements to structure relations among states or procedures within international organizations, to the less formal sets of understandings that arise from shared purpose among actors. Increasingly, international regimes are the means through which state and non-state actors regulate areas of global life that have transboundary consequences. Their character, as a public sphere, derives from both the opportunities they provide for dialogic engagement on the one hand, and the way in which they order particular spheres of international relations, reconfiguring the anarchy traditionally associated with the practice of world politics.⁶ It is within this public sphere that interests and identities are constituted, permitting the formation of new transboundary political communities to emerge within specific issue areas of world politics.

The next section examines three dimensions of international regimes that manifest their potential as sites for the practice of global democracy. First, regimes are increasingly incorporating publicity norms of participation and transparency that broaden the scope and depth of affected actors and their dialogue. More information is available and more non-state actors are participating in certain regimes that serve to enhance the legitimacy of these governance mechanisms. Secondly, regimes facilitate a form of global citizenship that is an essential requirement of global democracy. In effect, citizenship requirements at the global level are voluntaristic and group oriented rather than the legalistic and individualistic requirements at the domestic level. Insisting on similar requirements for citizenship at the global level, as practiced at the domestic level, raises the standard for global democracy to an unreasonable level. Third, international regimes possess transformative potential. That is to suggest that while regimes accommodate a pluralist global order, they also contain the potential for the emergence of a more solidarist order in which sovereign authority is reconfigured. Finally, I conclude with some observations on the state, international regimes and order in world politics.

REGIMES, PUBLIC SPHERES, AND COMMUNITY

The practice of citizenship necessarily occurs within a specific space or sphere of action that offers opportunities for inclusive participation and representation in open debate. At the domestic level, this space is anchored in territoriality, ascribing rights, privileges, and obligations to those within. Although a similar kind of boundedness is lacking in world politics, for any single issue the international regime is one potential institutional form of this space. The regime can acquire the characteristics of an international political community by virtue of the dialogic and participatory processes it makes possible within the boundaries of a particular issue area. In other words, international regimes may be considered as public spheres, depending upon the norms that constitute them.⁷

According to Marc Lynch, "a public sphere approach builds on a conception of action in which a public claim on identity or an argument made in the public sphere is an action."⁸ The public sphere, itself, is "that site of interaction in which actors routinely reach understandings about norms, identities, and interests through the public exchange of discourse."⁹ For James Bohman, the modern public sphere is distinguished by its role as a site for social and cultural criticism, and as a unique form of communication across a diverse audience.¹⁰ This audience, according to Bohman, need not be individuals, but can instead be participants of representative institutions or transnational civil society. The nature of the audience is significant because participation at the global level and the character of democratic practice cannot be expected to have the same form as a domestic practice of one person, one vote. Lynch further identifies a difference between a public sphere for deliberation and a political subsystem for decisions and administering their enforcement. In the international realm no structure exists to impose decisions, so public spheres serve "as locations for norm formation, and for deliberation over the shared interests of international communities."¹¹ Thus, the weight of the public sphere follows not from enforcement mechanisms, but from its creation and maintenance through deliberation of consensual norms. Lynch notes that not all deliberation will be free of strategic interests, but as he argues,

The point is not to find interest-free, power-free behavior but rather to identify the conditions under which the need for public justification oriented toward shared norms, goals or identity produces behavior different from behavior absent such demands. . . The more that a public sphere provides the expectation of ongoing deliberation, and the greater the sense of belonging to shared identity and institutions, the more that states must justify their behavior with reference to shared norms.¹²

The transformative potential of the public sphere is thus found in its capacity to build solidarity amongst a diverse group of actors. This sense of community, forged through public deliberation, reconfigures authority in world politics. Accountability in a global public sphere, indeed its inclusive and democratic character, is achieved through direct and mediated publicity. The former entails traditional state-to-state

interaction, while the latter expands the critical audience for decision making. Patterns of mediated publicity facilitate the participation of global civil society actors such as nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and social movements in processes of global governance in a variety of forms, including agenda setting, articulating ideas and knowledge about goals and practices, representing segments of the global polity, or monitoring and revealing compliance (and noncompliance). Thus, in world politics, institutions and the ideas that inform their development have the capacity to foster loyalties to and identities with emerging normative principles of global life consistent with new boundaries of political community.

The possibility of constructing political communities different from those of the sovereign state, that are anchored in moral and ethical principles, that recognize and account for diversity, and that give voice to those on the margins within and across territorial units, is found in commitments to the “ideal of a universal communication community.”¹³ This emphasis on dialogue and communicative action is an essential quality of the “thin universalism”¹⁴ of political community that exists across governance regimes in world politics. This kind of universalism is not about inscribing absolute ethics or morals onto the practices and principles of what might constitute the “good life.” Rather, it is about insisting on the condition whereby all voices have the opportunity to be heard and where dialogic engagement permits an expanding range of difference to be incorporated into discussions “to determine the principles of inclusion and exclusion which govern global politics.”¹⁵

Indeed, it is in the observable patterns of contemporary global politics that new forms of community consistent with a “thin universalism” may be taking shape. As a global public sphere, the international regime is a reflection of the kind of dialogic potential inherent in the practice of world politics. This is because many significant international regimes have their origins in the discursive and ideational interaction among state and non-state actors that provide the rationales for the need to regulate spheres of global life with legitimacy. The regime, in other words, may be a viable international political community within which higher principles are defined, expressed, and defended by members of global society.

The realization of these transformations in the character of global governance is manifest in several dimensions of international regimes. First, the incorporation of publicity norms enables non-state actors, in particular, to have greater access to decision making processes. Second, this participation is a reflection of a form of global citizenship integral to redefining notions of community in world politics. Such a redefinition of community through the regime is the essence of what may be referred to as a solidarist international society in the making.

PUBLICITY NORMS AND GLOBAL DEMOCRACY

Historically, international politics were viewed as the near-exclusive domain of nation-states. Theories of international relations have not been particularly concerned with the transformative role of institutions, regarding them instead, in instrumental

terms as solutions to the failure of political markets.¹⁶ By contrast, the incorporation of publicity norms of participation and transparency into international regimes ensures special consideration is given to the role of non-state actors in deliberations and decision making.¹⁷ Furthermore, these norms are an essential prerequisite to the emergence of meaningful notions of global citizenship and democracy and the promotion of solidarism in world politics.

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In fact, on any given issue, a wide array of social and political actors are concerned about whatever happens in global politics and want to have some say in these matters. Neglecting and silencing the diverse array of actors affected by a decision not only perpetuates structures of domination, but also renders such decisions as illegitimate and potentially unsustainable over the long haul. Yet, the expansion of NGO activity, often aggregated under the term “global civil society,” now extends widely across the gamut of regime and norm-building processes, ranging from lobbying and protesting efforts in the agenda-setting stage, to information gathering, and monitoring treaty compliance. Moreover, participation norms legitimize the activities of NGOs in the implementation of regime goals—humanitarian efforts, local human rights representation, and sustainable development tasks—are all undertaken by literally thousands of nongovernmental actors throughout the world.¹⁸ It is also important that there has been a boom in recent years in the number and variety of NGOs that have formed in the Global South.¹⁹ The use of new information technologies, especially by groups headquartered in the Global South, allow NGOs to stretch their scarce material resources much further than they were previously capable. It is through this kind of broad participation that regime legitimacy is secured.

Participation cannot be fully realized without transparency. Ann Florini defines it simply as the “opposite of secrecy.”²⁰ Specifically, transparency conditions focus on information requirements that facilitate decision making and the management of a regime, as well as, opening institutions and regime processes to outside inspection. The notion of transparency not only requires that various actors have access to information about regime effectiveness, but also that they are able to observe—if not participate in a strict sense—political and decision-making processes. This is a much more direct and inclusive form of scrutiny, which is crucial for assuring public accountability, an essential element of global democratic practice.²¹ Thus, the growing international norm of transparency has an impressive scope, encompassing both deep and broad information disclosure requirements for institutions and regimes on the one hand, and on the other, an expectation that at least some actors who are not parties to a given international institution or regime should be able to monitor its decision-making processes.

These obligations are not merely felt by states. International organizations like the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and European Union also face similar kinds of reporting requirements.²² In fact, even private transnational corporations are increasingly required to disclose information about their pollution emissions or labor practices. Virtually all new international regimes require parties to disclose important information about their behavior in the relevant issue area. In practice, this shift is perhaps most evident in the growing role of nongovernmental actors as observers of global governance. Also, institutions are often required to make important decision documents and meeting notes available to NGO observers or others who might request them. Whether in the daily deliberations at the United Nations and its specialized agencies, at major world conferences, or even within relatively isolated decision-making arenas, NGOs are now typically present as informed observers. Indeed, because of NGO inclusion, coupled with document disclosure, there is now an expectation of openness at many international proceedings. The cumulative effect of these requirements is quite remarkable as world politics is experiencing a movement away from secrecy toward transparency.²³ In other words, a transparency norm has been constructed and is becoming more pervasive in global governance.

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The emergence of publicity norms of participation and transparency are significant for advancing the prospects for global democracy within international regimes, making the policies and practices of global governance actors and institutions far more accountable to affected and sometimes weaker political actors. By contrast, when information and access is tightly controlled, states and international institutions can freely pursue policies that have significant and perhaps even adverse effects on specific individuals and groups. This democratic potential does not emerge merely from the fact of international cooperation through a regime. Rather, this potential follows when regimes stimulate political activity at a variety of levels to create new locations for public accountability. The degree to which these various centers of accountability are monitored, how information is provided and applied, and the effectiveness of these processes largely depends on the extent to which norms of participation and transparency are upheld within the regime.²⁴ Absent these norms, a regime can become a vehicle for exclusion and privilege.

Skeptics, of course, might point out that publicity norms in regimes fail to fulfill ideal conditions for global democracy. Perhaps this is so if the goal is to replicate at the global level democracy as it is practiced within states. However, the most that can be expected is the broadest form of inclusion permitted by contemporary

circumstances in world politics. In this regard, norms of participation and transparency are a necessary precondition for enabling a new participatory mode of citizenship at the global level that enhances the legitimacy of governance regimes.

CITIZENSHIP, ACTORS, AND ACCOUNTABILITY

It is because of the state-centeredness of existing institutions for governance and the theoretical commitments to explaining them that cosmopolitan theories of international relations have garnered increasing interest. These cosmopolitan theories posit the individual as an alternative focus of concern and the subject of legitimacy appeals.²⁵ Here, legitimacy of governance must be satisfied either by addressing the needs of the community of humankind or by permitting sufficient access to decision-making procedures to accord individuals authoritative input.²⁶

Genuinely democratic decision making provides the foundation of a cosmopolitan commitment that is, as Janna Thompson notes, "the notion that there are values which everyone in the world ought to accept, whatever their personal interests or community loyalties."²⁷ Indeed, the purpose of constituting the public sphere at the level of the individual is to preserve the commitment to individual autonomy and security that is central to cosmopolitan democracy. But, in a diverse and complex global polity, the ethical aspiration for inclusion and individual autonomy, and the practical realization of participation in authoritative decision-making processes, are complementary, though distinct ends. They should be treated as such because their reconciliation is problematic in the contemporary international state system.²⁸

The paradox of cosmopolitan democracy then, is to match global citizenship with institutional context. As Nigel Dower argues, there are two components of global citizenship: a moral definition, which relies on a commitment to a global ethic, and an institutional definition, which calls for some form of world government or a new set of institutions to accommodate global citizenship goals.²⁹ The former, he contends, is inadequate to realize cosmopolitan ends, while the latter is unrealistic. Instead, Dower offers a more pragmatic prescription whereby "we are world citizens" = "because of the nature of our global situation, we ought to work for global goals, and this involves using existing institutions to the same end."³⁰ Notably, in this conception, citizenship follows from the recognition of a need to work toward some shared end. From this, democracy demands individual participation within the context of groups where group membership is self-selected and is a mirror of values and aspirations held in common with other members. As Robert Talisse notes, this kind of participation is crucial to human flourishing because it embodies "a certain set of habits which both reflect common interests and enable individuals to act for the sake of the common good."³¹

This moral component is integral to democracy at the national level, but it is instructive for notions of global citizenship. There is a less demanding requirement for global citizenship and perhaps a less demanding standard for global democracy. The act of becoming a global citizen and the shift toward a mode of global democratic

practice is voluntary and ideational, and manifest in the mobilization of persons and groups whose shared values and concerns reflect the need to resolve collectively recognized challenges to human security.

The protection of the individual at the heart of the cosmopolitan project does not necessarily translate into an absolute requirement for individualized participation and electoral democracy at the global level. Any claim that it must, brings a rather hasty and unfortunate conclusion to the cosmopolitan endeavor. Rather, the practice of global citizenship is exercised through networks of global civil society that are now a constituent element of any description of global democracy; they are at the heart of the transformation of political community in international relations. The crucial point here is that NGOs and social movements can be *representative* agents or what James Rosenau refers to as “functional equivalents”³² in world politics, implementing tasks and aggregating interests and voices for segments of the global polity that, while often too small to express themselves within a single state, are more significant in numbers and influence across borderlines. Thus, short of developing alternative institutions that are able to accommodate transnational and individualized citizen participation, the population of NGOs in world politics is the most effective means of advancing toward the kinds of goals envisioned by cosmopolitan citizenship: these NGOs become citizen-representatives. It is precisely because individuals lack direct access to decision making processes at the global level and are represented instead by global citizenship-oriented NGOs, that the institutional structures of decision making and norm formation in world politics are so vital to the realization of global democracy *in the present*.

The international regime, as a global public sphere incorporating publicity norms, is a site for dialogic encounters that provide channels for the expression of civil society concerns and mechanisms to respond to these concerns. In broader terms, the democratic potential of international regimes is found in their potential to widen the range of political actors with access to influence and decision processes at both the global level and within states.³³ In this manner, the regime provides for degrees of accountability and legitimacy for those affected, thereby strengthening a mode of global citizenship bounded neither by culture nor language, but instead by shared experience, desire, and consequence. Through this democratization of global politics, the transformation of international society becomes immanent within the international regime.

ORDER, SOCIETY, AND GOVERNANCE: SOLIDARISM VERSUS PLURALISM

One of the more difficult questions concerning the form of global democracy guiding this discussion relates to the particular vision of implied international order. Different kinds of orders necessarily entail different kinds of institutional arrangements and obligations of members. For example, cosmopolitan democracy reduces to a minimum obligations and loyalty to existing territorial states, while envisioning the construction of international institutions that give primacy to the

individual *qua* individual. Andrew Linklater describes at length three ideal types of order available to states committed to reconfiguring the boundaries of political and moral community for the purpose of promoting inclusionary practices and enhancing human security. A pluralist society reflects a world in which states have dissimilar political and economic systems reflecting cultural and moral differences, thus, preserving the freedom and equality of independent political communities. By contrast, a solidarist international society reflects "some consensus about the substantive moral purposes which the whole society of states has a duty to uphold."³⁴ Finally, a post-Westphalian order advances beyond a solidarist society by virtue of closer forms of cooperation in which states relinquish many of their sovereign powers entirely.³⁵

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These visions reflect the potential redrawing of community in global life. The first two are suggestive of degrees of moral community, from weak to strong, while the latter is a more concrete reconfiguration of political community. Of particular concern in formulating a practical account of global democracy is the tension or, relation, between pluralism and solidarism. A post-Westphalian society demands a level and extensiveness of political and moral transformation unlikely to be broadly realized in a system of states bound by sovereignty. On the other hand, the concept of pluralism has wide appeal, for it mirrors sovereignty as the one common organizing principle around the world. Hence, Chris Brown suggests that international society should be "founded on 'the morality of states' and on an ethic of coexistence rather than upon those superficially more modern approaches which stress the rights and duties of individuals or the international struggle of classes."³⁶ And Fiona Roberston-Snape concludes, a pluralist society of states is "a practical rather than purposive association because there are no shared ends and there is no moral community."³⁷ By emphasizing the moral and cultural diversity of states, shared principles as they relate to, for example human rights, are necessarily thin. Moral priority, in other words, is placed on the state rather than the individual. Solidarism, by contrast, seeks to address an important weakness in a pluralist order by shifting moral priority to the individual; sovereignty is no longer absolute, but conditioned on the character of domestic arrangements that promote the well-being of individuals. It is a more cosmopolitan orientation that raises several issues, in particular, the basis on which solidarist principles are founded. If there are common moral and ethical standards, what are they and how are they reconciled?

This "moral complexity" points to the important role institutional forms might have in the ordering of international society. Whether thick conceptions of morality

associated with solidarism or thinner conceptions found in a pluralist framework prevail in the first instance is less significant than establishing appropriate institutions which can accommodate these considerations and ultimately offer procedures to implement agreed upon norms over time. In this sense, institutions must not inhibit the critical reflection upon and inquiry into those norms and their constitutive practices, which must be subject to scrutiny and revision as needed. International regimes, by expanding opportunities for broader participation and enhanced transparency for non-state actors, offer the institutionalized framework in which either, or both, pluralist or solidarist principles can be accommodated and expressed. Indeed, international norms may be considered contingent social facts, always subject to reassessment and revision. For example, human rights and environmental conventions both contain provisions that embrace foundationalist and communitarian ethics, yet they also provide for new principles reflecting what everyone agrees upon at a particular moment. Regular meetings of human rights commissions or the establishment of framework conventions and associated protocols in environmental regimes are indicative of flexible regime-organizing principles that can accord with the preferences of members of international society. They are preferences that vary along issue areas rather than as absolute standards. And, although there is no predetermined direction of preferences, the growing intensity of global interactions across issue areas increasingly seems to be the basis for "new moral growth," fostering "a kind of sociability, which promotes ethical behavior and establishes moral practice, not in response to philosophical imperatives, but to practical needs."³⁸

This approach to global order suggests a view of international regimes developed as frameworks for the practical and progressive management of global affairs which, in turn, become the foundation for a solidarist international society in the making. The moral complexity and tension between solidarism and pluralism will be resolved only incrementally, on an issue by issue basis, amongst actors in world politics who coalesce into a public sphere.³⁹ The precise reason why regimes are constructed in the first place is that actors respond to particular problems and situations at specific moments in historical time. In their construction, then, regimes accommodate this debate by offering principles which are subject to scrutiny and revision, typically in fact expanding to a more solidarist stance, as has been the case in many humanitarian situations.

CONCLUSIONS ON GLOBAL DEMOCRACY, THE STATE, AND INTERNATIONAL REGIMES

The contemporary global condition suggests that at the moment prospects for global democracy, defined by individual representation and deliberation, are not good. A global *demos* is lacking in the face of entrenched, particularistic identities and loyalties bound to ethnicity, religion, or territory. However, given contemporary economic and social globalization, the opportunities to promote fundamental transformations are real, though it may require more institutional hardware than is

currently available. Yet, it seems self-evident that existing institutional forms, such as the international regime, can serve as the institutional hardware of global democracy. By incorporating norms of transparency and participation, regimes provide a channel for the exercise of a meaningful form of global citizenship by NGOs, thus advancing moral and ethical progress in the relations among states and reconstituting global order, albeit in incremental ways.

Of course, one aspect of this transformative potential resides in the redefinition of the boundaries of political community, a task that looks past the state as an illegitimate or irrelevant form of authority to attain the ethical ends of cosmopolitanism. But, as Chris Brown suggests, strong state authority is a necessary ingredient in an era of globalization in order to regulate the effects of economic processes.⁴⁰ These types of states exist as effective administrative and bureaucratic entities which have the capacity to enhance public welfare and protect individuals from the worst consequences of unregulated market forces. While the presence of a strong state may pose unique challenges to the advancement of universalism and the transformation of community, when all is said and done, the mechanisms of global governance demand effective measures to administer agreed upon rules, norms, and principles that protect the person and enhance human welfare.

What this suggests is that the formation of fundamentally new institutions is not a necessary condition for realizing global democracy. True, there exists great tension between governance institutions structured along statist lines and those structured according to global imperatives. This tension, though, offers an opportunity to fashion the kind of global governance institutions that accommodate the pluralism of the global system while advancing solidarist principles. The human rights regime offers a powerful example because the formulation and institutionalization of principles in this issue typically confronts the cultural diversity of the global system. Yet, those human rights principles are increasingly the basis for legitimate claims on the behavior of states by individuals and NGOs. In a similar vein, the expanding scale of humanitarian intervention is redefining the limits of sovereign authority in world politics. Human rights, humanitarian intervention, and democratic government are just some of the broader concepts of proper state conduct that are progressively more integrated into notions of "good governance" in world politics and follow from principles and expectations expressed in international regimes.⁴¹ Hence, the international regime, as a global public sphere, by incorporating publicity norms that expand the scope of meaningful global citizenship, becomes a potential site of transformation wherein global democratic practices can anchor themselves in the present moment.

Notes

¹ The phrase "global governance" describes the "increasingly regulated character of transnational and international relations." See Elke Krahmann, "National, Regional, and Global Governance: One Phenomenon or Many?" *Global Governance*, 9, no. 3 (July-September 2003): 329.

² Daniele Archibugi, "Cosmopolitan Democracy and Its Critics: A Review," *European Journal of International Relations*, 10, no. 3 (September 2004): 437-475.

³ For studies of cosmopolitan democracy see for example, Archibugi, "Cosmopolitan Democracy;" David Held, *Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance* (London: Polity Press, 1995); and the essays in Daniele Archibugi, David Held and Martin Köhler, eds., *Re-imagining Political Community* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999).

⁴ Robert O. Keohane, "Closing the Fairness-Practice Gap," *Ethics and International Affairs*, 3 (1989): 101-116.

⁵ Stephen D. Krasner, "Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables," *International Organization*, 36, no. 2 (Spring 1982): 186.

⁶ The argument thus follows constructivist logic that anarchy is what states—and other actors—make of it. See Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is What States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics," *International Organization*, 46, no. 2 (Spring 1992): 391-425.

⁷ See, for example, Nayef H. Samhat "International Regimes as Political Community," *Millennium*, 26, no. 2 (Winter 1997): 349-378; and Nayef H. Samhat and Rodger A. Payne, "Regimes, Public Spheres and Global Democracy: Towards the Transformation of Political Community," *Global Society*, 17, no. 3 (July 2003): 273-295.

⁸ Marc Lynch, *State Interests and Public Spheres: The International Politics of Jordan's Identity*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 11.

⁹ Lynch, *State Interests and Public Spheres*, 11.

¹⁰ James Bohman, "Citizenship and Norms of Publicity: Wide Public Reason in Cosmopolitan Societies," *Political Theory*, 27, no. 2 (April 1999): 176-202.

¹¹ Lynch, *State Interests and Public Spheres*, 37.

¹² Lynch, *States Interests and Public Spheres*, 40.

¹³ Andrew Linklater, *The Transformation of Political Community*, 106 (London: Polity Press, 1998); and Samhat, "International Regimes as Political Community."

¹⁴ Linklater, *Transformation*, 106-7.

¹⁵ Linklater, *Transformation*, 107.

¹⁶ See Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984).

¹⁷ For an extended exploration publicity norms, see Rodger A. Payne and Nayef H. Samhat, *Democratizing Global Politics: Discourse Norms, International Regimes and Political Community* (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2004).

¹⁸ See, for example, the essays in John Boli and George M. Thomas, eds., *Constructing World Culture: International Nongovernmental Organizations Since 1875* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999); Leon Gordenker and Thomas G. Weiss, eds., *NGOs, the United Nations, and Global Governance* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1996).

¹⁹ Julie Fisher, *Non Governments: NGOs and the Political Development of the Third World* (West Hartford, CT: Kumarian Press, 1998).

²⁰ Ann Florini, "The End of Secrecy," *Foreign Policy*, no. 111 (Summer 1998): 50.

²¹ See Jan Aart Scholte, "Civil Society and Democratically Accountable Global Governance," *Government and Opposition*, 39, no. 2 (Spring 2004): 211-234.

²² See, for example, Kenneth Rogoff, "Europe's Quiet Leap Forward," *Foreign Policy*, no. 143 (July/August 2004): 74-76; Ngaire Woods and Amrita Narlikar, "Governance and the Limits of Accountability: The WTO, the IMF, and the World Bank," *International Social Science Journal*, 53, no. 170 (2001): 569-584; Adrienne Héritier, "Composite Democracy in Europe: The Role of Transparency and Access to Information," *Journal of European Public Policy*, 10, no. 5 (2003): 814-834; Daniel C. Esty, "Non-governmental Organizations at the World Trade Organization: Cooperation, Competition, or Exclusion," *Journal of International Economic Law*, no. 1 (1998): 123-148; Gabrielle Marceau and Peter N. Pederson, "Is the WTO Open and Transparent?," *Journal of World Trade*, 33, no. 1 (1999): 5-49.

²³ Florini, "The End of Secrecy," and Ann Florini, "Transparency and the Coming Democracy," *Disarmament Diplomacy*, no. 76 (March/April 2004), at www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd76/76af.htm. The shift toward greater transparency in the WTO and the World Bank is discussed in Payne and Samhat, *Democratizing Global Politics*.

²⁴ See, for example, Susan D. Burgerman, "Mobilizing Principles: The Role of Transnational Activists in Promoting Human Rights Principles," *Human Rights Quarterly*, 20, no. 4 (1998): 905-923; Ken

Rutherford, "The Evolving Arms Control Agenda: Implications of the Role of NGOs in Banning Antipersonnel Landmines," *World Politics*, 53, no. 1 (2000): 74-114; Tora Skodvin and Steinar Andresen, "Nonstate Influence in the International Whaling Commission, 1970-1990," *Global Environmental Politics*, 3, no. 4 (2004): 61-86; Leonard S. Rubenstein, "How International Human Rights Organizations Can Advance Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Response to Kenneth Roth," *Human Rights Quarterly*, 26, no. 4 (2004): 845-865; Lars H. Gulbrandsen and Steinar Andresen, "NGO Influence in the Implementation of the Kyoto Protocol: Compliance, Flexibility Mechanisms and Sinks," *Global Environmental Politics*, 4, no. 4 (2004): 54-75; William A. Douglas, John-Paul Ferguson and Erin Klett, "An Effective Confluence of Forces in Support of Workers' Rights: ILO Standards, US Trade Laws, Unions, and NGOs," *Human Rights Quarterly*, 26, no. 2 (2004): 273-299.

²⁵ Janna Thompson, "Community, Identity and World Citizenship" in Archibugi, Held and Köhler (eds.) *Re-imagining Political Community*, 179-197; Linklater, *Transformation of Political Community*, 204-211; Derek Heater, *World Citizenship and Government: Cosmopolitan Ideas in the History of Western Political Thought* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996).

²⁶ James Bohman, "Cosmopolitan Republicanism: Citizenship, Freedom and Global Political Authority," *Monist*, 84, no. 1 (2001): 3-22.

²⁷ Thompson, "Community, Identity and World Citizenship" in Archibugi, Held and Köhler, eds., *Re-imagining Political Community*, 191.

²⁸ The challenge is evident in attempts by cosmopolitan oriented thinkers to offer new global democratic assemblies that are elected by and represent individuals rather than governments. See, for example, David Held, *Democracy and the Global Order* (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1995); Daniele Archibugi and David Held, eds., *Cosmopolitan Democracy: an Agenda for a New World Order* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995).

²⁹ Nigel Dower, "The Idea of Global Citizenship: A Sympathetic Assessment," *Global Society*, 14, no. 4 (2000): 567.

³⁰ Dower, "The Idea of Global Citizenship," 567.

³¹ Robert B. Talisse, "Can Democracy be a Way of Life? Deweyan Democracy and the Problem of Pluralism," *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society*, 39, no. 1 (2003): 9.

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Enter the Fourth Horseman: Health Security and International Relations Theory

by Jeremy Youde

What relationship exists between the health of individuals within a state and that state's national security? This question has received increased attention in recent years in the wake of the AIDS pandemic, Ebola, hantavirus, SARS, anthrax, and avian flu. Jared Diamond's book, *Guns, Germs and Steel*,¹ which explicitly links infectious disease to the successes and failures of world populations, received the Pulitzer Prize for nonfiction and remains popular years after its initial publication. Numerous policymakers and academics have called for a redefinition of national security to include health threats. Using the rubric of health security or human security, advocates assert that a population's health is of utmost importance to the state's ability to survive within the international system. Redefining national security to include issues of health and infectious disease makes the concept of security more relevant to the challenges states face in the post-Cold War era. In 2000, the United Nations Security Council held a special session devoted to AIDS and its challenge to international security—the first time that a public health issue had received such attention from the world's highest body. States like Canada and Denmark have explicitly included issues of health security and human security in their national foreign policies.

Despite this popular support, many within the security studies community reject the notion of changing the concept of security to include infectious disease and health. They claim that doing so would dilute security's meaning, making it a catch-all term for anything negative. While not necessarily denying that infectious disease can pose a severe burden to a state, these scholars claim that it does not pose the same sort of existential threat to a state's livelihood. Human security and health security issues largely remain at the margins of the literature on international security.

Given this state of affairs, what is the future of the health security and human security paradigms? Do they deserve a place within the larger literature on security, or are they destined to remain fringe concerns? I argue that health security does have an important role to play in debates over international security, but that its advocates have approached the debate in the wrong manner. Instead of attempting to create a new security paradigm and hoping for acceptance within the academic debate, health security advocates would be better served by engaging existent theories of international relations and international security. By engaging security scholars on

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their own terms, advocates of the health security paradigm can have a greater influence on the debates over security while providing firm theoretical groundings for policymakers concerned about the role of infectious disease in international security. I demonstrate how infectious disease control can be integrated into the three major schools of thought in American international relations theory—neorealism, neoliberalism, and constructivism.

To explore this argument, I focus attention on sub-Saharan Africa, particularly southern Africa. A focus on these states allows me to explore the impact of AIDS on those states with the highest infection rates and with the greatest history with AIDS. Such a focus is particularly important for work such as this, because it allows me to combine empirical evidence over time with the observed realities of states coping with high infection levels. The experiences of this region can serve as a warning call to other parts of the world facing burgeoning infection rates, while also allowing analysis to move beyond the conjecture stage.

HEALTH SECURITY: ITS ORIGINS AND DEBATES

Many proponents of the health security paradigm look to the historical record to buttress their claims about the importance of infectious disease in altering the international system. Thucydides recalled how a mysterious plague felled the Athenian army, playing a decisive role in the outcome of the Peloponnesian War.² The Black Plague, which killed approximately one-third of Europe's population, played a decisive role in bringing about the end of the feudal system and encouraging the Reformation.³ Schoolchildren learn about how Cortez, with his much smaller army, was able to vanquish the Aztec civilization with the help of smallpox. Upon coming in contact with a virgin population, smallpox decimated scores of Aztecs and nearly eliminated the Aztec army. Those who managed to avoid the disease were cowed into surrender, believing their gods had abandoned them.⁴ Many people also know about American settlers intentionally giving blankets infected with smallpox to Native Americans, infecting them and easing the process of acquiring territory.⁵ These historical examples demonstrate the decisive impact infectious diseases can have on a population's survival and ability to fight off attacks from outside forces.

Calls to expand the security studies agenda have existed throughout the last forty years. Wolfers argued that not all states face the same security threats, and that one cannot therefore exogenously assume a state's security interests.⁶ Wolfers posited that the ideal security policy focused on the spreading of a state's values without the use of a state's military. More recently, Ullman warned that defining security solely in military terms was misleading.⁷ A focus on military security can distract governments from other, more dangerous threats, thus making the state less secure. Ullman further argued that it encourages a militarization mindset that makes the entire international system less secure.⁸ He redefined a security threat as something that threatened to degrade the quality of life for a state's residents over a short period of time, or narrowed the range of policy choices available to states.⁹ While innovative,

Ullman's efforts largely failed to change the terms of the security debate. Buzan refines some of the ideas put forward by Ullman. He notes that security for "human collectivities" are affected by a number of different sectors, such as the military, politics, economics, society, and the environment, and that these sectors all interact with one another.¹⁰ Therefore, one must interpret security as relational and interdependent: "individual national securities can only be fully understood when considered in relations both to each other and to larger patterns of relations in the system as a whole."¹¹

Health security advocates would be better served by engaging existent theories of international relations and international security.

Some authors picked up on this theme, though, and continued to promote it. For example, Homer-Dixon argued that environmental change should be properly considered a security threat, as it is likely to provoke conflict.¹² Kolodziej criticized security studies scholars for adhering to a strict constructionist view of security.¹³ He argued that equating security with war blinded researchers from the more immediate, pressing threats and challenges in the world.

The human security paradigm gained prominence in 1994, with the publication of the United Nations Development Program's (UNDP) *Human Development Report*. In that publication, the authors argued that the concept of security had been too narrowly defined, ignoring the experiences and challenges faced by the majority of the world's population.¹⁴ Instead, the authors offered a definition for a new security paradigm, which they called human security. Human security includes two aspects. The first includes freedom from "chronic threats [such] as hunger, disease and repression."¹⁵ The second aspect focuses on "protection from sudden or hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life."¹⁶ The suggestions laid out in the report immediately spawned a great deal of debate and discussion among both scholars and policymakers.

A growing number of scholars have embraced the human security paradigm in general.¹⁷ An important subset of these scholars has explicitly focused on health security and the challenges to national security posed by infectious disease. Health security examines the "mixture of the ordinary dynamics of international relations and the special dynamics produced by the challenges posed by pathogenic microbes."¹⁸ One of the most prolific authors within the health security paradigm is Andrew Price-Smith. He has written extensively about the need for "a fundamental reconceptualization of standard definitions of national and international security."¹⁹ His work combines case studies with cross-national quantitative analyses to demonstrate the potential impact of infectious disease on national development and security. He finds that high rates of infectious disease can have severe consequences for a state's economy, educational system, military, and political institutions. Further,

he notes that the impact of infectious disease can last up to fifteen years.²⁰ Critics, he notes, cite that humanity and microbes have coexisted for thousands of years, and neither side has wiped the other out. Though this may be true, Price-Smith argues that the scope of the threat in the current era is far greater than at any time in history.²¹ Singer evaluates AIDS' impact on international security by presenting the implications for national militaries and civil strife.²² In a similar vein, Laurie Garrett, a medical reporter for *Newsday*, has written two highly praised books about the threats posed by infectious disease and collapsing public health infrastructures on national security.²³

Some authors have approached the issue of health security from a humanitarian, ethical standpoint. Benatar asks, "What does the HIV/AIDS pandemic tell us about a world in which such a disease can emerge?"²⁴ He argues that the AIDS crisis, and health security in general, demonstrate the interconnectedness of the international system and humanity. Nelson asserts that the need for developed states to aggressively treat AIDS in the developing world goes beyond simple public health concerns.²⁵ Instead, the West has a moral imperative to eradicate AIDS in the developing world because doing so promotes and extends the fundamental rights that Western states claim to hold dear.

The work of health security scholars has attracted the attention of policymakers. The National Intelligence Council has released a National Intelligence Estimate in 2000 which explicitly linked the spread of infectious disease to the United States' national security.²⁶ Similar reports in 2002 and 2003 addressed the implications of AIDS and SARS, respectively, for United States foreign policy.²⁷ Former Vice President Al Gore spearheaded efforts to have the United Nations Security Council devote a session to address the implications of AIDS on international security in 2000.²⁸ In addition, President George W. Bush singled out the spread of AIDS in Africa and the Caribbean as a serious threat to the international community during his 2003 State of the Union Address.²⁹

Even with all of this high-level attention, many remain skeptical, if not hostile, towards attempts to broaden the security studies agenda. Using the example of environmental security, Deudney argues forcefully against broadening the definition of security. He argues that national security and environmental degradation are too dissimilar to fall under the same heading because of the type of threat each poses, the source and scope of the threat, the degree of intention about the threat, and the types of organizations designed to protect people from these threats.³⁰ He goes on to argue that employing the rhetoric of national security for environmental problems may actually be counterproductive.³¹

Along these same lines, Walt strenuously argued against broadening security studies to include issues such as "poverty, AIDS, environmental hazards, drug abuse, and the like."³² Doing so, he argues, would destroy the intellectual coherence and integrity of the discipline while distracting researchers and policymakers from crafting viable solutions to these problems. Paris cites the imprecision and malleability of the definition of 'human security' as its greatest problem.³³ Because the UNDP definition

and others are so vague and open to interpretation, it is next to impossible for human security to properly guide either policymaking or academic research. He writes, "Given the hodgepodge of principles and objectives associated with the concept, it is far from clear what academics should even be studying."³⁴ He applauds recent efforts to narrow the concept of human security, but notes that such efforts proceed in a haphazard fashion without explaining their rationales.

By calling infectious diseases a security threat, the implication is that significant spending on disease control measures in developing states is only justified when it threatens the United States' security.

Peterson, focusing specifically on the integration of infectious disease into security studies, offers one of the most far-reaching critiques. She notes that advocates of human security and national security "talk past each other at nearly every turn, stymieing any serious engagement over whether and how infectious diseases threaten security."³⁵ Co-opting the rhetoric of national security for infectious disease may intuitively seem the best route for engaging policymakers and convincing the public of the seriousness of the threat. She cautions, though, that this combination may be problematic for two reasons. First, she argues that it relieves states of their moral obligations to respond to crises in developing countries. By calling infectious diseases a security threat, the implication is that significant spending on disease control measures in developing states is only justified when it threatens the United States' security. Second, the discourse may actually generate further security dilemmas because any attempts by a state to undertake disease control programs may provoke suspicion about biological weapons programs or threats to the United States.³⁶

This brief review shows that the controversy over human security and health security has spawned an impressive amount of discussion and debate. Surprisingly, though, both sides continue to talk past each other. Neither side truly engages the other. Health security's advocates largely fail to make explicit references to traditional security studies paradigms or international relations theories. Its detractors, on the other hand, extol the virtues of the traditional definitions of security without ever demonstrating why or how health security fails to fit into those paradigms. The research I present here attempts to engage both sides of this debate. Not only will I show that health security is a valid concern for security studies, but that it can find its proper place in the literature within the traditional confines of security studies. By focusing attention on AIDS' impact on national militaries, economies, and identities, I demonstrate how health security fits within each of the three main theoretical traditions of North American international relations theory—neorealism, neoliberalism, and constructivism.

THE REALITIES OF AIDS

As of the end of 2002, UNAIDS and the WHO estimated that 42 million people worldwide were currently infected with HIV. Of these 42 million, roughly 29.4 million HIV-positive people lived in sub-Saharan Africa. This number represents 70 percent of all HIV infections worldwide.³⁷ Even more stunning, these 29.4 million HIV-positive people represent 8.57 percent of the total population of sub-Saharan Africa. No other region of the world even comes close to having such a widespread epidemic.

Southern African states have the dubious distinction of having the highest infection rates in the world. Botswana tops the list with a staggering 35.8 percent of its adult population being HIV-positive. The tiny kingdom of Swaziland comes in second with a 25.25 percent adult infection rate. Zimbabwe has the third highest infection rate at 25.06 percent, followed by Lesotho at 23.57 percent, South Africa at 19.95 percent, and Namibia at 19.94 percent.

The demographic consequences of the AIDS epidemic in sub-Saharan Africa are staggering. The change in life expectancy is perhaps the most dramatic. In many southern African countries, AIDS has wiped out all progress that states had made toward increasing life expectancy. Rising steadily since independence, many countries in the region now have life expectancy rates at or lower than those in the 1960s. In Botswana, average life expectancy for a child born today is around 38 years—a full 30 years less than would be expected without AIDS. Zimbabwe has witnessed a similar decline, from a predicted non-AIDS life expectancy of 70 years to a current 36 years. The average Zambian has lost 25 years on her or his life. Even South Africa, long considered the crown jewel of the region, has seen AIDS erode its average life expectancy. In 2000, in a non-AIDS scenario, the average South African could expect to live to 65. Because of AIDS, that same average South African can only expect to live to 50.³⁸

To fully understand how the realities of AIDS in southern Africa outlined above interact with international relations theory and changes in the international system, we need to explore in detail how changes occur in the international system in regards to the military, the economy, identities, and perceptions according to the leading theories. The next three sections explore each of these in detail.

AIDS AND THE MILITARY

Neorealists argue that military power is the most crucial part of changing the international system and understanding how the current international system came to be. However, in their emphasis on military power *qua* military power, they neglect to account for the factors that can increase or decrease military power. AIDS has thus far had an incredible impact on the militaries of southern African nations, and its impact will only grow as time goes on.

Reliable and accurate statistics on the rates of HIV infection in the military are difficult to come by. It is expensive to test all recruits for the disease. Given that

many of these states lack sufficient funds for basic upkeep on their barracks and equipment, they are hard-pressed to find funds for medical testing. Furthermore, some states may be reluctant to test recruits, knowing that the state lacks the funds and facilities to provide any care for that person if they do test positive. Despite these limitations, some estimates of infection levels do exist. Malawi, which has an adult infection rate of 15.96 percent, has an estimated 75 percent of its military personnel infected with HIV. Uganda, which is considered one of the world's 'success stories' for its commitment to combating AIDS and its success in bringing its adult infection rate down to 8.3 percent, has a 66 percent infection rate in its military. This is nearly eight times the infection rate of the population as a whole. In Zimbabwe, estimates show that 80 percent of the military personnel are HIV-positive.³⁹ Even more amazingly, the Zimbabwean government itself admitted in 1993 that up to 70 percent of its officer corps was HIV-positive. Estimates for the South African Defense Forces peg the infection rate around 40 percent, double that of the adult population as a whole. However, there exists a wide degree of variation within that estimate. Some units, such as those in KwaZulu-Natal, have an estimated rate of infection of 90 percent.⁴⁰

In the post-colonial era, militaries have proven themselves to be formidable foes of the democratic process when it failed to serve their immediate needs.

The figures alone are mind-boggling enough and difficult to grapple with. The problem becomes more acute, though, when we place it within the context of military actions and effectiveness. HIV-positive persons are more susceptible to a host of opportunistic infections, which further weakens their immune system and makes them incapable of performing their duties. Given the already high infection rates among the adult populations in these states, finding suitable and non-infected recruits to take the place of those who fall ill will become increasingly difficult. The loss of the officer corps could lead to a breakdown of discipline and effectiveness within the ranks, and the number of people from which to pull new officers is steadily declining.⁴¹ The general effectiveness of the military as a stable institution in southern Africa is threatened. This is all the more worrisome in light of post-colonial African history. In the post-colonial era, militaries have proven themselves to be formidable foes of the democratic process when it failed to serve their immediate needs.⁴² If we enter into a situation where undisciplined soldiers believe that the state cannot, or will not, provide for their own health needs or those of their fellow soldiers, the possibility of societal disruption is greatly increased. Bear in mind, too, that most of the states in southern Africa (indeed, throughout the continent) have only recently transitioned to some form of democratic governance and are still in the nascent stages of creating processes and norms for political competition. These states will find themselves hard-pressed if they face a threat from the military.

Evidence also suggests that AIDS is being increasingly used as a weapon itself, going back to the late 1980s. During the hearings of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa, it was learned that the Civil Co-operation Bureau (CCB) sent HIV-positive former African National Congress operatives who had defected to the government's side to the brothels outside Johannesburg. The hope was that these men would infect the prostitutes, who would then infect the men working in the mines. The mineworkers would then take the infection back to their home villages and towns, further spreading the disease.⁴³ It is unknown how successful the CCB was in this mission, but it points to the potential dangers of AIDS as a weapon. In Sierra Leone, Rwanda, and the Democratic Republic of Congo, reports have surfaced of infected troops deliberately raping women with the intention of spreading the virus. Given the violent nature of rape, the chances of infection are greatly increased. These actions essentially make combat continue for an additional fifteen years, as the newly infected die a slow death in a country that is grappling with the difficulties of reconstituting itself after military conflict.⁴⁴

AIDS thus severely weakens the military forces in states which are already weakened by high levels of HIV infection. The weakened nature of the military may pose a threat to the stability of states in the region, which could shift the balance of power. The increasing use of AIDS as a weapon threatens states even after any actual fighting itself has ceased. These three examples alone demonstrate how AIDS can and does have an impact on the militaries of southern Africa.

These realities can inform neorealist understandings of international relations. For neorealists, survival is the most important interest of any state. To ensure survival, a state must privilege its physical security above all else. Thus, states raise armies to defend themselves against outsiders. A disease that kills high numbers of troops without engaging in battle, decimates the officer ranks, and prevents states from undertaking training exercises will undermine a state's ability to ensure its physical security and survival. AIDS weakens the very tool that states employ to achieve their highest goal—survival. By incorporating health security concerns like AIDS into neorealism, one can gain a better perspective on how states maintain their survival.

AIDS AND THE ECONOMY

The negative impact of AIDS on the economies of southern African states is difficult to overstate. Because of their loss of economic stature and development, these states are far less likely to end up on the 'winning' side of those who arrange the international system. Thus, the neoliberal emphasis on the role of economics in setting and changing the international system is again seen when we examine AIDS.

Most directly, AIDS depresses national macroeconomic activity and indicators. The impact grows progressively more severe as more and more people fall ill. Real GDP levels in South Africa are predicted, in a non-alarmist scenario, to be approximately 0.3 percent lower due to AIDS over the next 15 years.⁴⁵ At the same time, inflation is predicted to increase during this same period, which places upward

pressure on interest rates. AIDS will also lead to increasing budget deficits due to lowered economic productivity, a loss of tax revenue, and an increased need for foreign assistance. These impacts are even greater in other countries in the region, such as Botswana, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

Much of the negative macroeconomic impact relates to changes in the labor pool. Most importantly, AIDS decreases the size of the labor pool. Fewer people are available to fill an increasing number of positions. Some scholars have argued that AIDS will not have a great impact on the overall labor pool, because many of these countries have large pools of unemployed or underemployed people who can fill the open jobs. These arguments ignore a number of important points. First, those who do step into jobs will have less experience, thereby decreasing overall worker productivity. Simply having people available does not mean that anyone can walk in and fill any position. South Africa's unemployment rate currently hovers between 30 and 40 percent.⁴⁶ However, many of these people lack the skills necessary to replace the workers falling ill and dying. Second, many people leave the labor pool altogether to care for family members who have fallen ill. Third, increasing levels of disease have a negative impact on investment, both domestic and foreign, meaning that a large number of jobs may simply disappear.

Given the high rates of HIV infection, a number of firms in the region have started hiring two or three people to fill every one slot available on the assumption that only one of those people will survive long enough to work for the company.⁴⁷ Such a strategy makes sense for a company attempting to operate in such an environment. However, this represents a huge outlay in training expenses, which has a negative impact on a company's bottom line. With higher absenteeism, lower productivity, and higher health care costs for employees, this large training expense is hardly sustainable over the long term.

The shortage of workers will likely lead to demands for increased wages, which in turn leads to higher production costs. To cover these higher costs, companies will be forced to make their products more expensive, and hence less attractive on the international market. Less competitive products will further weaken the position of southern African states in the global marketplace.

If economic power is crucial for having a seat at the table in setting the rules for the international system, then AIDS appears to have a detrimental impact on the ability of southern African states to play such a role. These states face lower incomes, higher costs, smaller labor pools, and less competitive placement within the marketplace. Such a unique confluence of events does not bode well for these states to impact the international system.⁴⁸

Some may argue that this situation is not unique. After all, they assert, southern African states have *never* been major players in the international economic order. While AIDS may make things even worse for these states economically, it does not fundamentally alter current realities. Such an argument fails to appreciate the economic consequences of AIDS on a number of fronts. First, as Boone and Batsell point out, AIDS begins to call the neoliberal economic order into question.⁴⁹ It becomes

increasingly difficult to justify an economic system that provides potentially lifesaving drugs to an ever decreasing pool of people in industrialized countries, while denying these drugs to those in southern Africa and other developing areas of the world. Recent disputes over pharmaceutical patents highlight these disagreements. Second, the southern African states will require ever increasing levels of foreign assistance to meet their minimal obligations to their people.⁵⁰ Without assistance or the restructuring of foreign debts, these countries face the prospect of defaulting on their loans to industrialized nations and multilateral financial institutions. A widespread rash of loan defaults would have a major impact on the world economic order. Third, southern Africa contains a large number of natural resources, such as gold, diamonds, and copper, that are incredibly important in the international economy. As it becomes increasingly expensive to obtain these materials, the impact will ripple throughout the rest of the economy. It may be true that AIDS will not allow southern Africa to *set* the agenda for the international economic order. However, it would be a mistake to then assume that this means that AIDS lacks the ability to *alter* the international economic order. The neoliberal emphasis on the role of economics to change the international system thus finds resonance in the case of AIDS in southern Africa.

It becomes increasingly difficult to justify an economic system that provides potentially lifesaving drugs to an ever decreasing pool of people in industrialized countries, while denying these drugs to those in southern Africa and other developing areas of the world.

AIDS contributes to a neoliberal understanding of the world because it directly impacts the complex interdependence that characterizes the international community. If states are assumed to rationally come together to achieve their common interests and use their economic ties to make for more peaceful relations amongst them, then those ties must be stable. States that are economically unproductive or cannot honor their business commitments to others will find themselves ostracized from the international community. What state will want to form strong interdependent relationships with a state whose population is too ill to be economically productive? The interdependent ties amongst states are weakened by a disease, undermining international cooperation. A neoliberal analysis of international relations that incorporates AIDS can better explain how and why economic relations in the international community emerge and maintain themselves. Health security concerns like AIDS can thus inform neoliberal analyses.

AIDS, PERCEPTIONS, AND IDENTITIES

Constructivists focus on how changing perceptions and identities alter the international system. However, constructivist scholars have avoided applying such analysis to issues like AIDS because they feared doing so might lead to their marginalization within the academy.⁵¹ However, AIDS provides an excellent arena for demonstrating the impact of changing perceptions and identities on the structure of the international system. As Fidler notes, "infectious disease measures historically have served as demarcations by which 'we' protect ourselves from the diseases of 'others.'" ⁵²

The lack of attention to altered perceptions and identities in the international arena is all the more strange when one considers the perceptions of AIDS in the United States. When it was first discovered, it was considered a disease of gay men (hence the disease's first name of GRID, or gay related immune deficiency) and, later, of intravenous drug users. Because these groups were marginalized within society and "got what they deserved" in the eyes of many people, the United States government allocated few resources toward studying the origins and treatment of AIDS in the early years. Not until AIDS started to spread to wider segments of the population did the disease warrant higher resource levels.⁵³ As people saw AIDS in a different light—from being a disease on the margins of society to one that could affect anyone—their perceptions of the importance and severity of the disease changed.

The same sort of process is at work in the international system, with AIDS altering the perceptions of the international community of southern Africa. During the colonial era, Africa was considered the 'Dark Continent.' Thanks in part to AIDS, this perception is again gaining prominence in the international consciousness.⁵⁴ Africa is increasingly seen as a continent that cannot take care of itself and relies upon the largesse of the industrialized nations. It is seen as requiring billions of dollars to combat a disease that came about because of the Africans' inability to control their libidos.⁵⁵ Witness how international media coverage of Africa, in the span of only a year or so, went from trumpeting the 'African Renaissance' to focusing on the AIDS scourge and the inability of African states to prevent their AIDS epidemics from spiraling out of control.

This perception is reinforced by positions of many southern African leaders. Thabo Mbeki has openly scoffed at the notion that HIV causes AIDS and has included scientists like Peter Duesberg on his advisory panel. Duesberg's work is widely discredited among AIDS researchers for his contention that the medicines used to treat HIV actually cause AIDS.⁵⁶ Duesberg's arguments are frequently cited by the South African Department of Health in its policy to deny antiretroviral drugs to pregnant women and to only offer "traditional" remedies.⁵⁷ By including someone like Duesberg on such a prominent panel and putting his ideas into practice, Mbeki invites ridicule and advances the perception that Africans cannot even grasp basic science.

The actions of other leaders have reinforced this altered perception of Africa as unable to care for itself or understand the modern world. Zimbabwe's Robert Mugabe has denied that AIDS is a problem in his country, despite its 25 percent adult infection rate. Mugabe has called AIDS "the white man's disease" and claims it is an attempt by the West to recolonize Africa.⁵⁸ President Thabo Mbeki of South Africa provoked international outrage and condemnation over his assertion that HIV does not cause AIDS, and his government's refusal to provide various anti-AIDS drugs.⁵⁹ These actions allow the international system to perceive southern African states as lacking the political will or basic knowledge necessary to combat AIDS. Instead, it is up to the West to come and 'save' Africa from itself.

Most policy recommendations regarding health security largely lack any theoretical foundation, making their suggestions incoherent and difficult to integrate into foreign policy strategies.

Again, some scholars may argue that these perceptions are nothing new, and merely reflect the same realities that have plagued Africa for years. These scholars, though, deny the fundamental shift in international perceptions of Africa. In recent years, a growing number of commentators have explicitly argued that Africa cannot handle its own problems.⁶⁰ With the reluctance of African leaders to seriously address the serious nature of their AIDS epidemics, these arguments have gained more prominence and adherents. This represents a dramatic shift. In the mid-1990s, when the 'African Renaissance' was a prominent theme, Western governments started to extend favorable trade terms to African states and discuss seriously the beneficial relationships between Africa and the industrialized states.⁶¹ With the rise of AIDS, though, such talks have almost completely disappeared. American foreign policy towards Africa has shifted from the African Growth and Opportunity Act and promoting the development of markets to funding abstinence-based AIDS prevention programs.

AIDS has shifted perceptions of southern Africa held by the industrialized states, and the international system as a whole, from a region coming into its own to a perception of a weak, inefficient region that can do nothing without the support of the West. Such a changed perception weakens southern Africa's role in the international system and denies the region the ability to weigh in on important matters facing the international community.

AIDS can inform constructivist analyses of the international system because it provides valuable insights about how and why state identities and perceptions change. The disease can alter not only how states envision and understand their own identities, but also how others perceive and react to those states. This can then impact international cooperation, the development of shared intersubjective meanings, and the development of international institutions. AIDS thus impacts many of the

concepts that lie at the heart of constructivist theories of international relations, making it valuable to incorporate this disease (and health security in general) into international relations.

OLD THEORY OR A NEW PARADIGM?

The three main schools of thought in North American international relations scholarship—neorealism, neoliberalism, and constructivism—start from different premises about how the international system is formed and how that system can change. However, all three share a reluctance to explore the role of disease in shaping and changing the international system. Fidler points out, though, “given the nature of the microbial world, a strong national interest in infectious disease control requires that the state sees such control as a matter of importance in the international system.”⁶² Thus, addressing the concerns and challenges raised by infectious disease necessarily requires that we analyze them as a matter of international relations. When we explore the impact of AIDS on the military, economic, and perceptual systems in southern Africa, though, we can see that AIDS does in fact lead to the same sort of changes that the various schools of international relations believe will alter the international system.

Many mainstream security studies scholars have rejected calls to broaden the definition of national security to include human security and health security. As a reaction, health security’s advocates have attempted to craft a new paradigm for studying international relations. In light of the evidence presented above, I argue that the problem with health security is not the concept itself, but the approach its advocates have taken in promoting it. Instead of attempting to create a new paradigm and then fighting for acceptance, health security researchers would be better served by integrating their research into existent schools of thought within international relations for three reasons. First, integrating allows health security researchers to engage mainstream scholars on their own terms. By showing how infectious disease can work within these existent paradigms, health security scholars can gain entry into the debate. Second, health security threatens self-marginalization and eventual academic irrelevance if its proponents cannot demonstrate the applicability of their analyses to the wider world of international relations. Finally, incorporating health security into existent international relations theories will give the paradigm greater weight in the policymaking realm. Most policy recommendations regarding health security largely lack any theoretical foundation, making their suggestions incoherent and difficult to integrate into foreign policy strategies. With a proper theoretical grounding, the suggestions offered by health security can take their proper place within the policymaking realm.

Infectious disease directly interacts with these traditional aspects of national security, and can be integrated into existent international relations theories. It is not the inadequacy of the theories themselves that has encouraged the view that they are of little use; rather, it is the reluctance of scholars to utilize these theories to approach

novel situations. The "human security" paradigm admirably encourages the field of international relations to understand that threats to the international system can come from any number of sources. However, by emphasizing its distinctiveness and the need to develop new heuristic tools in order to analyze these new threats, the paradigm threatens to marginalize itself and discourage mainstream scholars from analyzing these new threats. This is not to say that traditional international relations theory can fully explain everything about how AIDS will impact the international system. Unfortunately, the human security paradigm fails to appreciate the understanding these traditional theories can bring to our analysis.

AIDS in southern Africa represents a clear and distinct challenge to the international system as it is currently constructed. Only by utilizing the tools of international relations theory can we truly assess the nature of that challenge and devise strategies to combat the spread of AIDS.

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REVIEW ESSAY

Europeanization, European Integration, and Globalization

by Ellen B. Pirro and Eleanor E. Zeff

Helen Wallace and William Wallace (eds.) *Policy-Making in the European Union* (4th edition). Oxford University Press, 2000. 610 pp. \$30.00 (paperback) ISBN 019878242X

Maria Green Cowles, James Caporaso, and Thomas Risse (eds.), *Transforming Europe: Europeanization and Domestic Change*. Cornell University Press, 2001. 272 pp. \$21.50 (paperback) ISBN 0801486718

Vivien A. Schmidt, *The Futures of European Capitalism*. Oxford University Press, 2002. 280 pp. \$19.95 (paperback) ISBN 0199253684

These three works represent the most recent developments in the evolution of the term “Europeanization.” Each of them uses a slightly different interpretation with different functions for this concept. The term “Europeanization” is emerging as a central organizing concept in the study of what is happening in Europe. It is important for scholars to assess its utility and value as the discipline grows.

Forty years ago, this grand experiment in multilateral governance began. With it emerged a number of theoretical explanations and the beginning of European integration. Today, the study of Europe focuses on Europeanization, while many other theories have disappeared. The three works considered here represent individual turning points in the study of the European Union. They address the question of whether Europeanization is merely a regional type of globalization or another way of talking about integration. Yet, they raise more questions than are resolved. In addition, there is a danger of overusing Europeanization as a ‘catchall’ explanation for the changes occurring in Europe, the European Union, and in the member states. Each of these authors tries to rein in this term; in a field where neither general agreement nor any shared understanding has emerged.

Early European theories concentrated on federalism and functionalism, addressing questions of creating institutions, the breadth/scope of these new institutions, and the amount or level of sovereignty which should be yielded to the supranational

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body.¹ All agreed that economic integration was the defined goal, while political and military integration was the aspiring goal. A united Europe would be the final outcome regardless of the process and different stages.

As the European Union grew and prospered, various theories withered and were supplanted with newer ideas. Despite the fact that the European Union was operating very successfully and expanding its coverage, the member states continued both as part of the organization, and as individual nation-states with separate policies on international issues and distinctive domestic agendas. For some time, the intergovernmental approach seemed the most credible explanation for continued EU developments since complete political union had yet occurred. The rise of the constructivist approach² helped solidify this theoretical movement away from creation to operation. Research interests shifted to how the European Union operated, as opposed to if and how it would succeed; how decisions were taken, what roles were important; and as growth occurred with the addition of new countries, how, where, and why the European Union expanded.³ Attention moved to EU institutions rather than theories of integration. In particular, the institutionalist approach derived from constructivist theorizing seems to hold more promise in explaining these developments.⁴

None of these theories have proven robust enough to provide satisfactory explanations for the European Union, let alone accurately predict its future direction. So, the tendency which has emerged is to use middle-range theoretical notions to promote partial explanations. Europeanization is one of the middle-range concepts which moves towards theory. There are four organizing notions which underlie this concept; the first three, many scholars generally agree upon while the fourth is still a topic of considerable debate.

First, the idea of European integration as a linear concept is used in middle-range theorizing about Europeanization. This notion brings forth the idea that the end goal is the complete unity of Europe—a United Europe or in some cases a United States of Europe. Helen Wallace is the closest author to a pure integrationist of the three works considered here. However, all of them espouse the goal of European integration as an end in itself, to help explain EU developments, and they all cite linear progression in the formation of European politics.

The second area of agreement is that there is a competition between explanations which offer ‘top down’ or ‘bottom up’ approaches to policy analyses. It has become apparent member states themselves have a significant impact on the development of the European Union, including how it makes decisions, and what considerations are taken into account. Robert Ladrech is one of the first to consider a ‘bottom up’ approach to Europeanization.⁵ Cowles et al. note that while,

Much of the book is preoccupied with what goes on at the domestic level, even though we recognize that ultimately the causal processes go both ways—activities at the domestic level affect the European level and vice versa.⁶

Wallace also examines EU decision making and policy formation from the ‘top down.’⁷ In contrast, Vivien Schmidt solely utilizes the “bottom up” approach, looking

at how national economic adaptation is occurring and its net effects.⁸ Much is made in the literature of the mutual influences, yet most scholars concentrate on the “top down” approach.

The third organizational principle is the general agreement on the impact of Europeanization on the “deepening and widening” goals of the European Union. Deepening refers to expansion of the European Union’s policies to cover a wider range of governing areas. The new constitution’s areas of shared competence, which directly impact the member states’ operating procedures, as well as their regulations, are an example.⁹ Wallace discusses the expansion of policies in this topic area. Widening means a commitment to adding new members and enlarging the purview of the formal institutions. Most agree increasing Europeanization includes both deepening and widening the European Union. Schmidt’s central issue is how the members incorporate and absorb the new economic regimes coming from the EU. She presses for convergence between national operations and the EU’s dictates. Cowles et al. look at the implications of new regulations and activities on the member states. None of the three volumes considered focus on expansion, which has become the most recent “hot topic” because of the addition of ten states in May 2004. All of them assume the European Union will continue to expand after 2004. All three authors see increases in the competence of the EU and greater sovereignty yielded by the national members as a continuing activity.

Fourth, in defining Europeanization several questions remain. Are Europeanization and European integration the same thing? Does Europeanization refer only to the European Union? Is it tied to the institution? Or is Europeanization simply a regional variety of globalization? How do globalization and Europeanization fit together?

It is noteworthy in much of the prior literature of these authors that Europeanization is seen as exclusive to the European Union. Within most of the literature, Europeanization deals primarily with the effects of the EU institution and its policies on its member states. However, more recent scholarship creates a broader context around this concept.

EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

Earlier scholars considered integration and Europeanization to be analogous. These three scholars have chosen to make critical distinctions between the two concepts. Helen Wallace is the closest of these three to integrating ‘Europeanization’ into ‘European integration.’¹⁰ She speaks of European integration as a “broad phenomenon,” fundamentally different from the process of policymaking. She sees integration as the significant phenomenon within European studies—an ongoing process of making Europe one—and Europeanization is but one component of that process. She does not, however, give us any guidance or illustration of any other components.

Vivien Schmidt charts an explicit distinction between European integration, which she sees operating at the top level, and Europeanization which takes place at the bottom. To her, European integration is an all encompassing process by which

transnational regimes and their institutions are created and maintained. In contrast, to Schmidt, Europeanization refers to the domestic impact of European integration. It is the incorporation of these integrative elements in "politics, policies and practices" which makes Europeanization work.¹¹ Europeanization then is the execution of policies designed to move European integration forward.

There are two main ways that "Europeanization" is defined and related to the European Union. Schmidt acknowledges the process of Europeanization differs both in scope and rate from state to state, but with congruence as the ultimate goal.

I define European integration as the process of EEC/EC/EU construction and policy-formulation by a wide range of actors—representative of governmental as well as non-governmental entities, of member states as well as of the EU—engaged in decision-making at the EU level.¹²

Her discussion lacks a method to determine how Europeanization is progressing in each state. This will be a critical area in documenting the success of the recently ascended states, where it is already claimed that laws have been enacted, but not put into practice. Cowles et al. equate European integration with the "functionalist" and "institutional" theoretical approaches that as a practice created the European Union. To her, integration is the end result of Europeanization.

Vivien Schmidt epitomizes the first approach as one of a number of scholars who define Europeanization as the domestic impact of European integration.¹³ She links Europeanization with the undermining of national authority and encouraging of policy convergence between the member states and the European Union. What she suggests about the emerging EU is that everything, ranging from its formal institutions and policies to the informal processes of representation and operation, has an impact on the daily functioning of the member states. As discussed above, she distinguishes Europeanization from European integration. To the degree that member states' policies and institutions converge with EU policies, they are Europeanized regardless of the level of integration achieved. As an institutionalist, Schmidt utilizes discourse analysis to assess the levels of Europeanization within chosen states, and their susceptibility to Europeanization. Schmidt goes on to suggest "new modes...through the EU are seen to trump national ideas."¹⁴ She demonstrates in the *Futures of Capitalism* that despite altering policies within European nations, Europeanization does not necessarily lead to policy convergence (e.g. compliance). Each country is affected differently depending on existing circumstances, history, political culture, and discourse on the issues.

Robert Ladrech sees Europeanization as a significant new development within the EU context, as more and more of its policies become components of political and economic life in the member-states and as the EU's expanded policy scope extends into more areas of national legislation.¹⁵ His focus is on how national organizations adapt to inputs from the European Union, a 'bottom up' approach, and the unequal impact of Europeanization on nations due to their differing political

cultures and institutions.¹⁶

Cowles et al. offer a slightly different outlook on Europeanization. While they can be aligned with institutionalists, their perspective recognizes the existence of a two-way process, whereby the EU has an effect upon individual members and the member states affect the EU.¹⁷ They focus on the top down causal path, with domestic change as the outcome of EU policies. Europeanization to them means the creation of policies and institutions at the EU level.

*We define Europeanization as the emergence and development at the European level of distinct structures of governance, that is, of political, legal, and social institutions associated with political problem solving that formalize interactions among the actors, and of policy networks specializing in the creation of authoritative European rules.*¹⁸

Johan Olsen, like Schmidt, utilizes the reverse approach, concentrating on domestic adaptation.¹⁹ Olsen also discusses the variance of Europeanization from state to state, with differing implications, rates of change, areas, and types of changes.

*Differentiated responses and patterns of adaptation and institutional robustness can in particular be expected in political settings like the European one. First, because European institution building and policymaking are unevenly developed across institutional spheres and policy areas, the adaptive pressures on states and institutions vary... Second, differentiated responses are likely because the (West) European political order is characterized by long, strong and varied institutional histories, with different trajectories of state- and nation-building, resources and capabilities... As a result, extensive penetration of domestic institutions by European developments is taking place in some spheres, while there are also protected spaces, stubborn resistance and non-penetration in other spheres.*²⁰

Helen Wallace, Thomas Risse, and others utilize Europeanization to signal the development of a European political culture or identity—a “we-Europe” feeling as well as the emergence of a new political entity.²¹ This new European-ness would replace the nationalisms and nation-state focus which has prevailed since the French Revolution. Research centers around the emergence of this collective identity and the extent to which state identity and national culture are maintained, by examining the differential impact of the European Union on domestic institutions, policy making, and the methods which are being used. “Domestic adaptation with national colors” became their shorthand description of the varying domestic responses to Europeanization seen across both member and non-member countries.²² Wallace also recognizes the effects of Europeanization extend to both EU and non-EU members and that the relationship between Europeanization and globalization merits discussion.

EUROPEANIZATION AND GLOBALIZATION

Parallels are drawn between Europeanization and “globalization,” defined in its most simple form as the phenomenon of removing international boundaries especially in the economic area.²³ Many scholars, such as Wallace, see Europeanization as one

type of globalization—a regional subset.²⁴ Both are primarily economic in nature. Both phenomena have institutional bases—globalization has the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the World Trade Organization while Europeanization has the EU. Both processes seem to be expanding their range and scope.

*The EU arena is only part of a wider pattern of making policy beyond the nation state. In many areas of public policy, including those within which the EU is active, there are broader transnational consultations and regimes. These vary a great deal in their robustness and intensity, but they are part of a continuum of policy-making that spreads from the country, through the European arena, to the global level.*²⁵

To Wallace, the interaction of globalization and Europeanization is so close, it is hard to determine which is the leader and which the follower.

*[W]hat is the relationship between the two phenomena? Here there is something of a chicken and egg debate. Is the EU a reaction to globalization, or is it an agent of globalization? Perhaps the important pressures are global, and the Europeanization of certain policy activities is in essence a response to globalization. On the other hand, perhaps the existence of the EU has produced a different form of globalization in western Europe from that in other parts of the world.*²⁶

But there is a divergent view, which sees Europeanization as a separate entity from both globalization and the current EU integration processes. This interpretation of Europeanization becomes a primary goal to be achieved by the European nations. Europeanization in this form is the creation of a new political entity—Europe. The European Union is one—but only one—of the institutions following this creative path. Both Cowles et al. and Schmidt take this pathway. “In defining Europeanization, we also differentiate this process from that of internationalization or globalization, more broadly defined.”²⁷

In Cowles et al., globalization constitutes a potential threat to the EU and “Europeanization itself might respond to ‘globalization processes’ by reinforcing their trends or by shielding EU member states against their undesired effects.”²⁸ Similarly, Schmidt sees globalization as a possibly detrimental to the economic well-being of the European nations.

*At the European level, Europeanization rather than globalization has been at the centre of policy-makers’ ideas and projects. Their discussions have remained focused on all aspects of European integration, from the ‘community method’ to subsidiarity, the quandary of ‘widening vs deepening’, the extent of enlargement, and the extension of the ‘acquis communautaire’. Globalization instead seems to have been so much part of background assumptions about the necessity and appropriateness of economic openness and market-driven policies of budgetary restraint in the process of European integration that the term itself has appeared comparatively infrequently in the discourse of the EU Commission.*²⁹

Moreover, she does believe European integration is a stronger force than globalization.

As a set of economic pressures, Europeanization has acted both as a conduit for global forces and as a shield against them, opening member states to international competition in the capital and product markets at the same time as they protect them through monetary integration and the Single Market. As a set of institutional pressures, the European Union has gone way beyond any other international or regional economic authority with regard to the vast array of rules and rulings affecting its member states. And as a set of ideas, European integration has been driven by a common political project for economic liberalization which has been much more compelling than that of any other regional grouping of countries in the world, and which has served as a complement to the liberalizing ideas related to globalization.³⁰

Despite her contention that the EU is only one of the Europeanizing institutions, Schmidt focuses exclusively on the EU's efforts.

Much of the literature on citizenship and national political norms in Europe utilizes this conceptual separation between Europeanization and globalization.³¹

Global market forces are not the only exogenous factors that might influence domestic institutional change... [N]orms and ideas can also develop outside the European Union. Transnational human rights groups and historical events like the end of the Cold War influence the discourse on citizenship and identity within the European Union. They may even 'trigger' domestic responses... Of course, we must also distinguish between Europeanization pressures and those emanating from the member states themselves.³²

In their discussion of Europeanization as a pathway to creation of a supranational identity, Europeanization becomes a very different notion than globalization.

"Europeanization also consists of *constructing systems of meanings and collective understandings*, including social identities."³³

CONCLUSION

What emerges from this extensive research is that Europeanization has two distinctive meanings and uses in contemporary literature. While it is detached from European integration, one school of thought, represented here by both Wallace and Cowles et al., places the concept firmly at the supranational level of the creation of European institutions designed to promote integration. Wallace suggests Europeanization rests within the European Union.³⁴ Cowles et al. and Schmidt suggest there could be Europeanization occurring outside EU institutions, and that other regimes, institutions, and processes are part of the Europeanization process. Despite their similarities in their perspective on European integration, Cowles et al. and Wallace diverge in their views of the links between globalization and Europeanization. Cowles et al. take Europeanization beyond its economic roots, seeing it as something inherently different and not tied to globalization. For Wallace, globalization and Europeanization are inextricably tied.

The other view, proposed by Schmidt, places the origins of Europeanization at the domestic level, defining it in terms of adaptation and convergence. For Schmidt, Europeanization is a regional shield against the destabilizing elements of globalization.

While they are both primarily economic, each has the potential to damage economic growth and functioning, and she would value Europeanization over globalization. Europeanization, with its meaning of incorporating social constructs and identities, approaches the early discussions of Deutsch in the creation of a European “we-feeling.”³⁵ But as all agree, European integration still remains an elusive and a long-range goal.

Notes

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² Alexander Wendt, “Social Theory of International Politics,” (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), and Nicholas Onuf, “Worlds of Our Making: the Strange Career of Constructivism in International Relations,” in *Visions of International Relations: Assessing an Academic Field*, ed. Donald J. Puchala, 119-141 (Columbia, South Carolina: University of South Carolina Press, 2002).

³ Robert Keohane, “Governance in a Partially Globalized World ‘Presidential Address,’” *American Political Science Review*, 95, no. 1 (March 2001): 1-13, and Wayne Sandholtz and John Zysman, “1992: Recasting the European Bargain,” *World Politics*, 42, no. 1, (October 1989): 95-128.

⁴ Ian Bache, “Europeanization: A Governance Approach,” (Paper presented at the EUSA 8th International Biennial Conference, Nashville, Tennessee, USA, March 27–29, 2003), and Johan P. Olsen, “The Many Faces of Europeanization,” ARENA working papers, WP 01/02, (2002), 14.

⁵ Robert Ladrech, “Europeanization of Domestic Politics and Institutions: The Case of France,” *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 32, no 1 (1994): 84, as cited by Bache, “Europeanization,” 2. While Bache recognizes influence flows in both directions he concentrates on the top down approach.

⁶ Thomas Risse, Maria Green Cowles, and James Caporaso, “Europeanization and Domestic Change: Introduction,” in *Transforming Europe: Europeanization and Domestic Change* ed., Maria Green Cowles, James Caporaso, and Thomas Risse, 4 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001). While this quotation is taken from the “Introduction” authored by Risse et al., Cowles et al. is used in the remainder of this review because the description lends itself to the rest of the edited compilation.

⁷ Helen Wallace, “The Policy Process: A Moving Pendulum,” in *Policy-Making in the European Union* (4th Edition), ed. Helen Wallace and William Wallace, 39-64 (Oxford University Press, 2000).

⁸ Vivien A. Schmidt, *The Futures of European Capitalism*, (Oxford University Press, 2002) 13-58.

⁹ The European constitution has not yet gone into effect. The European parliament approved it on January 12, 2005, but it has yet to be ratified by the member states.

¹⁰ Wallace, “The Policy Process,” 39-64.

¹¹ Schmidt, *The Futures of European Capitalism*, 43.

¹² Schmidt, *The Futures of European Capitalism*, 42.

¹³ Schmidt, *The Futures of European Capitalism*, 42.

¹⁴ Vivien Schmidt, “The Europeanization of Representation in ‘Simple’ and ‘Compounded’ Systems: Changes in National Practices, Challenges to National Ideas and Discourse.” (Paper presented at the Seminar Series, “Europeanization and the Reshaping of Representation,” held by the European University Institute and the University of Florence, Florence, Italy, June 7, 2002): 3.

¹⁵ Ladrech, “Europeanization of Domestic Politics.”¹⁶ Ladrech, “Europeanization of Domestic Politics.”

¹⁷ See Risse et al, “Introduction.”

¹⁸ Risse et al., “Introduction,” 3. Emphasis in the original.

¹⁹ Olsen, “The Many Faces of Europeanization,” 14.

²⁰ Olsen, “The Many Faces of Europeanization,” 14. Emphasis in the original.

²¹ Wallace, “The Policy Process;” Thomas Risse, “A European Identity? Europeanization and the Evolution of Nation-State Identities,” in Cowles et al, 198-216; Donald J. Puchala, “Institutionalism, Intergovernmentalism, and European Integration: A Review Article,” *Journal of Common Market Studies*,

37, no. 2 (1999): 317-331; and Kevin Featherstone and G. Kazamias, *Europeanization and the Southern Periphery* (London: Frank Cass, 2001).

²² Risse et al., "Introduction," 1.

²³ The literature on defining globalization is too extensive for consideration here. However, a good place to start is David Held & Anthony McGrew, "Globalization," Joel Krieger, ed. *The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World*, 2nd Edition, 324 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001).

²⁴ Helen Wallace, "The Policy Process," 48-49.

²⁵ Helen Wallace "The Institutional Setting: Five Variations on a Theme," in, Wallace and Wallace, *Policy-Making in the European Union*, 7.

²⁶ Helen Wallace, "The Policy Process," 49.

²⁷ Risse et al., "Introduction," 3.

²⁸ Risse et al., "Introduction," 4.

²⁹ Schmidt, *The Futures of European Capitalism*, 42-3.

³⁰ Schmidt, *The Futures of European Capitalism*, 14.

³¹ Thomas Risse, "European Identity? Europeanization and the Evolution of Nation-State Identities," in Cowles et al., *Transforming Europe*, 198-216; Tanja A. Borzel, "Europeanization and Territorial Institutional Change: Toward Cooperative Regionalism," in Cowles et al., *Transforming Europe*, 137-158, Jeffrey T. Checkel, "Europeanization of Citizenship?" in Cowles et al., *Transforming Europe*, 180-197.

³² Maria Green Cowles and Thomas Risse, "Transforming Europe: Conclusions," in, Cowles et al., *Transforming Europe*, 221.

³³ Cowles and Risse, "Conclusions," 219. Emphasis in the original.

³⁴ Helen Wallace, "The Policy Process."

³⁵ Karl Deutsch, Sydney A. Burnell, and Robert A. Kann. *Political Community in the North Atlantic Area*, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1957).

REVIEW

From Community to Science

by Clayton J. Cleveland

Amitai Etzioni, *From Empire to Community: A New Approach to International Relations*. Palgrave Macmillan, 2004, 260 pp. \$29.95 (paperback) ISBN 1403965358

This is an extremely timely work stressing two alternative paradigms of how the international system works as well as a possible route to negotiate the perils of both extremes. Rather than viewing the foundation of the system as one of several competing perspectives, Amitai Etzioni stresses the nature of the value systems that international actors adhere to in their attempts to navigate the problems emerging in a post-9/11 world. The two extremes Etzioni identifies as dominant perspectives fall along traditional lines of thought in international relations theory. The extreme right views power as the key attribute of the international system to determine outcomes while the extreme left views consensus and the idealistic promotion of human capabilities as the foundation of their respective values. Etzioni attempts to chart a course between these two extremes along a third way which he calls “soft communitarianism.” This perspective combines the values of the West with the foundations of non-Western ethics into a third possibility. Elements of both perspectives are incorporated into a synthesis of values that are capable of transcending the lines of division identified by many contemporary theorists.¹

This book is organized around many of the themes that are relevant in today’s international order. These themes include the tensions between international and domestic forms of organization, state and non-state² actors and the need to replace the current global architecture with a new form of organization capable of meeting the demands of the 21st century. The book is divided into three parts. Part one covers the development of new forms of international organization in “The Emerging Global Normative Synthesis.” Part two deals with new and persisting security threats in “A New Safety Architecture.” Part three looks at other issues affecting the conduct of international politics in “Beyond Global Safety.”

The conception of the balance that Etzioni includes in this text may be one of the most important ideas introduced. For the conduct of politics in the world, it is a lesson that should be heeded by many of the current statesmen operating in the international arena. However, a cyclical form of the movement within societies may

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be a more persuasive model rather than a unidirectional movement of norms in today's world. For example, in the wake of the Napoleonic wars, the trend in Europe was towards conservatism with a strong dose of absolutism for the maintenance of the current social order.³ This suggests that the phenomenon that Etzioni examines may be similar to a pendulum rather than a single direct path towards "soft communitarianism." Balance is sought but never achieved in such a situation. Extremes are pursued by those attempting to reassert balance and then others follow who attempt to reestablish a balance with opposing extremes.

At times, it seems the advocacy position contained within this work overwhelms the empirical examination of the direction of international relations. This form of directionality is identified as a serious methodological error in political science.⁴ Etzioni needs to provide reasons why the communitarian ideals he advocates trump the individualism and triumphism that are seen in the West. There evidence provided of a soft movement towards communitarianism is interpreted from evidence that may indicate a different direction for future international relations.

While Etzioni provides several relevant questions about the direction of global politics, the answers to these questions will occupy theorists for some time. For example, Etzioni asks the question of "What is the difference between freestanding architecture and the global architecture?" He follows up with "Do these new institutions need to be incorporated into the global architecture?" The second question itself suggests an answer to the previous question, i.e., new institutions are necessary for the global architecture. This answer runs counter to the notion proposed by Keohane that regimes need to be adapted to changing circumstances because of the costly exercise that is necessary to create them in the first place.⁵ To answer these questions, it is necessary to look at empirical evidence within recent history that may provide examples of new institutions that have been created. Some of these have been created without the support of the hegemon (the US) in the international system. This indicates that something may be operating that allows the actors within the international system to overcome collective action problems association with the construction of new institutions on the global level. At the same time, it is likely that when historians look back at this period of time and suggest that the hegemony of the US has been eclipsed and they choose a point where the US started its decline, it will be the landmines treaty that marks the end of the rise and the certainty of the eclipse. This is probably the case even though the clear dominance of US power started its decline during the 1970s.⁶ It is also likely that some of the historians will argue that the mark of the decline occurred at the point in time that the majority of the international system (or international society) stood against the US on certain issues like the landmine treaty, the International Criminal Court of Justice, or the Iraqi war. They will argue that it was only the rate of increase that declined rather than the actual distribution of capabilities that the US controlled in the international arena.

Etzioni provides a view of international relations that is both timely and important for the current era of politics. The formation of new norms and principles for the

direction of the global system contained within these pages will assist students of international politics to ask the necessary questions about the future of international relations.

Notes

¹ Areas of division between peoples identified include civilizational fault line identified by Samuel P. Huntington in Samuel P. Huntington, "Clash of Civilizations," *Foreign Affairs*, 72, no. 3 (Summer 1993): 22–50; Religion or traditional ways of life against globalization identified by Benjamin Barber. *Jihad vs. McWorld*. (New York: Ballentine Books, 2001).

² This term refers to actors that are not constitutes by states. A synonym for this could be sub-state rather than supra-state actors. However, one apparent feature of the new international order is actors with no form of state affiliation. Hence, the use of the term in this essay of non-state rather than sub-state actors.

³ Frederick Artz, *Reaction and Revolution: 1814-1832* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1934).

⁴ Gary King, Robert Keohane, and Sydney Verba, *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994): 107–108.

⁵ Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984).

⁶ W. Max Cordon, "American Decline and the End of Hegemony," *SAIS Review*, 10, no. 2 (Summer-Fall 1990): 13–26.

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REVIEW

Capitalism's War?

by Michael D'Abramo

Milan Rai, *Regime Unchanged*. Pluto Press, 2003. 230 pp. \$16.95 (paperback)
ISBN 0745321992

Since the beginning of the US-led war on Iraq, there has been serious debate concerning both the causes and the legitimacy of the war. Some argue US unilateralism is undermining diplomatic efforts to solve future conflicts peacefully, while others maintain hegemonic leadership may actually maintain stability in the long-run. Milan Rai, in his forthcoming book *Regime Unchanged: Why the War on Iraq Changed Nothing*, makes the case that the war was illegitimate, illegal according to international law, and cause for concern for those "with an open mind who is willing to test official justifications for the war on Iraq against the available evidence."¹ Rai claims that the Bush administration has consistently lied, distorted evidence, and continually changed the goalposts in order to effect leadership change in Iraq. Unfortunately, he veers off course in an attempt to connect alleged US and British support for Nazism in Europe and Japan after WWII, and supposed US support for fascism in Iraq. He implicates the media as complicit in a global cover up of the West's promotion of fascism throughout the ages in order to maintain market access. Rai concludes that the war in Iraq is a continuation of capitalist exploitation, and implores the anti-war movement to stand against the rising tide of fascism.

The book begins with an outline of the events leading to the point of war including the inspections process, Secretary of State Colin Powell's address to the UN Security Council, and the other efforts to obtain a second Security Council resolution authorizing the use of force. Rai maintains that the anti-war movement forced the Security Council to oppose an immediate attack without first exhausting the inspections process. Rai continues by claiming that, "The problem was that the United States was opposed to the work of the weapons inspectors."² As such, "[t]he point was not to *prove* that the inspectors were incompetent, but to build this impression in the public mind."³ And thus after patience for the inspections regime wore thin, the US and UK rushed to war.

It is at this point Rai's argument attempts to connect Nazism during World War II to the US use of Ba'athist officials in a post-war Iraq. Rai's assessment requires the reader to make a huge leap of logic in order to grasp what is a nonsensical

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argument that contains a conspiratorial tone. Rai maintains that, “[t]he record shows that much of the Nazi system *was* left in charge of Germany in the aftermath of 1945, and within days of this editorial being published, the British, and U.S. governments were straining every nerve to re-nazify Iraq and to leave Ba’athist leaders in very serious forms of power.”⁴ Unfortunately, Rai does not give advice as to what the US should do with Ba’athist officials who have suddenly found themselves without employment under an occupying power.

Rai concludes by indicting the US and UK as sponsors of capitalist exploitation, using fascism as a means to promote stability in the periphery. He insists that, “[t]he war on Iraq was indeed ‘capitalism’s war,’ designed to reinforce positions of disparity internationally, between the Great Powers and the colonial area.”⁵ The war in Iraq, therefore, is merely an extension of this philosophy.

Milan Rai delivers a rendition of the war in Iraq that is supposed to garner the sympathies of the anti-war movement, anti-globalizationists, and other groups among the political left. As such, people involved with the protest movement may find this book interesting. However, Mr. Rai’s contribution to the study of the war in Iraq is limited at best, leaving the reader with a less than compelling argument. His book’s reliance on anecdotal evidence detracts from the argument he attempts to deliver. If Mr. Rai is indeed trying to construct a compelling Marxist critique of capitalism and its effects upon international peace, he fails to deliver. Instead, the reader is left with a poorly thought out explanation of events that may or may not indict the capitalist system as the primary cause for war on Iraq.

Notes

¹ Milan Rai, *Regime Unchanged* (London: Pluto Press, 2003), xix.

² Rai, *Regime Unchanged*, 64.

³ Rai, *Regime Unchanged*, 80.

⁴ Rai, *Regime Unchanged*, 118.

⁵ Rai, *Regime Unchanged*, 174.